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Introduction
Emily P. Hoffman 
Western Michigan University
As the twentieth century comes to a close, educational quality and 
financing have emerged as among the most important social and eco 
nomic issues of concern to this nation. The Economics of Education 
refers to the study of how resources are allocated to achieve educa 
tional goals. Questions of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness have 
been addressed to all levels of formal education—from early childhood 
education to higher education. This series of papers by prominent 
economists who have specialized in educational issues brings an eco 
nomic perspective to several major questions being asked of the educa 
tional system in this country and contributes to the national debate.
Three of the papers address elementary and secondary education. 
The thrust of the Henry M. Levin paper is to examine the educational 
opportunities afforded "at risk" children at the primary level and to 
describe an alternative approach being tested in a number of locations 
across the country. Eric A. Hanushek takes on the issue of whether or 
not equity in public support of elementary and secondary schooling 
will improve student outcomes. Robert H. Meyer points out that per 
formance-based incentives for elementary and secondary schools must 
be carefully considered and implemented.
Two of the papers focus on higher education issues. Estelle James 
and Nabeel Alsalam examine the economic payoffs to various higher 
education choices. They address the question of whether an institu 
tion's reputation "pays off in the labor market for individuals who 
graduate from it. W. Lee Hansen documents the cyclical nature of the 
mission of higher education as it has swung from emphases on equity 
of access to quality and back again.
In the final paper, Mary Jean Bowman philosophizes about the 
dynamics of educational policy and practice. Curriculums and instruc 
tional approaches that are state of the art today may be obsolete tomor 
row. Therefore, as policymakers grapple with quality and financing
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issues, they need to identify and heed the fundamental and unchanging 
purposes of education.
In "Economics of Education for At-Risk Students," Levin expresses 
his concern over the high student dropout rates from our current school 
system. As a remedy, he offers and explains his accelerated schooling 
concept. Levin defines at-risk students as those who are unlikely to 
succeed in existing schools—over half of whom do not graduate— 
because they do not have the background on which success in that 
school system is based.
Levin feels that schools have taken the wrong approach in their 
attempts to help the weak student; he charges that the prevalent reme 
dial or compensatory education with repetitive drill slows learning of 
at-risk students. He feels that the current system of remedial education 
does this by lowering the expectations of the teachers, which lowers 
the achievements of the students. Indeed, both the teachers and the stu 
dents are stigmatized by the remedial labelling. Levin believes that 
failing students need to be challenged and accelerated, not given reme 
dial work. Levin finds that the methods that work well with gifted stu 
dents also work well with at-risk students—high expectations and 
stimulating material results in success for at-risk students.
Levin recommends three major changes in the American school sys 
tem to allow the development of accelerated education. First, the 
schools must have a clear objective of bringing at-risk children into the 
mainstream of education, not allowing them to languish in the backwa 
ter. Second, there must be school-site empowerment. This means that 
the decisions affecting the operation of the school must not be passed 
down from a remote central administration, but must be made by those 
directly involved in the educational process—the school administra 
tors, the teachers, the parents, even the students. Of course, there must 
be some overall system of accountability, with rewards commensurate 
with performance. Third, the schools must build on the strengths of the 
teachers, the parents, and the students—not dwell on their weaknesses 
as an excuse for failure.
Levin describes the Stanford Accelerated Schools Project, where the 
methods that he proposes have been tried. He reviews the pattern of 
success of these "accelerated schools," which rely on an enrichment 
strategy rather than the "dumbed-down" rote repetition of conventional
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remedial education. He claims that these methods result in a high rate 
of learning by at-risk students, citing examples of impressive gains in 
achievement test levels among students from the most deprived socio- 
economic background in schools that have adopted the methods he has 
developed. Amazingly, this progress was achieved by reorganizing the 
schools, not by increasing the expenditures per pupil.
Levin presents estimates of the proportion of students who are at- 
risk, and the implications of this for the future quality of our labor 
force. Besides the general societal benefits, Levin claims that the mon 
etary benefits, in terms of less need for social services, combined with 
higher incomes and the resulting higher tax revenues, more than com 
pensate for the costs of the accelerated school programs. He summa 
rizes cost-benefit studies of investments in at-risk students and finds a 
range of $3 to $6 in benefits for each $1 in'cost.
If the changes Levin recommends can be widely adopted and the 
pattern of success can be repeated, all of us—students, parents, teach 
ers, taxpayers, employers, every member of society—will be much 
better off.
In "Can Equity Be Separated from Efficiency in School Finance 
Debates," Eric Hanushek contends that just spending more money on 
the existing school system does not guarantee improved student 
achievement. He tries to apply the economic concept of "production 
function," which might be more familiarly known as a cost-quality or 
input-output approach to student performance. He shows that the con 
cept of "equity" is not easily defined; as a result, courts, politicians, 
school officials, and public debate have, by default, tended to accept 
"expenditure per pupil" as a measure of equity. Hanushek points out, 
however, that unless the school system operates efficiently, there is no 
direct link between expenditures and results.
Hanushek has analyzed the results of 187 prior studies that 
attempted to relate some objective measure of student output to charac 
teristics of the educational system that were related to costs. He finds 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, "the research reveals no strong 
or systematic relationship between school expenditure and student per 
formance." His point is not that money doesn't count, but that "unless 
some way is found to change the districts that would squander addi 
tional funds into districts that would use them effectively, added
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resources are not likely to lead to any improvement in average perfor 
mance."
Hanushek analyzes data from the state of Alabama, which ranks 
among the lowest in educational expenditures. Alabama has a state 
wide Basic Competency Test (BCT), which allows comparisons to be 
made between school districts on a uniform basis. He estimates the 
effects of increasing per-pupil expenditures on passing rates for the 
BCT when controlling for sociodemographic variables (such as family 
background and rural/urban school district). Bringing the expenditures 
of all the below-median districts up to the state median level would 
produce almost no change in the BCT passing rates. Bringing the 
expenditures of all districts up to the level of the highest district in the 
state (which would bring the state up to about the national mean) 
would produce at most a 4 percent change in the BCT passing rates.
Hanusek offers a number of additional arguments against simply 
making policy on the basis of expenditure differences. First, he notes 
that any effort to lessen variation in expenditure is more likely to 
increase than to decrease the total level of expenditure. Second, there is 
no assurance that new funds will go to schools of poor children, since 
property wealth and concentrations of poverty may exist in the same 
district. Third, spending differences may not accurately reflect the real 
resources a district is able to deliver, either because of cost differences 
for inputs or because of differing needs of student populations. Fourth, 
districts spend in response to the desires of the population and to popu 
lation shifts, so their expenditure levels may increase or decrease over 
time. Fifth, districts perceived to have superior schools will attract 
home buyers and "bid up" the housing prices in the district relative to 
otherwise identical housing in another district. Sixth, in many states, 
issues other than property wealth—such as local preferences, differ 
ences in student needs, curricular choices, cost differentials—deter 
mine the pattern of expenditure. Seventh, while the tax rate provides an 
indication of the price that residents pay to raise school funds, differ 
ences in tax rates across communities do not necessarily reflect the 
degree of educational equity.
Hanushek concludes that there is no easy way to improve student 
performance. He believes that school finance reform that focuses on 
achieving equal spending per student rather than efficient use of 
resources will not guarantee improved performance of students. He
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admits that no definitive alternative seems sure to bring about improve 
ment in the current school system. However, that is not an argument 
for maintaining the status quo. Rather, Hanushek believes that having 
some measure of student achievement affect educational expenditures 
is the route to follow. Hanushek seems optimistic about merit pay for 
teachers and school choice (such as a voucher system) as potential 
reforms worth exploring.
Robert Meyer directly addresses the issue of performance measure 
ment in "Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance? A 
Critique of Common Educational Performance Indicators." Meyer 
argues that accurate assessment of student progress is important 
because administrators and teachers respond to the indications (and 
resulting incentives) provided by the results of the assessment instru 
ment. He demonstrates that the traditional methods of reporting scores 
(typically as means or medians of entire school districts) from stan 
dardized educational tests may be misleading when used as an assess 
ment of school performance and student achievement. He shows that 
using such measures as the basis for allocating school system resources 
(such as merit pay plans for teachers) is not generally desirable, and 
may even have perverse effects. In particular, these testing methods 
foster "teaching to the test" at the expense of "real learning."
In agreement with many other critics of large-scale educational test 
ing, Meyer feels that the prevalent pattern of multiple-choice tests that 
focus on items of factual knowledge rewards rote learning, rather than 
higher order thinking and the development of problem-solving skills. 
Since traditional tests are not satisfactory instruments for determining 
educational achievement, Meyer wants (as do many other critics) per 
formance-based tests that will elicit the student's ability to perform 
real-world tasks—for example, the road test for a driver's license. As 
Meyer points out, each student's educational level at a particular 
moment is the cumulative result of all prior schooling. Therefore, a 
good measure of educational achievement must not suffer from the 
three main defects in the traditional assessment measures: nonlocaliza- 
tion, overaggregation across grade levels, and contamination due to 
mobility. Nonlocalization results from reporting the data from too large 
an area (such as a school district, or even an entire state). He feels that 
a good assessment measure must be localized so that it can be related 
to the school (or even specific classroom) where the learning
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occurred—or failed to occur. Overaggregation is the failure to identify 
what performance gains occurred at a particular grade level. Therefore, 
performance levels must be measured frequently. Contamination 
resulting from student mobility occurs when students transfer between 
school systems. In that case, an assessment score would falsely 
attribute to one school system the effects (good or bad) of another 
school system.
Meyer proposes reporting the successes and/or failures of the school 
system in terms of two related measures of performance: a value added 
indicator and a gain indicator. The value added indicator would mea 
sure only the amount a student learned in a particular class in a particu 
lar year. This immediately avoids the localization, aggregation, and 
contamination problems. The gain indicator would report the gain in 
students' educational level over a period of time (ideally, a school year) 
from all sources. Thus, the sum of all the value added indicators is 
included, plus the contribution of nonschool factors (such as the socio- 
economic characteristics of the student's home and community).
Meyer presents the results of several simulations that show the 
effects of various patterns of student inflow and school effectiveness 
on student educational gain and achievement. These graphs and tables 
demonstrate the sensitivity of the apparent measurement of achieve 
ment to prior conditions.
In conclusion, Meyer advocates more frequent and better testing, 
the collection of data on student and family characteristics, and the 
development of better statistical models.
In "College Choice, Academic Achievement, and Future Earnings," 
Estelle James and Nabeel Alsalam reinforce the old maxim that the 
harder one works, the more successful one will be. It should be care 
fully noted that "success" here is measured only in monetary terms, 
namely, one's income seven to nine years after graduating from col 
lege.
James and Alsalam studied a sample of 1,321 males selected from 
the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 and 
the Postsecondary Education Transcript Study data sets. The men were 
interviewed in 1986, having graduated from college seven to nine 
years earlier. James and Alsalam used two statistical models to analyze 
how the characteristics of both the students and the college they 
attended affected earnings.
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In the first model, they compared the 285 colleges that had at least 
two graduates in the sample. Considering only which college a student 
graduated from served as a good predictor of that student's future earn 
ings. James and Alsalam then added variables to the first model that 
represented the initial characteristics of the students (such as high 
school grades, SAT scores, family income), what they studied, and 
how well they did in the college. This increased the predictive power 
of the model, but greatly decreased the importance of the specific col 
lege attended.
The second model included the characteristics (such as private/pub 
lic, large/small, SAT scores of students) of all of the 499 individual 
colleges represented in the data. This almost eliminated the predictive 
power of which college the student attended. Including the variables 
for the characteristics of the students and what they studied and how 
well they performed academically again increased the predictive 
power of the model and greatly reduced the importance of the specific 
college attended.
In sum, James and Alsalam agree with Meyer in that there is both a 
value added and a gross output (Meyer's "gain") in higher education. 
What the world perceives—and generally, is willing to pay for—is the 
"finished product." While there is a component of indirect screening in 
a particular student's choice of a particular college, what the student 
does while attending that college—the skills acquired and/or devel 
oped—are the best indicator of future financial success.
W. Lee Hansen, in "The Financial Squeeze on Higher Education 
Institutions and Students: The Balance Between Quality and Access," 
discusses trends since World War II in the shifting emphasis between 
the quality of higher education and the ease of access to it. He posits 
that the goals of the American higher education system are influenced 
by many forces, both from within and from without.
A noteworthy feature of Hansen's study is that "quality" is measured 
in terms of financial inputs to education, not academic outputs. 
Accordingly, "quality" is not the amount students are learning, but the 
amount of money spent on faculty salaries and related instructional 
costs. Correspondingly, "access" here means affordability—whether or 
not students are able to meet the expenses of attending college.
Hansen calculates monetary proxies that quantify both access and 
quality. The sum of tuition plus fees, less the total amount of financial
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aid, serves as the proxy for access. The sum of all instruction-related 
costs, adjusted by subtracting the costs of nonteaching programs (such 
as the extension programs of the land-grant state university systems 
and sponsored research projects at the major universities) serves as the 
proxy for quality.
As Hansen observes, scholars from many disciplines have studied 
patterns of change in society. He particularly refers to previous work 
c*n cycles by Arthur Schlesinger. The general tendency seems to be for 
society to move towards an extreme position, but to then reverse 
course and head for the opposite extreme, much as the swinging of a 
pendulum. As evidence for the cycles, Hansen presents tables that 
show the ebb and flow of the costs of higher education and the sources 
of student financial support for nine periods from 1947 to 1989.
Analyzing this data, Hansen finds long-run swings between empha 
sis on access (e.g., the GI bill) and emphasis on quality (e.g., curricu 
lum reforms) in higher education. He finds four of these swings in the 
last half-century. In the first one, which ran from the late 1930s until 
the early 1950s, the main thrust was on access to college, with the GI 
bill providing the ultimate example of this. The next period, from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, was an era of enormous expansion in 
higher education. There was great emphasis on the quality of American 
higher education, particularly in the areas of engineering and science, 
brought on by the "space race" with the USSR. In the following period, 
from the mid-1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, emphasis shifted 
back to expanding access to higher education, as exemplified by the 
various federal student aid programs initiated in this period.
The fourth period, which began in the early 1980s and continues to 
the present, differs from the previous ones. There now appears to be 
concern about both access to and quality of higher education. Hansen 
concludes that the conflict now is over the "cost-effectiveness" of 
higher education, and how the costs are to be apportioned among the 
students and their families, voluntary contributors to higher education, 
and taxpayers on the local, state, and federal levels.
The most important of the trends that he found is that students and 
their families are being asked to pay an increasing share of the cost of 
higher education, rising from 26 percent after World War II to 41 per 
cent by the late 1980s. Hansen offers two plausible explanations for 
this. One is that the rising demands for other publicly provided ser-
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vices (such as welfare and medical care) have increasingly competed 
with higher education for support from government and private 
sources. Another possibility is that it increasingly appears to our soci 
ety that the benefits of higher education (at least in the form of higher 
incomes) accrue more to the individual than to society; therefore, the 
greater beneficiary should pay a greater share of the costs.
The last paper in this collection, "The Economics of Education in a 
World of Change" by Mary Jean Bowman, is quite different from the 
preceding five. Rather than reporting on research in a particular area of 
the economics of education, she takes a philosophical approach, 
exploring more the "what" and "why" of education, in contrast to the 
"hows" of method and financing of the other papers.
Bowman has a long and distinguished career—indeed, when she 
began her studies of economics, the subject was much more the quali- 
tativeness of political economy rather than the quantitative path that 
economics currently follows. Perhaps this makes her more qualified to 
step back—to see the forest, rather than concentrating on the trees. In 
trying to predict what kind of education will be most suitable to pre 
pare for a future in which the only certainty seems to be change, it is 
probably better to take the longest view, rather than try to extrapolate, 
no matter how carefully, from the trends of the present.
Bowman's central thesis is the importance of exploring change for 
meaningful analysis in the economics of education. She begins with 
clarification of the meanings and scope in this context of "education" 
and "economics of education," going on to specify the kinds of change 
and the implications of change as they affect and are affected by educa 
tion in industrialized societies.
Bowman defines education in a broad sense as "learning," which 
includes but is not limited to "schooling." In considering the very 
important, and very difficult, problem of how students can best be pre 
pared for the future, she discusses whether general, vocational, or spe 
cialized education is most appropriate for coping with the change and 
uncertain expectations that seem inevitable in the future. She argues 
for general education, which should provide all students with a solid 
foundation of both literacy and numeracy. While specific curricula of 
vocational or specialized education may become obsolete, a sound 
general education will facilitate lifelong learning—the learning that 
occurs after graduating from school—which will provide the knowl-
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edge needed in one's employment. She says, "a world of change calls 
for learning both within and outside of schools. It calls for general edu 
cation in preparation for future learning, for specializations that can 
cope with change, and for both applied and theoretical learning."
Bowman considers the general learning that should take place in the 
home and in the preschool years to be of the greatest importance. Not 
only must children be prepared for formal schooling, but perhaps even 
more important, children must be socialized in terms of attitudes and 
behavior in order for them to succeed in the world. She contends that, 
due to deficiencies in learning in some homes and the perverse trends 
(such as increased illicit drug abuse) in today's society that work as dis 
incentives to education, schools must, by default, become socializing 
agencies for many children.
The allocation of resources to educate children for a world that dif 
fers in many ways from the one in which we grew up involves many 
complex issues. While the papers in this volume do not provide 
answers to all of the problems, it is hoped that the application of an 
economic perspective will add a useful dimension to the dialogue.
The Economics of Education 
for At-Risk Students
Henry M. Levin 
Stanford University
The nation currently faces an immense crisis in addressing the edu 
cation of at-risk students—pupils who are unlikely to succeed in exist 
ing schools. Such students currently comprise over one-third of all 
elementary and secondary school students, and their numbers are rising 
absolutely and proportionately over time. At-risk students are about 
two years behind grade level in school achievement by sixth grade and 
perform at about the eighth-grade level if they graduate from high 
school. Over half do not graduate. Their poor educational performance 
does not provide them with the skills needed for labor market success 
and further training, a situation with serious consequences for the 
economy.
At-risk students are defined as those who are unlikely to succeed in 
school as these institutions are currently constituted because they do 
not have the experiences in the home, family, and community on which 
school success is based. Given the existing curriculum and instruc 
tional practices, schools are not neutral arenas in which all types of stu 
dent backgrounds lead to success. Students who come from middle- 
class and nonminority backgrounds, with both parents present in their 
lives, and who speak a standard version of English are much more 
likely to succeed educationally than those from impoverished, minor 
ity, immigrant, nonstandard English-speaking, and single-parent back 
grounds. At-risk students are caught in a mismatch between their home 
situations and what schools require for success. An effective set of pol 
icies to improve educational outcomes for at-risk students requires 
addressing both the in-school and out-of-school experiences of these 
children.
This article will focus on the contributions that economic analysis 
can provide in addressing the educational needs of at-risk students. The 
first part will present information on the demography and educational
n
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status of at-risk students and some economic consequences. The sec 
ond will offer a summary of what is known about the economic returns 
to investments in these populations. The final part of the paper will 
present a new microeconomic approach to the schooling of these 
youngsters, which has shown promise.
A Crisis of At-Risk Students
The challenge of addressing the needs of at-risk students is impor 
tant because they are a large and growing portion of student enroll 
ments in the United States, and their poor educational performance has 
important consequences for the economy and society. It is widely 
viewed that high school completion represents a minimum qualifica 
tion for the vast majority of jobs in the U.S. labor force and for eligibil 
ity for further training. Students from minority and low-income 
backgrounds are far more likely to fail to complete high school than 
other groups, and the proportion of both minorities and children from 
impoverished circumstances is increasing among the school popula 
tion.
Among members of the labor force between 25 and 29 years old in 
1985, only about 14 percent had failed to complete high school or its 
equivalent (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 
1987). But the figure among blacks was 19 percent and among Hispan- 
ics it was almost 40 percent. Both among minorities and whites, per 
sons from families of low socioeconomic status have considerably 
higher dropout rates than those from more advantaged backgrounds 
(Rumberger 1983). Similar patterns exist for academic achievement, in 
which those from low socioeconomic backgrounds and of minority sta 
tus show considerably lower test scores than their white and nondisad- 
vantaged counterparts (Smith and O'Day 1991).
The fact that populations of school children who are minorities or 
from low-income families, especially where the parents have not com 
pleted high school, represent a substantial and increasing portion of 
school enrollments is a particularly ominous situation. From 1970 to 
1980, U.S. public school enrollments from the preprimary level to 
twelfth grade declined from about 46 million to 41 million students.
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During the same time period, minority enrollments rose from about 9.5 
million to about 11 million, or from about 21 to 27 percent of the total 
(National Center for Educational Statistics 1984, p. 16). By the year 
2020, it is expected that minority children will represent almost half of 
all children aged 17 and under (Pallas, Natriello, and McDill 1989), a 
figure that has already been reached in California and Texas. Minority 
students comprise three-quarters or more of the enrollments of many of 
the largest cities of the nation, including New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Philadelphia, Miami (Dade Country), and Detroit (McNett 
1983). Minority enrollments have been increasing at a more rapid pace 
than the general population because of considerably higher birth rates 
and immigration—both legal and undocumented—that have been 
unprecedented in recent decades. Both factors create rapid growth, par 
ticularly among school-age populations. Immigrant and other minority 
populations tend to be young and of childbearing age, in contrast to an 
older, nonminority population.
When poverty is used as an indicator for "at-risk" populations, a 
similar pattern emerges. Between 1969 and 1979 the proportion of 
children in poverty stayed at about 16 percent; but it rose precipitously 
to 22 percent by 1983 and is projected to reach 27 percent of the chil 
dren 17 years and under by 2020 (Koretz and Ventresca 1984; Pallas, 
Natriello, and McDill 1989). This is a rise from about 15 million to 
over 20 million children in poverty. Between 1984 and 2020 the num 
ber of children who are not living with both parents is expected to rise 
by 30 percent from 16 million to over 21 million (Pallas, Natriello, and 
McDill 1989). This is especially alarming, given that the real incomes 
of single mothers with children fell in absolute terms by 13 percent 
between 1970 and 1986 (Congressional Budget Office 1988).
Trends for other indicators of children at-risk have been moving in 
the same direction. For example, Pallas, Natriello, and McDill (1989) 
project that the number of children raised in families where the mother 
has not completed high school will rise by 56 percent to over 21 mil 
lion by 2020. Of particular importance are the low educational attain 
ments of immigrants drawn from rural regions of some of the poorest 
countries in the world. For example, of the largest single group of 
immigrants into California—Mexicans—only about 28 percent had 
more than an eighth-grade education in the early 1980s (Muller 1985, 
p. 7).
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Not only are the numbers of at-risk students growing but there is 
evidence that their degree of disadvantage is increasing, too. In the fall 
of 1972 about 46 percent of Hispanic high school graduates partici 
pated in postsecondary education immediately following graduation 
(National Center for Education Statistics 1984, p. 160). By the fall of 
1980 that proportion had fallen to 40 percent, despite the widespread 
loosening of admissions standards during this period. While the partic 
ipation rate in higher education of Hispanics from middle socioeco- 
nomic backgrounds fell by about 10 percent, the rate for Hispanics of 
lower socioeconomic background fell by 22 percent. This is even more 
surprising, given that the high school dropout rate for Hispanics rose 
over the period, meaning that one would normally expect the high 
school "survivors" to be better qualified. This drastic change in partici 
pation over such a short period may have been occasioned by poorer 
academic preparation and thus lower eligibility for postsecondary edu 
cation or less adequate financial resources, both factors associated with 
increasing disadvantage.
In summary, the evidence suggests that the proportion of at-risk stu 
dents is high and increasing rapidly. Estimates derived from the vari 
ous demographic analyses suggest that upward of one-third of all 
students in kindergarten through twelfth grade are educationally disad- 
vantaged or at-risk (Levin 1986). When achievement is used as a crite 
rion, it appears that the number of educationally at-risk students may 
be as high as 40 percent (Kennedy, Jung, and Orland 1986, pp. 62-63).
General Economic Implications
The rising numbers of at-risk students and their continuing failure to 
succeed educationally will have important economic ramifications in at 
least three areas: (1) quality of the entry-level labor force; (2) the cost 
and quality of higher education; and (3) the cost of public services.
Quality of Entry-Level Labor Force
One consequence of the present educational status of at-risk stu 
dents will be a serious deterioration in the quality of the labor force. As 
long as persons from such backgrounds were a small minority of the 
population, they could be absorbed by low-skill jobs or relegated to the 
status of unemployment without direct consequences for the economy.
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High dropout rates, low test scores, and poor academic performance of 
a group that will become a larger and larger portion of the school pop 
ulation mean that a larger portion of the future labor force will be 
undereducated for available jobs. Here we refer not only to managerial, 
professional, and technical jobs, but even to the lower-level service 
jobs that are increasingly important in the U.S. economy (Levin and 
Rumberger 1987). Clerical workers, cashiers, and salesclerks all need 
basic skills in oral and written communications, the acquisition of 
which is hardly guaranteed in the schooling of the disadvantaged 
(National Academy of Sciences 1984). A U.S. government study in 
1976 found that while 13 percent of all 17-year-olds were classified as 
functionally illiterate, the percentages of illiterates among Hispanics 
and blacks were 56 and 44, respectively (National Assessment of Edu 
cational Progress 1976). These and other test score results (Smith and 
O'Day 1991) suggest that many at-risk students are not acquiring the 
foundation that will enable them either to work productively in avail 
able jobs or benefit from training that would increase productivity and 
provide job mobility.
As at-risk populations become an increasing and even dominant 
share of the labor force, their inadequate educational preparation will 
be visited on the industries and states in which they work, affecting 
their competitive positions and our national economic status. Employ 
ers will suffer in terms of lagging productivity, higher training costs, 
and competitive disadvantages that will result in lost sales and profits. 
This problem will be especially severe for states with the largest 
growth in the disadvantaged population, such as California and Texas, 
where minorities already represent the majority of all students. It will 
also be most serious in those industries that depend upon this popula 
tion for their labor needs. As a result, state and federal governments 
will suffer a declining tax base and a concomitant loss of tax revenues 
that could be used to fund improvements in education and other ser 
vices.
Cost and Quality of Higher Education
The implications for higher education are also severe. Even with 
high dropout rates, an increasing proportion of high school graduates 
will come from disadvantaged backgrounds. Without intervention at an 
early stage in their education, these students will leave high school
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with serious learning deficits, which will prevent many of them from 
benefiting from current levels of instruction in colleges and universi 
ties.
High school graduation entitles the at-risk student to pursue postsec- 
ondary study in community colleges and many state universities. Even 
if increasing numbers of disadvantaged students gain college entry, 
their low achievement means that a high proportion of them will expe 
rience academic failure and leave without a degree. Among the group 
that entered college in 1972, only 13 percent of the Hispanics, 16 per 
cent of the Native Americans, and 24 percent of the blacks completed a 
bachelor's degree by 1976, compared to 34 percent of the whites 
(Garibaldi 1986, p. 390). Although ultimate completion rates were 
higher for all groups, differences remained, and it took longer—on 
average—for minority students to complete their degrees.
One obvious response to this situation is to provide massive reme 
dial functions to assist educationally disadvantaged students to reach- 
levels where they can benefit from conventional instruction. According 
to a recent survey by the U.S. Department of Education in the early 
1980s, one in every four freshmen was already enrolled in a remedial 
mathematics course, and one in every six in remedial reading (Abra 
ham 1988). A similar study for fifteen southern states in 1986 found 
that about 36 percent of the freshmen in public institutions of higher 
education in those states were taking at least one remedial course in 
reading, writing, or mathematics (Abraham 1988).
High levels of college failures and dropouts and massive remedial 
interventions have costly consequences to both students and institu 
tions. Large numbers of failures mean wasted time for students and 
wasted resources for colleges, not to mention the psychological costs 
to students of not being able to "make it." Substantial remedial activi 
ties require additional faculty, and student programs take longer, with a 
greater cost in tuition and lost earnings during the extended training 
period required. Also, as a college or university takes on remedial 
functions, it is likely to approve some of these courses for degree 
credit, which results in a watering down of the overall curriculum and 
standards.
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Cost of Public Services
A final consequence of failing to address the challenge of at-risk 
students will be the rising costs of public services as more and more 
citizens are forced to rely upon public assistance and undereducated 
teens, and adults pursue illegal activities to fill idle time and obtain 
income. Many of the disadvantaged will continue to have difficulty 
finding regular jobs as adults, so their families will need to depend 
upon the availability of public assistance to survive. When one applies 
a teenage unemployment rate of 40 percent or so to a larger and larger 
group of school dropouts, there are likely to be increasing numbers of 
undereducated youth taking their activities to the streets rather than to 
the workplace.
Among a national sample of 19- to 23-year-olds in 1981, 72 percent 
of the jobless, 79 percent of those on public assistance, and 68 percent 
of those arrested in the previous year had scored below the average on 
the AFQT measure of basic skills (Berlin and Sum 1988, p. 29). 
Among 18- to 23-year-old males in 1981, those with a high school 
diploma had a 94 percent lower probability of arrest; and among girls 
aged 18 to 21 the high school graduates had a 54 percent lower proba 
bility of having a baby out of wedlock (Berlin and Sum 1988, p. 42).
A study of black women in their mid-thirties in 1982 found that 
each additional year of schooling was associated with a reduction of 
about 7 percent in the probability of receiving public assistance 
(Owens 1990). Moreover, participation in public assistance seems to 
be becoming even more education-dependent over time; education had 
twice the impact on the relation in 1982 as it did in 1967 (Owens 
1990).
A projection of these outcomes on an expanding at-risk population 
will not only make the United States a less desirable place to live, but 
will increase the costs of police services and the criminal justice sys 
tem. At the same time, the potential decline in economic activity cre 
ated by an underprepared workforce will erode tax revenues. This 
situation will place additional pressures on the middle class to pay 
higher taxes for welfare and the system of criminal justice at the same 
time that the economy is flagging. As such it will exacerbate the politi 
cal conflict between haves and have-nots, as taxpayers resist raising
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taxes in the light of a faltering economy and mounting pressures for 
higher expenditures.
Summary of General Economic Implications
To fail to address the present and future educational needs of at-risk 
students will incur high social costs in terms of reduced productivity in 
the labor force and higher education as well as rising costs of public 
services. Education is not only linked to public assistance and criminal 
justice, it is also linked to health, status, and a variety of other impor 
tant social outcomes (Haveman and Wolfe 1984). In fact, when all the 
identifiable outcomes associated with education are taken into account, 
it has been estimated that the overall return on education is twice as 
high as when only its effect on income is considered.
Benefit-cost Studies of Educational Investment
The knowledge that economic and social benefits can be achieved 
by investing in at-risk student populations is not an adequate criterion 
for investment. Although such investments are likely to result in con 
siderable benefits, there are also likely to be considerable costs. From 
an economic perspective, it is necessary to know whether benefits 
exceed costs and whether they exceed them by magnitudes equal to or 
greater than alternative social investments. In this section, we will 
review the results of benefit-cost studies of educational investments 
among those populations.
Programs for Reducing High School Dropout Rates
A number of economic studies have addressed the costs and benefits 
of programs for reducing the rate of high school dropouts. In a classic 
study on the subject, Weisbrod compared the impact of a St. Louis pro 
gram designed to reduce the rate of dropouts among "dropout-prone" 
high school students with the rate of dropouts in a control group of 
similar students who did not have such a program (Weisbrod 1965). 
The dropout prevention program was associated with a high school 
completion rate that was about 7 percent higher than that of the control
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group. Weisbrod estimated the cost for each of the additional graduates 
and contrasted it with the estimated income benefits of high school 
graduation for these students. He found that the costs of the program 
exceeded its benefits.
There are at least two reasons for believing that analyses of more 
recent programs would show stronger benefits. Weisbrod used 1959 
census data to estimate the additional incomes of the graduates. 
Because of discrimination and other factors, the earnings of women 
and minorities were a much smaller portion of white male earnings 
some 30 years ago than they are today. Since the dropout-prone group 
included considerable numbers of females and minorities, the benefits 
were probably considerably understated relative to what would be 
obtained with more recent data. Further, the earnings advantages of 
high school graduates relative to dropouts have increased. Finally, the 
program that Weisbrod evaluated was initiated over thirty years ago 
when dropout prevention was in its infancy.
In contrast, a more recent study of dropout prevention found large 
net benefits (Stern, Dayton, Paik, and Weisberg 1989). This evaluation 
was based upon the success in reducing the number of dropouts at 
eleven academies created in public high schools in California. These 
academies comprised special programs or schools within the larger 
high school setting and provided vocational training for careers in 
which students stood a good chance of placement, as well as academic 
training. Students were given special attention from their teachers and 
the representatives of local employers. When students were matched 
with a similar group of students in regular school programs, it was esti 
mated that the academies had saved 29 persons who would have been 
expected to drop out.
The marginal costs of the academy program, beyond those of the 
regular school program for all 327 students, were compared to benefits 
in terms of the additional earnings of the twenty-nine persons "saved" 
from dropping out. The overall benefits of the program were found to 
exceed overall costs by considerable amounts, the specifics depending 
upon which assumptions were used regarding benefits. However, the 
results also show that for some of the academies net benefits were pos 
itive and for others negative—that is, costs exceeded benefits. This 
suggests that a more refined evaluation of individual programs would
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be useful in arriving at an understanding of which programs were the 
most promising on the basis of a benefit-cost analysis.
In contrast to studies of a single dropout program, Levin undertook 
a national study on the economic consequences of high school drop- 
outs (Levin 1972). Here he calculated the additional lifetime earnings 
and tax revenues that would have been generated if the entire cohort of 
25- to 34-year-old males in 1970 had graduated from high school. It 
was assumed that even if existing dropouts had graduated they would 
not have done as well as those who had actually graduated from high 
school. Thus, additional earnings of dropouts who would be induced to 
graduate were assumed to be only 75 percent of those of conventional 
high school graduates. But it was also assumed that a portion of the 
induced graduates would continue into higher education, with resulting 
additional earnings from that source as well.
The total loss of lifetime earnings for this group as a result of failure 
to complete at least high school was estimated at about $237 billion. 
The additional cost for achieving this result was comprised of two 
parts: first, the cost of the additional years of schooling undertaken by 
members of the group; second, the cost of additional expenditures to 
prevent dropping out. It was assumed that it would have been neces 
sary to increase annual schooling expenditures on those at-risk of drop 
ping out by 50 percent a year for all of their elementary and secondary 
schooling to keep them in school until completion of high school. On 
this basis, it was estimated that the total costs of achieving at least high 
school graduation for all members of the cohort was about $40 billion, 
producing a benefit of $6.00 for each dollar of cost. The additional life 
time earnings would have generated about $71 billion in government 
revenue or about $1.75 in tax revenues for each dollar in cost. The 
study also estimated that inadequate education was contributing about 
$6 billion a year to the costs of welfare and crime in 1970.
Robledo (1986) replicated this analysis more recently for that cohort 
of Texan ninth graders in 1982-83 who were projected to drop out 
before their anticipated graduation in 1986. They estimated the benefits 
of a dropout prevention program as those attributable to savings in 
public assistance, training and adult education, crime and incarcera 
tion, unemployment insurance and job placement, and as higher earn 
ings associated with the additional number of high school graduates. 
Such benefits were calculated at $17.5 billion, and the costs to elimi-
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nate dropouts for this cohort were estimated at slightly less than $2 bil 
lion or a ratio of $9 in benefits for each dollar of costs. Estimates of 
additional tax revenues were 2.5 times greater than costs to the tax 
payer.
Catterall (1987) did a similar type of analysis for persons who 
dropped out of the Los Angeles high school class of 1985. He found 
that because of high school dropouts, the Los Angeles class of 1985 
was projected to generate over $3 billion less in lifetime economic 
activity than if all of its members had graduated. In contrast, Catterall 
suggested that the cost of investing successfully in dropout reduction 
would be a mere fraction of this amount. Further, he found that Los 
Angeles was addressing the dropout problem with specific programs 
that were spending the equivalent of only about $50 per dropout, or 
less than one-half of 1 percent of school spending, even though 40 per 
cent of its students were not graduating.
Preschool and Higher Education
There is evidence that even preschool investments in at-risk popula 
tions can reduce dropping out as well as provide other types of bene 
fits. Barnett undertook a benefit-cost analysis of the Perry Preschool 
Project in Ypsilanti, Michigan (Barnett 1985). The Perry Preschool 
approach has been studied for two decades and has been used as a 
model for hundreds of preschools for disadvantaged students across 
the country, including the national Head Start program. Students who 
had been enrolled in the preschool project were followed until age 19. 
It was found that relative to a matched control group, enrollees in the 
project experienced better school achievement, educational placement, 
educational attainment, and employment. Monetary values for the ben 
efits were calculated on the basis of the apparent effect of these advan 
tages on the value of childcare during the programs; reduced school 
expenditures for remediation, special services, and grade repetition; 
reduced costs of crime, delinquency, and welfare; and higher earnings 
and employment.
It was found that the benefits exceeded the costs by a large margin 
under a wide range of assumptions. The one-year program showed 
benefits of $7.00 for every dollar of costs, a benefit-cost ratio of about 
7:1, and the two-year program showed a benefit-cost ratio of about
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3.6:1 (Bemieta-Clement et al. 1984, p. 60). About 80 percent of the net 
benefits were received by taxpayers in the form of higher tax contribu 
tions and lower expenditures on education, crime, and welfare and by 
potential crime victims in the form of lower costs for property losses 
and injuries.
A study of benefits and costs for financial aid to stimulate participa 
tion in higher education for low-income students has also indicated 
high benefits relative to costs for government investment (St. John and 
Masten 1990). Here researchers compared tax revenues generated by 
the additional income produced by the higher levels of college partici 
pation among low-income students with the costs of financial aid that 
induced these higher enrollments. The net present value of additional 
tax revenues was four times as great as the cost of the aid program for 
students in the high school class of 1980. That is, from the perspective 
of the federal treasury, such programs had a benefit-cost ratio of 4:1.
These particular studies suggest that investments in at-risk students 
yield high returns to society. Such social investments are highly worth 
while in that their benefits exceed costs and that the margin by which 
they exceed costs is competitive with or superior to that of other highly 
productive investments. Of greatest importance is that higher tax reve 
nues and reductions in the costs of social services more than compen 
sate for the investments. In fact, in the case of the early childhood 
intervention program established by the Perry Preschool, most of the 
net benefits accrued to taxpayers (Barnett 1985).
Summary of Benefit-Cost Results
These benefit-cost results suggest that investments in the education 
of students at risk of undereducation are likely to have high payoffs to 
society. While each study can be questioned because of imperfect 
information and the need to make assumptions on both the cost and 
benefit sides of the equation, their overall pattern is remarkably consis 
tent. This interpretation is buttressed by a recent study that found that 
increased investment in schooling quality among states was consis 
tently associated with higher earnings of the adults who were schooled 
in those states, holding constant other influences (Card and Krueger 
1992).
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Estimated benefits for educational interventions tend to be about 
three to six times as high as estimated costs for at-risk students. 
According to Haveman and Wolfe (1984), the consideration of returns 
to human capital investments in the form of increases in earnings will 
capture only about half of the total returns. Thus most of these esti 
mates are subject to understatement because they tend to be limited to 
the effects of educational investments on productivity and earnings and 
do not capture the value of reductions in the costs of health, public 
assistance, criminal justice, and a variety of other benefits. However, 
recent work suggests that cross-sectional estimates tend to overstate 
the benefits to human capital investments on behalf of the poor (Levin 
and Kelley 1991). All of the estimates are based upon cross-sectional 
evidence, with the exception of those based upon the preschool inter 
vention. Since there is no direct evidence on the potential degree of 
overstatement or understatement of these results, a reasonable assump 
tion is that they are offsetting and that the estimates are a reasonable 
first approximation of returns to investments on behalf of at-risk popu 
lations.
The Microeconomics of Educational Reform
In the early 1980s, a rash of reports by national commissions and 
other groups were published recommending national educational 
reforms to improve economic competitiveness. The most important of 
these was Nation at Risk, produced by the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education (1983). Most of the recommendations of these 
reports addressed changes in secondary school programs for college- 
bound students by calling for more academic courses with more rigor 
ous standards at that level. But at-risk students were not even meeting 
the "lower" standards that existed at that time and were dropping out in 
response to academic demands. The reports said almost nothing about 
improving school effectiveness prior to high school to make it possible 
for at-risk students to meet both existing and higher standards.
Why were the reports of these commissions silent about at-risk stu 
dents? In response to this question, I undertook a study on the demog 
raphy, educational outcomes, and social consequences of this group of
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students (Levin 1986), the results of which are summarized in the first 
section of this paper. As an extension of that study I began to explore 
the production of schooling for this group of children (Levin 1988). 
Surprisingly, I found that the educational process in schools attended 
by these children was the cause of much of the problem rather than the 
solution.
That research found that at-risk students started behind other stu 
dents and lagged farther behind the educational mainstream the longer 
that they were in school. And this problem did not appear to stem from 
a lack of teacher dedication, a charge that has often been made. Para 
doxically, it occurred because compensatory programs for the disad- 
vantaged are designed to slow down the instruction of such students, 
on the that assumption that at-risk students are less capable than others. 
Such students are placed into less demanding instructional settings— 
either by pulling them out of their regular classrooms or by adapting 
the regular classroom to their "needs"—and offering remedial or com 
pensatory educational services. While this approach appears to be both 
rational and compassionate, it has exactly the opposite consequences.
First, it reduces learning expectations on the part of both the chil 
dren and the educators assigned to teach them, and it stigmatizes both 
groups with a label of inferiority. Second, it slows down the learning 
process so that at-risk students fall farther and farther behind the main 
stream, the longer that they are in school. Third, the approach to reme 
diation is to provide repetitive practice of low-level basic exercises 
through endless drill and practice. This educational experience is 
empty and joyless because it fails to incorporate a rich curriculum, stu 
dent involvement and discourse, interesting applications of concepts, 
active problem solving, and learning activities that build on the 
strengths of the students and their backgrounds. Finally, this remedial 
approach does not draw sufficiently upon parental and community 
resources, nor does it provide for the participation of school-based edu 
cators to influence the programs that they must implement.
The study concluded that an effective approach to educating the dis- 
advantaged must be characterized by high expectations, deadlines by 
which such children will be performing in the educational mainstream, 
stimulating instructional programs, planning by the educational staff 
who will offer the program, and the use of all available resources, 
including the parents of the students. This approach should incorporate
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a comprehensive set of strategies that mutually reinforce each other in 
creating an organizational push toward raising the achievement of stu 
dents to the level that we expect in the mainstream.
A key element in this strategy is accelerated schools, which were 
designed by our Stanford Accelerated Schools Project to have exactly 
the opposite consequences by bringing at-risk students into the educa 
tional mainstream by the end of elementary school (Levin 1988). Our 
premise was very basic: at-risk students must learn at a faster rate than 
more privileged students—not at a slower rate that drags them farther 
and farther behind. What is required is an enrichment strategy rather 
than a remedial one.
I hypothesize that acceleration works as well for at-risk students as 
it has for their better prepared counterparts. One recent study assigned 
at-risk students at random to remedial, average, and honors classes in 
seventh-grade mathematics. At the end of the year, the at-risk students 
in the honors class—which provided pre-algebra instruction—out 
shone at-risk students in the other two groups (Peterson 1989). Similar 
results were found when at-risk students were provided with high-con 
tent instruction that emphasized thinking ability and decision making 
rather than basic skills (Knapp, Shields, and TXirnbull 1992).
Institutionalizing Change
Moving from an idea to institutional change is never an easy pro 
cess. In order to develop a strategy for creating accelerated institutions, 
we found that we would have to make three major changes in U.S. 
schools, changes that were in deep conflict with current practices 
(Levin 1988). These changes have deep economic roots in that they 
require that: a clear objective function for the school (unity of purpose) 
be established; those with de facto property rights exercise those rights 
on behalf of children within a framework of incentives and account 
ability (school-site empowerment with responsibility); and an appro 
priate technology of schooling that will deliver results (building on 
strengths) be employed.
Unity of Purpose
Most schools that educate at-risk students seem to lack any central 
purpose. In economic terms they are firms without an objective func-
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tion. In this framework, traditional schools are better understood as a 
composite of individuals and programs that seem largely disparate and 
piecemeal with no central vision. Planning, implementation, and evalu 
ation are typically done independently and by different groups. Teach 
ers tend to see their responsibilities extending no farther than 
maintaining good practices in self-contained classrooms, while reme 
dial specialists work in isolation from each other and the regular school 
program.
Acceleration requires the establishment and pursuit of a common 
vision that serves as a focal point for the efforts of parents, teachers, 
staff, and students. The vision of an accelerated school must focus on 
bringing children into the mainstream, where they can more fully ben 
efit from school experiences and opportunities. The development of 
this vision requires the combined efforts and commitment of all parties 
involved. Unity of purpose refers to both a vision or dream of what the 
school can be and an action plan that will get the school there.
School-site Empowerment
Existing schools for at-risk students are largely dominated by deci 
sions made by entities far removed from the school site and classroom. 
Federal and state governments and central offices of school districts 
have established a compendium of rules, regulations, directives, poli 
cies, laws, guidelines, reporting requirements, and "approved" instruc 
tional materials that serve to stifle educational decisions and initiative 
at local school sites. It is little wonder that administrators, teachers, 
parents, and students tend to blame factors "beyond their control" for 
the poor educational outcomes of at-risk students. And, as the histori 
cal record has shown, compliance with these policies ensures failure, 
not success.
Accelerated schools are based on the concept of internal responsibil 
ity, in which major decisions that will determine educational outcomes 
are made by establishing a collective sense of efficacy and applying the 
skills and organization to undertake the changes that are necessary. If 
the school is to achieve its vision of educational success, administra 
tors, teachers, other staff, parents, and students must participate in 
making informed decisions regarding school activities. Important areas 
of school-site decisions include some or all of the following: curricu 
lum, instructional strategies, instructional materials, personnel, and
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allocation of resources inside of the school. Such decision making 
requires active support from the district's central office in the form of 
information, technical assistance, staff development, and evaluation, as 
well as an overall system of accountability in which the school is 
rewarded according to its performance.
Building on Strengths
Schools with large numbers of at-risk students tend to highlight the 
weaknesses of their students, staff, funding, administrative support, 
and so on, as an explanation for poor performance. A particularly 
heavy emphasis is placed on the litany of what is wrong with at-risk 
students and their parents. But good pedagogy begins with the 
strengths and experiences of participants and builds on those strengths 
rather than dwelling on the weaknesses. This means that schools must 
shift from a technology of production that has shown consistent failure 
to one that has shown superior results.
Accelerated schools seek out the strengths of their students and 
other participants and use those strengths as foundations on which to 
build their programs. In this respect, students are treated as gifted and 
talented students, where strengths are identified which are then used as 
a basis for providing enrichment and acceleration. The strengths of at- 
risk students are often overlooked because they are not as obvious as 
those of middle-class students. But our research has shown that at-risk 
children bring assets that can be used to accelerate the learning pro 
cess. These include interest and curiosity in oral and artistic expres 
sion, ability to learn through manipulation of appropriate learning 
materials and interesting applications, the capability to delve eagerly 
into intrinsically interesting tasks, and a capacity for learning to write 
prior to mastering reading skills.
The process of building on strengths is not limited to students. 
Accelerated schools also build on the strengths of parents, teachers, 
and other school staff. Parents and teachers are largely underutilized 
resources in most schools. Because they want their children to succeed, 
parents can be powerful allies if they are placed in productive roles and 
provided with the skills to work with their children. Teachers bring 
gifts of insight, intuition, and organizational acumen to the instruc 
tional process, gifts often untapped by the mechanical curricula so typ 
ical of remedial programs. Accelerated schools acknowledge the gifts
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of teachers and parents and build on those strengths in fulfilling their 
accelerated visions.
Combining the Principles
An accelerated school is not just a conventional school with new 
principles or special programs grafted onto it. It is a dynamic environ 
ment in which the entire school and its operations are transformed. The 
emphasis is on the school as a whole, rather than on a particular grade, 
curriculum, staff development approach, or other limited strategies. 
The goal is high academic achievement for all students.
The three principles of unity of purpose, site-based empowerment, 
and building on strengths are woven together in virtually all the activi 
ties of the accelerated school. The school is governed by its staff, stu 
dents, and parents, and priorities are pursued by task groups that follow 
a systematic inquiry process for problem solving, implementation, and 
evaluation.
Accelerated schools use a heavily language-based approach across 
all subjects, even mathematics, with an early introduction to writing 
and reading for meaning. Curricula reflect a sense of high expectations 
and a tie to the students' cultures. Active learning experiences are pro 
vided through independent projects, problem solving, and utilizing 
new knowledge and skills in concrete situations. By applying academic 
concepts and skills to real-life problems and events, students see the 
usefulness of what they are learning.
The organization of accelerated schools allows for a broad range of 
participants and a collaborative approach in which students' families 
play a central role. Indeed, success depends on parents working with 
staff and students, helping to make school decisions by participating in 
the decision bodies of the school.
Some Results of Accelerated Schools
The first two accelerated pilot schools were established in 1987 and 
have been operating for five years. The total transition from a tradi 
tional to an accelerated school takes about six years. Since that time 
approximately three hundred additional schools, most of which are ele 
mentary schools, with a recent extension to middle schools, have initi-
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ated the transition process. We have found that the transformation to an 
accelerated school can be done primarily by reallocating existing 
resources to free up staff time and make other provisions for staff 
development and accelerated school activities. To my knowledge, none 
of these schools has obtained additional funding beyond even 1 percent 
of their budgets to pursue accelerated school activities. We believe that 
the basic transformation to and operation of an accelerated school can 
be done largely within existing resources. It should be noted that most 
of the other national educational reforms that have shown success 
require an additional cost of about $1,000 per student, in comparison 
with about $20 to $30 per student for accelerated schools.
Early results have been extremely promising. The Daniel Webster 
School in San Francisco enrolls a student body that is over 90 percent 
minority and over 80 percent on public assistance. It was one of the. 
bottom elementary schools in San Francisco in 1987, ranking sixty- 
fifth out of sixty-nine schools with test scores in mathematics. By 1991 
the mathematics scores had risen to twenty-third in San Francisco, 
among the top third of all schools. Students were performing above 
grade level in mathematics at every grade. Test score gains in all three 
areas tested—reading, language, and mathematics—were the highest 
of all the schools in San Francisco. The Daniel Webster School was the 
only school in San Francisco in which both black and Spanish-surname 
students made more than a year of academic progress in one academic 
year.
The Hollibrook Elementary School in Houston enrolls over one 
thousand students, many of them recently arrived immigrants from 
Central and South America. About 90 percent of the students are from 
families below the poverty line. In 1988 the school's fifth graders were 
about two years behind grade level in reading and language arts and 
almost half a year behind grade level in mathematics. By the spring of 
1991 Hollibrook fifth graders were performing at grade level in all sub 
jects and one year above grade level in mathematics (McCarthy and 
Still 1993).
Most of the accelerated schools have been established in the last two 
years, so it is too early for them to have completed their transforma 
tion. Nevertheless, the early results for these schools are also impres 
sive, with improved attendance, parent participation, test scores, 
student projects, and reduced behavior problems and vandalism.
30 The Economics of Education for At-Risk Students
Investment in the education of at-risk students has a large payoff, and 
we have the wherewithal to use that investment wisely in accelerated 
schools. Indeed, those characteristics that make for an efficient firm 
can be applied to schools to improve their efficiency substantially. 
Given this evidence, it is surprising that many economists immediately 
resort to a market approach in looking for economic strategies to 
improve the education of at-risk students (Friedman 1962; Levin 
1991). Typically, they cite the work of Chubb and Moe (1990) or Hof- 
fer, Greeley, and Coleman (1987), which was reanalyzed by Willms 
(1987), who found that students in Catholic schools were able to 
achieve as much as a one-tenth of a standard deviation advantage over 
similar students in public schools. But accelerated schools have shown 
achievement gains of 1.5 standard deviations, or fifteen times that 
large, without resorting to a change in educational finance to vouchers 
or other systems that would require public funds for private schools. 
No comparison between private and public schools has come close to 
finding this effect.
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Can Equity Be Separated
from Efficiency 
in School Finance Debates?
Eric A. Hanushek 
University of Rochester
School finance discussions have concentrated on equity and rest on 
a few elementary premises. Poor children, often residing in decaying 
cities, do worse in terms of achievement, jobs, and overall success than 
children from better environments. Schools are society's designated 
institution to remedy this situation—but schools serving the disadvan- 
taged are hampered in this task by a lack of sufficient resources. With 
more funding, these schools could put in place the successful programs 
that are available, and the cycle of poverty could be broken. It is only 
equitable then to support poor schools at the level at which schools for 
otherwise more advantaged students are financed. The more recent 
variant of the discussion, focusing on an adequacy version of equity, 
begins by noting the need for high quality education in order for an 
individual to compete successfully in the labor market, and then turns 
to a statement of how overall funding for schools must be increased to 
provide everybody with acceptable opportunities.
These common arguments are simple, straightforward, and compel 
ling. Unfortunately, they are also seriously flawed. The quest for equity 
has generally pointed to policies that neither promote greater equity 
nor help deal with the serious schooling problems facing the United 
States.
For over two decades, courts and legislatures have been embroiled 
in debate and controversy over the way in which local public schools 
are financed. Interestingly, this has been an area where the states have 
completely dominated policy deliberations, and the federal govern 
ment has never played an important role. Indeed, as a direct result of 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
*This is a revised and expanded version of Hanushek 1991.
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trict v. Rodriguez, the court discussion has been conducted exclusively 
at the state level. Each state has followed a different course based on 
the requirements of its state constitution, the preferences of its citizens 
and legislators, and the wisdom of its courts. Nevertheless, while 
sometimes obscured by the details of specific state actions, there are 
common elements to the school finance policy developments in the 
states.
One important lesson learned over time is that school finance court 
cases, legislative decisions, and school policies in general are more 
complicated than was previously thought. The framework for delibera 
tions on school finance reform was developed in the 1960s and given 
national attention through the landmark case in California, Serrano v. 
Priest. This case, which has been transported elsewhere, set out what is 
now the standard argument: 1 (1) Traditional funding of schools, which 
relies heavily on local funds raised substantially by property taxes, 
leads to large disparities in the education available to rich (suburban) 
students and to poor (urban and rural) students; and (2) The inequities 
in the quality of schooling resulting from the fiscal system must be cor 
rected, and the courts are an obvious route to forcing the legislature to 
provide the economically and educationally disadvantaged with better 
schools.
An updated version of these arguments is found in Kozol (1991), 
where the disparities in schools between some of the nation's best and 
worst schools are described in vivid detail. Armed with this descriptive 
information, Kozol proceeds directly to the policy conclusion that all 
schools should be moved to duplicate the very best, a conclusion that 
merges both the equity and the adequacy arguments.
We have now discovered that many of these simplistic views are 
misleading, if not just plain wrong. The required actions involve more 
fundamental adjustments than merely redirecting funds, and these fun 
damental changes are difficult to implement directly from the court or 
from the capitol. These complications are addressed in the subsequent 
discussion.
This paper considers the overarching public policy issues involved 
in searching for improved equity through altering school financing 
arrangements, concentrating on the central policy issues that transcend 
state boundaries. Moreover, it avoids all consideration of legal theories
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and interpretations that have surrounded the court cases except as they 
intersect with larger matters of broader educational policy.
Most school finance discussion, as opposed to school policy discus 
sion, has focused almost exclusively on variations in expenditure per 
student. A variety of reasons can be cited to explain this emphasis. 
First, expenditure levels are easily measured and easily modified by the 
court or legislature. Second, it seems reasonable to presume that what a 
school can offer in terms of quality or breadth is directly correlated 
with the resources devoted to the task. Finally, even if there is some 
doubt about how well money is currently being spent, money well 
spent would surely make a difference. Each of these premises is rea 
sonable if schools are operating efficiently. 2 Given efficient school 
operation, expenditure is a good index of performance. On the other 
hand, if schools are not operating efficiently, the interpretation of 
expenditure differences becomes totally ambiguous, because expendi 
ture variations need no longer be directly correlated with variations in 
school quality. Moreover, added funding of schools may lead to no 
gains in student performance.
One fundamental observation underlies the discussion in this paper: 
There is no systematic relationship between school expenditure and 
student performance. This observation implies a significant level of 
inefficiency in schools. Given that, legal arguments and policy deci 
sions based on expenditure variations are simply suspect, at least from 
an educational perspective. Indeed, many popular changes, both pro 
posed and adopted, no longer look like "reform" but instead tend to 
move us away from good policy.
School finance discussions have not totally ignored the potential pit 
falls of concentrating on expenditure alone. After passing references to 
issues of efficiency along with assertions that the research is ambigu 
ous,3 pragmatism is frequently claimed as the underlying justification: 
expenditure differences appear to be such a reasonable measure of dif 
ferences in schools, and they are measurable.4 1 argue later that this 
logic is likely to cause serious distortion in policies.
The plan of this paper is straightforward. It begins with a discussion 
of the evidence about expenditure and school performance. It then con 
siders how this evidence relates to court cases and overall judgments 
about a state's schools. It concludes with an examination of how court
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cases, and the related legislative actions, relate to effective policies 
toward schools.
What We Know About School Expenditure
Because the interpretation of expenditure differences is so central to 
all discussions of school finance, this section provides evidence con 
cerning the relationship between expenditure and student perfor 
mance.5 It is simply not possible to ignore these data in setting school 
policy when the objective is either to improve overall student perfor 
mance or advance the cause of true educational equity.
Aggregate Data
Much of the current concern about the performance of our schools is 
motivated by the fact that student performance has remained constant 
or actually fallen during a period in which school spending has contin 
ually increased. Figure 1 illustrates this by superimposing the trend in 
student performance on the trend in educational expenditure. Real 
expenditure per pupil has risen steadily and dramatically over the past 
two decades. Specifically, after allowing for inflation, expenditure per 
pupil more than doubled between 1967 and 1991; this corresponds to 
about a 3.5 percent compound annual growth rate. 6 At the same time, 
performance as measured by Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores fell 
to a level significantly below those attained during the mid-1960s. 
Moreover, while there was some recovery from the 1979-80 trough, 
the improvements of the early 1980s have now ceased.
There are reasons for quibbling about these specific statistics for 
both achievement and spending. The measurement of performance by 
SAT scores has been questioned because the test does not rely on a rep 
resentative sample, because the test-taking population has changed 
over time, and because the content of the test itself may have changed. 
Analysis of these objections, however, indicates clearly that the 
observed achievement decline is not simply an artifact of that specific 
test. Further, declines have been registered on a variety of other tests 
given over the same time (see Congressional Budget Office 1986,
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1987). Continued international evidence also places U.S. students 
behind a surprisingly wide range of foreign students on math and sci 
ence performance. For example, in tests of advanced algebra for 
twelfth graders in 1982, U.S. students trail students from Hong Kong 
to Hungary, bettering only the students from Thailand in fifteen coun 
tries sampled (McKnight et al. 1987).7 Thus, there is no doubt that stu 
dents are performing worse now than they did in the past, when 
spending on schools was noticeably less.
Figure 1
Real School Expenditure and Achievement 
1967-1991
Average SAT Score Real expenditure per pupil"
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Similarly, some have argued that the tasks facing schools have 
changed over time so that the comparisons of expenditures are not 
strictly appropriate. For example, increased expenditure may partly
40 Can Equity Be Separated from Efficiency in School Finance Debates?
reflect attempts to educate more expensive students—handicapped stu 
dents, immigrants, and other educationally disadvantaged. Again, how 
ever, while these changes in student populations undoubtedly have 
some influence on costs, they are insufficient to explain the substantial 
aggregate increases that have transpired.
Moreover, it is important to note that the expenditure patterns reflect 
a number of underlying adjustments, which mirror common policy rec 
ommendations. Pupil-teacher ratios have fallen steadily for the past 
three decades. While there were twenty-five students per teacher in 
public elementary and secondary schools in 1965, there were fewer 
than eighteen in 1985. 8 Over the same period, the proportion of teach 
ers holding a master's degree or above went from under a quarter to 
over half. Median teacher experience also almost doubled, going from 
eight years in 1966 to fifteen in 1986. 9 The only aggregate input not to 
follow this steady pattern is teacher salaries. Real teacher salaries, as 
best we can tell, have cycled: average salaries rose through the 1960s, 
fell back in the mid to late 1970s, and rose again during the 1980s. 10
The aggregate picture is clear. School spending has increased dra 
matically since the mid-1960s, largely through the instituting of poli 
cies that educational decision makers have proposed as a way of 
improving student performance—reducing class sizes and upgrading 
the education and experience of the teaching force. Yet student perfor 
mance has actually fallen over the same period.
Individual- and School-Level Analyses
Although research into the determinants of students' achievement 
takes various approaches, one of the most appealing and useful is what 
economists call the production function approach, or in other disci 
plines the input-output or cost-quality approach. In this approach, 
attention is focused primarily on the relationship between school out 
comes and measurable inputs into the educational process.
The origin of estimating input-output relations in schools is usually 
traced to the monumental U.S. study, Equality of Educational Oppor 
tunity, or what is more commonly known as the Coleman Report. 
Explicitly designed to study equity, this report was the U.S. Office of 
Education's response to a requirement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
to investigate the extent of inequality (by race, religion, or national ori-
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gin) in the nation's schools. The study's fundamental contribution was 
to direct attention to the distribution of student performance—the out 
puts with which I am concerned here. Instead of addressing questions 
of inequality simply by producing an inventory of differences among 
schools and teachers according to race and region of the country, the 
Coleman Report sought to provide an understanding of which, if any, 
of the observed differences in school resources were important for stu 
dent learning. This very different perspective—the right one when stu 
dent educational performance is the concern—set a standard in the 
school policy debate. Unfortunately, in the subsequent financial equity 
debate, this important innovation has been largely ignored.
The Coleman Report was widely interpreted as finding that schools 
are not very important in determining student achievement. Families 
and, to a lesser extent, peers were seen to be the primary determinants 
of variations in performance. The findings were clearly controversial 
and immediately led to a substantial research effort to compile addi 
tional evidence about the relationship between school resources and 
school performance.' }
The underlying model guiding the Coleman Report and most subse 
quent studies is very straightforward. It postulates that the output of the 
educational process—that is, the achievement of students—is related 
directly to a series of inputs. Policy makers directly control some of 
these inputs—for instance, the characteristics of schools, teachers, and 
curricula. Other factors, such as families and friends plus the innate 
endowments or learning capacities of the students, generally cannot be 
affected by public policy. Further, although achievement is usually 
measured at discrete points in time, the educational process is cumula 
tive; past inputs affect students' current levels of achievement.
Based upon this model, statistical techniques, typically some form 
of regression analysis, are employed to identify the specific determi 
nants of achievement and to make inferences about the relative impor 
tance of the various inputs into student performance. This summary 
highlights the overall findings from the research.
These studies of educational production relationships measure out 
put not only by student scores on standardized achievement tests but 
also by other quantitative measures, such as student attitudes, school 
attendance rates, and college continuation or dropout rates. The gen 
eral interpretation is that they are all plausible indicators of future sue-
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cess in the labor market. This interpretation has been confirmed by 
other research into labor market outcomes (see review in Hanushek, 
Rivkin, and Jamison 1992).
Empirical specifications of production function models have varied 
widely in details, but they have also had much in common. Family 
inputs tend to be measured by sociodemographic characteristics of the 
families, such as parental education, income, and family size. Peer 
inputs, when included, are typically aggregate summaries of the socio 
demographic characteristics of other students in the school. School 
inputs include measures of the teachers' characteristics (education 
level, experience, sex, race, and so forth), of the school's organization 
(class sizes, facilities, administrative expenditure, and so forth), and of 
district or community factors (for example, average expenditure lev 
els). Except for the original Coleman Report, most empirical work has 
relied on data, such as the normal administrative records of schools, 
that were constructed for other purposes.
Empirical Results for Expenditure Effects
The production function approach has been broadly employed to 
investigate the impact on school performance of the core factors deter 
mining expenditure on education. Instructional expenditure makes up 
about two-thirds of total school expenditures. Instructional expenditure 
is in turn determined mostly by teacher salaries and class sizes. Finally, 
in most U.S. school districts, teacher salaries are directly related to the 
years of teaching experience and educational level of the teacher. Thus, 
the basic determinants of instructional expenditure in a district are 
teacher experience, teacher education, and class size. Most studies, 
regardless of what other school characteristics might be included, ana 
lyze the effect of these factors on outcomes. (These are also the factors 
most likely to be found in any given data set, especially if the data 
come from standard administrative records.)
Because the analyses have such common specifications, the effects 
of the expenditure parameters can easily be tabulated. Here I present 
data from a reasonably exhaustive search that uncovered 187 separate 
"qualified studies" found in thirty-eight separate articles or books 
through the middle of 1988. 12 These studies, while restricted to public 
schools, cover all regions of the United States, different grade levels,
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different measures of performance, and different analytical and statisti 
cal approaches. About one-third draw their data from a single school 
district, while the remaining two-thirds compare school performance 
across multiple districts. A majority of the studies (104) use individual 
students as the unit of analysis, whereas the remainder rely upon 
aggregate school-, district-, or state-level data. The studies are split 
about evenly between primary schooling (grades one through six) and 
secondary schooling (grades seven through twelve). Over 70 percent of 
the studies measure school performance by some kind of standardized 
test. However, those using nontest measures (such as dropout rates, 
college continuation, attitudes, or performance after school) are for 
obvious reasons concentrated in studies of secondary schooling. There 
is no indication that differences in sample and study design lead to dif 
ferences in conclusions. 13
According both to conventional wisdom and to generally observed 
school policies, each factor should have a positive effect on student 
achievement. More education and more experience on the part of the 
teacher cost more and are presumed to improve individual student 
learning; smaller classes (more teachers per student) are also expected 
to be beneficial. 14 More spending in general, higher teacher salaries, 
better facilities, and better administration should also lead to better stu 
dent performance. The quantitative magnitudes of estimated relation 
ships are ignored at this point, and attention is focused on the direction 
of any estimated effect.
The data in table 1 provide a picture of how well conventional wis 
dom and common school policies hold up to analysis. The columns in 
the table divide the available estimates by direction of effect and statis 
tical significance. Since not all studies contain estimates of each expen 
diture component, the first column simply indicates the total number of 
estimates available. Thus, for example, 152 of the 187 studies include 
an estimate of the effect of teacher-pupil ratios, or class sizes. Of the 
152 estimates of the effects of class size, only 27 are statistically sig 
nificant. Of these, only 14 show a statistically significant positive rela 
tionship, whereas 13 display a negative relationship. 15 An additional 
125 estimates show that class size is not significant at the 5 percent 
level. 16 Nor does ignoring statistical significance help to confirm the 
benefits of small classes, since the insignificant coefficients have the 
"wrong" sign by a 46 to 34 margin. 17
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The entries for teacher education tell a similar story. The statistically 
significant results are split between positive and negative relationships, 
and in a vast majority of cases (100 out of 113) the estimated coeffi 
cients are statistically insignificant. Forgetting about statistical signifi 
cance and looking just at estimated signs again does not make a case 
for the importance of added schooling for teachers. 18
Table 1. Summary of the Estimated Relationship Between Student
Performance and Various Components of School Expenditure 
(187 studies)
Input
Teacher/pupil
Teacher
education
Teacher
experience
Teacher salary
Expenditure/ 
pupil
Administrative
input
Facilities
Number 
of 
studies
152
113
140
69
65
61
74
Statistically 
significant
+
14
8
40
11
13
7
7
13
5
10
4
3
1
5
Statistically insignificant
Total
125
100
90
54
49
53
62
+
34
31
44
16
25
14
17
-
46
32
31
14
13
15
14
Unknown
45
37
15
24
11
24
31
SOURCE: Hanushek (1989).
Teacher experience is slightly different. A clear majority of esti 
mated coefficients point in the expected direction, and about 29 percent 
of the estimated coefficients are both statistically significant and of the 
conventionally expected sign. But these results only appear strong rela 
tive to the other school inputs; they are hardly overwhelming in an 
absolute sense. Moreover, they are subject to interpretive questions. 
Specifically, these positive correlations may result from senior teachers 
having the ability to locate themselves in schools and classrooms with 
good students. In other words, causation may run from achievement to 
experience and not the other way around.
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Overall, the results are startlingly consistent. No compelling evi 
dence emerges that teacher-pupil ratios, teacher education, or teacher 
experience have the expected positive effects on student achievement. 
There is no reason for confidence that hiring teachers with more educa 
tion or having smaller classes will improve student performance. Evi 
dence of the effect of teacher experience appears marginally more 
convincing, at least when no consideration is given to the magnitude of 
any relationship.
The remaining rows of table 1, summarizing information on other 
expenditure components, including administration, facilities, teacher 
salaries, and total expenditure per student, 19 provide poorer evidence 
on the relationship of resources and performance, but what evidence 
does exist is consistent with the previous results. The quality of admin 
istration is measured in a wide variety of ways, ranging from character 
istics of the principal to noninstructional expenditure per pupil. 
Similarly, the quality of facilities is identified through spending and 
many specific physical characteristics. If only because of the prepon 
derance of positive signs among the significant coefficients, adminis 
tration appears marginally stronger in its relationship to student 
achievement than facilities. Nevertheless, the available evidence on 
both again fails to support convincingly the conventional wisdom.
Finally, and not surprisingly, explicit measures of teacher salaries 
and expenditure per student do not indicate that they play an important 
role in determining achievement. 20 After all, the underlying compo 
nents of these expenditures were themselves unrelated to achievement. 
While negative expenditure effects—in which funds are not only 
unproductive but also harmful—are difficult to interpret, it is much 
easier to believe that differences in spending have little or no impact on 
student performance.
Without systematic tabulation of the results of the various studies, it 
would be easy to conclude that the findings are inconsistent. But there 
is a consistency, though it does not match the conventional wisdom. 
The research reveals no strong or systematic relationship between 
school expenditure and student performance. This is the case both 
when expenditures are decomposed into their underlying determinants 
and when they are considered in the aggregate. 21
Given the general biases toward the publication of statistically sig 
nificant estimates, the paucity of results confirming the conventional
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wisdom is notable. The common calculation of statistical significance 
is inappropriate when a series of sequential tests of alternative formu 
lations of the achievement relationship is conducted. A sequential 
approach built on the calculated statistical tests will yield biased esti 
mates of significance. In reality, too many estimated parameters will be 
judged to be significant. 22
These results reflect the structure and operating procedures of 
schools observed in existing settings. A different organizational struc 
ture with different incentives could produce very different results. For 
example, almost every economist would support the position that 
increasing teacher salaries would expand and improve the pool of 
potential teachers. However, whether this improves the quality of 
teaching depends on whether or not schools can systematically choose 
and retain the best teachers from the pool. The results on salary differ 
entials presented previously might be very different if schools faced a 
greater incentive to produce student achievement and if mechanisms 
for teacher selection were altered. In other words, there seems little 
question that money could count. It just does not systematically do so 
with the current organization of schools.
Moreover, the consistency criterion used to judge the results and the 
potential for policy improvements does not suggest that money never 
counts. The results are entirely compatible with the notion that some 
schools use funds effectively and others do not. But unless some way is 
found to change the districts that would squander additional funds into 
districts that would use them effectively, added resources are not likely 
to lead to any improvement in average performance. Good uses of 
funds are balanced by bad uses within the current structure.
Other Inputs into Education
Since the publication of the Coleman Report, intense debate has sur 
rounded the fundamental question of whether schools and teachers are 
at all important to the educational performance of students. The Cole 
man Report has been commonly interpreted as finding that variations 
in school resources explain only a negligible portion of the variation in 
student achievement. If this were true, it would not matter which par 
ticular teacher a student had or which school a student attended—a 
conclusion that most people would have difficulty accepting.
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The findings of direct analyses of differences among teachers are 
unequivocal and indicate a very different conclusion: teachers and 
schools differ dramatically in their effectiveness. A number of studies 
provide analyses of the differential effectiveness of teachers and 
schools based on estimation of the average gain in performance of each 
teacher's (or school's) students. 23 These studies confirm that there are 
striking differences in teacher performance as measured by average 
gain in student achievement.
The faulty impressions about the nonimportance of teachers and 
schools left by the Coleman Report and a number of subsequent stud 
ies are the result of a confusion between measures of effectiveness and 
true effectiveness itself. In other words, existing measures of the char 
acteristics of teachers and schools are seriously flawed and thus are 
poor indicators of true effectiveness; when these measurement errors 
are avoided, schools are seen to have important effects on student per 
formance.
These input-output analyses have also investigated a wide variety of 
other school and nonschool factors. Although it is difficult to be spe 
cific in any summary of other factors because the specifications of the 
various inputs employed in the statistical analyses vary widely, three 
generalizations are possible. First, family background is clearly very 
important in explaining differences in achievement. Second, while 
considerable attention has been given to the characteristics of peers or 
other students within schools, the findings about their effects are 
ambiguous. Finally, studies have examined many additional measures 
of the effects of schools, teachers, curricula, and especially instruc 
tional methods on achievement, but no simple characterization of good 
teachers emerges.24
While not systematically addressed by existing research, one plausi 
ble interpretation of the combined results of these studies is that an 
important element of "skill" is involved in being a successful teacher. 25 
Skill refers simply to the ability of some teachers to promote higher 
achievement among their students. The evidence previously presented 
then indicates that it is currently impossible to identify, much less to 
measure, components or elements of this skill with any precision. 
Moreover, the direct evidence casts doubt on whether any form of 
teacher training course could be organized to foster high skill levels in
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teachers. In simplest terms, if we cannot define or measure it, how can 
we teach it?
Implications for Equity and School Finance Reform
I now turn to the application of this evidence to consideration of 
school finance reform. Here I sketch some obvious and some less obvi 
ous implications of the preceding findings. Again, while school finance 
policy frequently contains many state-specific nuances, this discussion 
concentrates on two common elements of "reform." Most school 
finance reform programs, based on simplistic equity notions, assume 
that a basic objective is to limit local variations in school expenditure 
or, if variations are to exist, to insure that such variations are not 
related to the property wealth of the district.
The Central Implication
The evidence on school performance indicates that variations in 
school expenditure are exceedingly poor measures of the variations in 
education provided to students. Most directly, when students' learning 
is the concern, the conventional evidence about inter-district disparities 
in spending does not identify where educational deficiencies are to be 
found, and such evidence is generally irrelevant for either an equal pro 
tection or an educational disparity court case. 26 Such evidence about 
expenditure simply does not indicate differential provision of educa 
tion. Therefore, showing how expenditures vary, either absolutely or in 
accordance with characteristics of districts and students, does not have 
much use.
We must be quite precise about the interpretation of expenditure. As 
previously noted, most economists, including myself, would readily 
accept that differences in spending would be directly related to the 
education provided if schools were operating efficiently. The previ 
ously presented evidence indicates clearly, however, that assuming 
efficiency in spending is entirely inappropriate.
While there are many alternative ways to define and measure educa 
tional equity, only the most narrow of these would call for paying
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attention to expenditure variations in the face of the evidence that such 
expenditure variations are unrelated to the education provided. The 
standard employed would have to be a rigid one linked to dollars, with 
total disregard for the quality of schooling received by students.
In other words, equity and efficiency are inextricably linked. It is not 
possible to ignore efficiency issues under the guise of being concerned 
solely with equity.
Other Implications
There is another side to this discussion: What is likely to happen if 
we disregard the evidence on the interpretation of expenditure differ 
ences and simply make policy on the basis of expenditure differences? 
This consideration is prompted by a few arguments that are sometimes 
heard, such as: "The educational problem of the poor is serious, and 
equalizing expenditure cannot hurt;" or "We should at least give every 
one the same chance to make mistakes." The policies flowing from 
such notions do, unfortunately, have a down side to them.
First, a likely reaction to any move to lessen variation in expenditure 
is to increase the total level of expenditure on schools. The reason is 
simple: a state legislature, faced with a need to alter expenditure pat 
terns, finds it much easier to redistribute a larger pie than a fixed pie. In 
the school finance debate, this is frequently referred to as "leveling 
up," or bringing the low-spending districts up to the spending levels of 
the top districts. The arguments behind the policy are generally based 
either on the need to do better or on pure political necessity. On the 
other hand, because of the potential for disruption and the obvious 
divisiveness of "leveling down," there is seldom much interest in this 
idea. The previous evidence indicates, however, that added funds will 
on average be dissipated on things that do not improve student 
achievement (at least unless other, larger changes are also made). 
Teachers, administrators, and perhaps taxpayers in some districts gain 
ing funds will probably be happier, but the average state taxpayer and 
parent will not find that the resulting changes do much more than 
increase tax bills.
Second, there is no assurance that the new funds will go to the 
schools of poor children. As indicated previously, one of the pervasive 
views of finance "reform" is that poor children will be helped (or at
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least will have a better chance by virtue of greater funding). However, 
reform schemes designed to follow district wealth patterns can lead to 
unexpected outcomes because frequently there is not a strong relation 
ship between district wealth and the concentration of student poverty. 
Some states find that wealthier districts in terms of property wealth per 
student also have concentrations of poorer families and children. New 
York State provides a good illustration. Consider the six largest cities 
in New York State: New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Yonkers, Syra 
cuse, and Albany. Albany and Yonkers have tax bases in which real 
property per student is greater than the state average; New York City, 
Rochester, and Syracuse have tax bases per student only slightly below 
the state average; and Buffalo is left with a tax base 30 percent below 
the state average. Yet all of these districts except Yonkers have poverty 
rates for children above the state average. For example, while the aver 
age poverty rate in New York State for children 18 or younger in 1980 
was 19 percent, it was over 36 percent in New York City and over 30 
percent in Buffalo.27 The largest districts in the state intervened (unsuc 
cessfully) on the side of the plaintiffs in the Levittown case and intro 
duced a new argument, municipal overburden,28 in order to protect 
their funding. In other states, property wealth and poverty may be neg 
atively correlated—that is, high property wealth tends to be found in 
districts with a small poverty population, but even in these states the 
overall pattern clearly does not hold jurisdiction by jurisdiction. 29 
Therefore, while not inevitable, it is likely that many districts serving 
poor children are hurt in spending terms by plans to neutralize expen 
diture on the basis of district wealth. Moreover, because of a combina 
tion of federal and state grants, districts with concentrations of poor 
students frequently have above average spending, regardless of their, 
property wealth or overall economic health. 30 Programs to limit varia 
tions in expenditure could operate to cut back existing compensatory 
spending for disadvantaged students.
Third, spending differences may not even accurately reflect the real 
resources each district is able to deliver (i.e., the actual educational 
inputs). This is the simple result of possible cost differentials facing 
individual districts. That is, if districts face different prices for things 
they might buy, from teachers to buildings and equipment, dollar varia 
tions themselves do not indicate variations in available real resources. 
As a simple example, if the schools in one city were less pleasant and
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desirable than those in other cities, it would be necessary to pay a 
higher salary to hire a teacher of equal quality. 31 An extension of this 
notion involves districts faced with concentrations of students who are 
more difficult to educate because of a variety of pre-existing educa 
tional deficiencies. These, like cost differences for inputs, lead to 
expenditure variations in districts behaving in an otherwise identical 
manner. (Indeed, many state funding formulae recognize such issues 
and attempt to adjust for input cost differences or for differences in stu 
dent preparation, handicap status, and the like, even though the magni 
tude of any real cost differences is poorly understood).
Fourth, districts themselves are not entities to which educational 
policies should be geared. Individuals choose among districts when 
they enter an area and move among districts after they live in an area. 
In fact, there is extensive evidence that individuals make choices 
among districts in part to satisfy their demands for various public ser 
vices. Some people who place considerable weight on schooling search 
for districts that seem to emphasize quality schooling. Others who 
emphasize other goods or even low public expenditure seek districts 
that provide an agreeable level and pattern of the services they are 
looking for. Certainly this system has some drawbacks. Moving can be 
expensive, and some might find it difficult to move to the districts they 
would like, for example, because of housing prices, commuting costs, 
or discrimination. Nevertheless, the fundamental fact for this discus 
sion is that individuals generally have considerable latitude in choos 
ing schools. They are not inextricably tied to a particular district and 
are not doomed to whatever expenditure levels currently exist in a spe 
cific district. Finally, individual districts change their expenditure in 
line with the desires of the population and with population shifts, so 
that districts may increase or decrease their expenditure over time. For 
example, it is possible to trace the movement of district expenditure in 
the State of Indiana between 1977 and 1987. Only forty-three of the 
seventy-six top spending districts in 1977 remained in the top quartile 
in 1987; only forty-two of the seventy-six bottom quartile districts 
remained there from 1977 through 1987. Thus, policy discussions that 
speak generally of the population as captives of districts with undesir 
able spending patterns tend to miss an extremely important feature of 
the political economy of local jurisdictions. (The special problems of 
"mobility-constrained" groups, such as the poor, are discussed below).
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Fifth, the preferences and movements of citizens across district 
boundaries have direct ramifications for the observed distribution of 
property wealth. Specifically, districts that appear to offer a particularly 
favorable tax and school quality package will appear relatively attrac 
tive to many people. This will lead to a bidding up of housing prices in 
such desirable jurisdictions, because they are in demand, other things 
being equal. In fact, it is well documented that "otherwise identical" 
houses will sell for different amounts because of citizens' evaluations 
of the taxes and the schooling being offered. (See Tiebout 1956, Gates 
1969, Rosen and Fullerton 1977, and Wendling 1981). Another way of 
saying this is that some people pay for their schooling up front through 
the capitalization of school advantages into the price of homes. Some 
places that initially look attractive from the vantage point of the tax 
rate alone are really less attractive because the low rate is multiplied 
times a high valuation (relative to the other attributes of the home). 
This has, among other things, a direct effect on the property tax base of 
the community—something that is often entered into the discussion of 
the "inequities" of the school finance system. Moreover, reform 
changes in the funding formula of the state imply distributing some 
what arbitrary capital gains and losses across the jurisdictions in the 
state. Some places will be made more fiscally attractive and some less 
by major changes in the financing laws, leading to changes in the capi 
talization of fiscal differences.
Sixth, in most states spending levels reflect a wide variety of things, 
including the preferences of the citizens. While it is common to argue 
that local property wealth is the primary determinant of expenditure 
differences, that simply is not the case. For example, even though New 
Jersey and Indiana have relied on local property taxes to fund schools, 
rough estimates indicate that less than a fifth of the variation in expen 
diture would be eliminated by totally equating local property wealth 
per student. 32 A combination of local preferences, differences in stu 
dent needs, curricular choices, cost differentials, and a variety of other 
factors completely dominate property wealth in the determination of 
the pattern of expenditure.
Seventh, differences in tax rates across communities bear no direct 
relationship to the degree of educational equity. Most importantly, 
school finance reform has been based on perceived differences in the 
quality of education available, and the quality of education is not
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related in any simple way to tax rates. The tax rate provides an indica 
tion of the price that residents face to raise funds for schools, and high 
tax rates might indicate that some districts find it more difficult than 
others to raise funds through the property tax. But tax rates differ 
according to a variety of factors, including community preferences, 
community income and wealth, the amount of nonresidential wealth in 
the tax base, and so forth. The pattern of tax rates may be an issue from 
the standpoint of various notions of "taxpayer equity," but tax rates sel 
dom have much to do with considerations of equity in education. Fur 
ther, while the education clauses of state constitutions may require 
states to provide certain levels of education, they never indicate that 
school tax rates must be equalized across a state.
This list of likely ramifications underscores the point that simple 
alterations in expenditure patterns can have consequential and undesir 
able effects. What is already known about the educational process and 
about behavior of local jurisdictions leads to the inescapable conclu 
sion suggested in my introduction: the general assumptions behind 
early school finance reform are misleading at best.
Magnitude of Expenditure Effects
The evidence presented in Table 1 did indicate that a majority of 
studies found a positive relationship between aggregate expenditure 
and student performance, albeit few statistically significant relation 
ships. While this finding might suggest a potential for equity improve 
ment by means of adding resources to low-spending districts, moving 
to such policy deliberations requires consideration of the magnitude of 
any expenditure effects. Specifically, how much could achievement in 
low-spending districts be altered by an infusion of new resources?
Two alternative estimates, representing very different circum 
stances, illustrate why the magnitude of performance change associ 
ated with expenditure increases must enter into policy considerations. 
First, Wendling and Cohen (1981) conducted a study of expenditure 
effects in 1977-78 in New York State, the state with the second highest 
rate of spending (behind Alaska) during that year.33 Second, new evi 
dence for 1991 from the State of Alabama, with the 46th highest 
spending rate in 1990, provides information about expenditure rela 
tionships at low levels of expenditure.
54 Can Equity Be Separated from Efficiency in School Finance Debates?
New York has consistently been at or near the top of spending on 
schools across all states. Its average expenditure in 1978 was 45 per 
cent above the average for the country. Wendling and Cohen (1981) 
examine whether or not expenditure differences among districts in 
New York matter for student achievement, and they conclude that 
indeed expenditure is important. They analyze average third-grade 
reading and mathematics achievement for 1,021 districts. While they 
examine various model formulations and different groupings of dis 
tricts,34 the results for the entire state are representative and provide a 
clear indication of how expenditure relates to student performance.
The estimated effect of approved operating expenditure35 on student 
performance is uniformly statistically significant, but the magnitude of 
the estimates shows the difference between statistical significance and 
policy significance. The estimated expenditure parameters are .001 and 
.002 for third-grade reading and mathematics performance, respec 
tively. This implies that a $1,000 increase in expenditure per student 
yields an additional point on the reading test and an additional two 
points on the mathematics test. While absolute scores are difficult to 
interpret, some idea of magnitude can be gained by looking at move 
ment in the distribution of spending and performance. An increase of 
$1,000 is a 50 percent increase in state school spending and is 2.2 stan 
dard deviations in expenditure within the sample of schools, but it 
yields an increase in performance of only .2 to .3 standard deviations. 
This is equivalent to moving the average student up to around the sixti 
eth percentile or to moving a student starting at the 10th percentile to 
the 15th percentile. In simple terms, attempting to increase perfor 
mance through simple increases in expenditure is very expensive.
Alabama is a relatively low-spending state, falling at the other end 
of the distribution from New York State. The state's highest-spending 
district in 1991 (Mountain Brook) had total current expenditure per 
student of $5,113. This is slightly below the mean level for the entire 
nation in 1991, for which the preliminary estimates are $5,237. The 
minimum spending in Alabama was about $2,900 per student. Thus, 
variations in spending in Alabama should provide some insight into 
whether or not there exists some threshold expenditure below which 
changes in spending have strong and noticeable effects on achieve 
ment—the issue that comes up in discussions of "adequacy" (Celis 
1992).
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The statistical analysis attempts to explain variations across districts 
in Alabama's Basic Competency Tests (BCTs). These are criterion-ref 
erenced tests adopted by the state board of education to measure 
whether or not students are accomplishing what was expected of them 
according to the curriculum for different grade and subject areas (read 
ing, mathematics, and language arts). The performance measure is the 
percentage of a district's students meeting the minimum standards for 
the specific tests ("passing"). 36 Weighted least squares regression anal 
ysis is employed to estimate the effect of current expenditure per stu 
dent in average daily attendance (ADA) on performance, while holding 
constant the influence of family background and school district type 
(i.e., city or county district). 37
The results of estimates for the State of Alabama can be easily sum 
marized. Table 2 presents the estimated expenditure effects. None of 
the nine estimated relationships is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level, and one is even negative. 38
Table 2. Estimated Change in BCT Pass Rate for Expenditure Increase
of $1,000 per Student in Average Daily Attendance (ADA): 
______Alabama, 1990-91___________________________
Test and Grade
Read Read Read Math Math Math Lang Lang Lang 
gr3 gr6 gr9 gr 3 gr 6 gr9 gr 3 gr 6 gr 9
Change in
percent
passing
t -ratio
0.568
0.51
0.119
0.07
2.733
1.95
2562
1.70
0.423
0.19
1.574
0.78
1.656
1.00
-0.133
-0.07
2.565
1.54
NOTE: Estimates are the weighted least squares regression estimates of the determinants of per 
cent passing the Alabama Basic Competency Test (BCT) for different subject areas and grades 
for 127 school districts in 1990-91 (Hoover and Mt. Brook excluded). Estimates equations 
include percent of students receiving free or reduced lunch; percent nonwhite; city school dis 
trict indicator; and current expenditure per ADA. Weights are the number of students in average 
daily attendance. 
Abbreviations:
ADA: per student in Average Daily Attendance 
BCT: Basic Competency Test
Table 3 presents the results of two alternative policy scenarios. The 
first brings all of the spending of districts below the median in the state 
up to the median. The second,, which is sometimes called "full leveling
Table 3. Predicted Change in State Pass Rates from Increased Spending: Alabama Districts, 1990-91
A. Partial leveling-up by bringing all low-spending districts to median (cost=$74
Reading Mathematics
grade 3 grade 6 grade 9 grade 3 grade 6 grade 9 grade 3
1990-91 pass 
rate 81.3 64.3 73.1 78.8 59.4 43.8 73.2 
Change in pass 
rate 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Projected pass 
rate 81.4 64.3 73.4 79.1 59.4 44.0 73.4
million)
Language
grade 6 grade 9
59.7 52.2 
-0.0 0.3 
59.7 52.5
B. Full leveling-up by bringing all districts to top (cost=$1.05 billion)
1990-91 pass 
rate 81.3 64.3 73.1 78.8 59.4 43.8 73.2 
Change in pass 
rate 0.9 0.2 4.2 4.0 0.7 2.4 2.6 
Projected pass 
rate 82.2 64.5 77.3 82.8 60.1 46.2 75.8
59.7 52.2 
-0.2 4.0 
59.5 56.2
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up," brings all districts up to the level of the highest spending district 
in the state. Bringing all states to the median expenditure level would 
cost an additional $74 million (compared to total spending of $2.4 bil 
lion). While this increase of 3 percent is not a large relative change in 
expenditure, the top panel of table 3 indicates that it would yield 
imperceptible changes in performance on most of the tests. The bottom 
panel provides estimates of the achievement effects of full leveling 
up—i.e., bringing all district spending up to that of Mountain Brook. 
Such a policy would cost $1.05 billion and would yield at most a 4 per 
centage point increase in students passing the BCT in the state. The net 
impact of leveling up is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2 
Alabama Performance with Leveling-Up
r»ad-3 read-6 read-9 math-3 math-6 math-9 lang-3 lang-6 lang-9
Test and Grade
Actual 1990-91 Added Achievement
The importance of these results is clear. A policy of bringing all dis 
tricts to the top in spending would place Alabama schools at approxi 
mately the mean for the nation, up dramatically from its current
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position in the national distribution of spending. But this increase of 
the state's school spending by over one-third would have very small 
effects on aggregate school performance, at least if the schools behave 
in a way consistent with current practice. The resulting performance 
would remain very far below the state's goals of a 95 percent passing 
rate on the separate BCT tests.
There is also no evidence from analyzing the schools of Alabama 
that there exists a minimum threshold for school spending. There is no 
apparent range of stronger influence of spending on achievement than 
is found for the entire set of schools.
Policy Alternatives
Concerns about the implications of school finance reform do not, of 
course, vitiate the undeniable need to improve our public schools. The 
deplorable conditions described in Kozol (1991) require addressing. 
The intentions of finance reformers have been, in my opinion, good. 
Only their approach is questionable. Three general factors lead to the 
judgment that structural change is essential. First, in absolute terms 
students are not performing up to expectations. Performance, as mea 
sured by standardized tests over time, international comparisons of 
tests, various measures of workplace performance, and common per 
ceptions, is currently unacceptable. Second, as indicated by the previ 
ous evidence, there is overwhelming evidence that the resources 
devoted to schools—which have been both large and increasing-have 
not been effectively used. Third, the significantly skewed distribution 
of educational success, which leaves poor and minority students 
behind the rest of the population, is incompatible with most people's 
views on the goals of our society.
The previous sections of this paper indicate why "reform" as com 
monly included in school finance considerations is unlikely to address 
any of these causes of concern. The primary focus on the distribution 
of state financial aid or the limits on local fiscal options distracts atten 
tion from the issues of school organization, incentives for perfor 
mance, and the goals of the system. Because of the contentiousness of 
issues surrounding the distribution of funds, school finance debates
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have the potential for absorbing all energy related to school policy. 
Thus, in addition to generally offering few solutions to the problems 
previously identified, there is a significant opportunity cost in stalling 
some of the fundamental restructuring that must proceed if we are to 
deal with the current problems of schools. This problem of distraction, 
of course, is not inevitable, but there are strong forces pushing in that 
direction.
The concentration of courts and legislatures on finance reform while 
skirting away from more fundamental policy considerations does fol 
low a certain logic. Expenditures are readily measurable; there is a 
plausible argument behind their importance; there is no obvious alter 
native focus of policy; and operating on expenditure at least represents 
doing something. In other words, there are serious problems, and it is 
perceived that at least some attempt to remedy them should be under 
taken.
This logic is supported by the lack of convincing evidence that any 
specific approaches or policies will bring about significant improve 
ments in student performance. As reviewed previously, no set of sim 
ple changes involving either resources or programs shows a 
consistently strong relationship with performance.
But that is just the problem. Concentrating solely on dollars or 
resources does not confront the basic structural problems in the opera 
tions of schools. For example, while Jonathan Kozol (1991) points to 
the lack of achievement of impoverished students and calls for 
increased funding, he ignores the fact that the increased funding will 
be administered by the same school boards and administrators that he 
railed against in Death at an Early Age (Kozol 1967). An alternative 
approach, which suffers from many of the same problems, is to argue 
that additional funds would not be utilized in old unproductive ways 
but would be used in highly directed ways that insured achievement. 
This approach is often accompanied by the description of a specific 
program that has been shown to work in the few places where it has 
been tried. The problem, of course, is that we really do not know in 
general terms what will work, and the successful programs that have 
been identified have not been broadly introduced by districts with the 
funds to do so (for example, through general federal compensatory 
education funding or more generous local support). There is simply no 
reason to believe that a centrally directed system of increased funding
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relying on the simple identification of productive programs or spend 
ing patterns would be more productive than what has been currently 
observed.
An alternative formulation of educational policies avoids the pitfalls 
of previous approaches and offers considerably more promise of 
improvement. The alternative is moving to organizations and incentive 
systems that directly reward performance. The current set of policies, 
almost exclusively pursued, involves providing or requiring certain 
inputs—expenditures, class sizes, teacher attributes, and the like. 
These input policies are essentially pursued and continued without 
regard to their effectiveness, either in the aggregate or in specific 
instances. The proposed alternative is to concentrate on student perfor 
mance instead of factors thought (or hoped) to be important in deter 
mining student performance.
Various systems have been used or suggested to promote perfor 
mance-based policies, including merit pay for teachers, merit awards 
for schools that perform well, and a variety of plans emphasizing 
choices among educational institutions. Essentially, the common ingre 
dient of such plans is that resources are directly related to performance: 
if performance is high, resources are high; if performance is low, 
resources are commensurately low. For example, merit pay for teach 
ers operates by increasing salaries of those who perform well and not 
of those who perform poorly. Similarly, choice plans, which operate by 
allowing students and parents to choose among alternative schools, 
work by reinforcing parental judgments about quality schools, with 
suitable flows of resources to the schools that attract students.
The orientation of these policies is based on finding the correct 
incentives. If tangible incentives for improved performance are 
offered, most decision making can be expected to improve. Actual 
operations of hiring, promotion, curriculum, student placement, and 
the like—while not specified or regulated by a central authority—can 
be expected to respond to incentives. This has been demonstrated by 
wide-ranging research, both in education and elsewhere. Determining 
effective incentives, however, will take experimentation, bargaining, 
and evaluation.
There are many different versions of these performance-based 
plans, particularly of the choice plans. Commonly discussed choice 
plans range from magnet or special schools (which are fairly wide-
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spread in some urban districts) to full vouchers, which provide parents 
with funds to pay tuition at either public or private schools of their 
choice. Between these extremes are free choice within public school 
districts, open enrollment in any public school in the state, and tuition 
tax credits to rebate a portion of any tuition payments to the parents.
Performance-based options have been discussed widely and will not 
be reviewed here (see Chubb and Hanushek 1990). Instead I will 
merely highlight two features. Each option has conceptually appealing 
elements. And there is little historical evidence for each option that 
would provide details of either how it should be implemented or the 
magnitude of gains that might be expected. In other words, there is also 
considerable uncertainty, particularly about details of implementation, 
because these approaches are largely untried. The uncertainty should 
not, however, be taken as a reason for avoiding them but should dictate 
a more interactive approach to policy making instead. Moreover, as 
indicated, each performance-based option has considerable appeal, 
especially as an option to the almost universally employed input poli 
cies that have had such a dismal record.
The performance-based view of educational policy is very different 
from the current view of how to make policy. It also is not very amena 
ble to the simple remedies and simple tracking of responses so appeal 
ing within a court context. Nevertheless, for all its messiness and 
uncertainty, it offers some realistic hopes for improvement—some 
thing that is absent from narrow decisions on expenditure and other 
inputs.
The use of performance-based plans is supported by the research 
into educational performance reviewed above. This research indicated 
extremely large and significant variations in the performance of indi 
vidual teachers and schools. It is also very important to reiterate here 
that research has concentrated on the value-added of teachers and not 
on absolute performance levels of students. The research demonstrates 
that there can be low value-added in a "good" suburban school where 
the absolute level of achievement is quite high. Similarly, there can be 
high value-added within "bad" central city schools where students 
come to school quite unprepared but leave with marked increases in 
their achievement (see, for example, Hanushek 1992). While research 
cannot identify the components of successful and unsuccessful teach 
ing, it supports the simple but powerful notion that good performance
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can be identified by school administrators (see Murnane 1975 and 
Armor et al. 1976). Further, if this capacity can be extended to individ 
ual parents—who frequently at least act as if they can tell the differ 
ence between good and bad teachers—the groundwork for 
performance-based policies is established.
The overall point is straightforward: a range of effective policies 
appears to be available. They are, however, almost certainly very dif 
ferent from the traditional policy focus and the orientation of tradi 
tional school finance "reform" efforts. Moreover, instituting some of 
these fundamental reforms might take added funds, particularly in the 
implementation and learning phases. There is a huge difference, as 
should be clear, between expenditures directly linked to improved 
incentives and student performance and expenditures made in the 
hopes that something good will happen.
Finally, the restructuring of incentives in schools appears to be the 
only feasible answer to dealing with the gloomy record schools have in 
improving the performance of educationally and economically disad- 
vantaged youth. Various input-oriented programs have been mounted 
to deal with the disadvantaged, including a large portion of all federal 
spending on schools, but there is little evidence that this has had much 
impact. The alternative to restructuring incentives as proposed here is 
to continue to expand the programs that have thus far been unsuccess- 
fiil.
The evidence from past analyses demonstrates that good teachers 
exist in what are commonly thought to be bad urban districts. Their 
existence, however, is masked by generally low achievement levels; 
that is, even though an individual teacher may elicit more than one 
year of achievement growth within a one-year period, low absolute 
levels of performance could hide it. The policy problem is that we have 
not been able to attract, to identify, and retain sufficiently large num 
bers of such good teachers so as to have the kind of influence that is 
needed. This is just the appeal of performance-based incentive 
schemes. They are designed to reinforce good performance. We 
should, at the same time, not have overly optimistic expectations. As 
has been thoroughly documented, family influences are very powerful 
in determining achievement levels; so while specific teachers might 
have a substantial influence on achievement, they might not immedi 
ately overcome the deficits arising from factors outside the schools.
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Indeed, it may take the continued efforts of many good teachers over 
the course of the student's school career. This reality, however, should 
not deter our efforts to provide the best possible education.
Conclusions
School finance reform, as commonly espoused in courts and legisla 
tures across the country, is likely to work against the very improve 
ments most needed in public schools. By its nature, emphasizing 
primarily the distribution of expenditure per student, financing reform 
is almost certain to exacerbate existing problems of inefficiency in 
school operation.
Discussions of school finance reform typically attempt to separate 
considerations of efficiency from issues of "equity." Such a distinction 
is impossible, however, if the definition of equity involves the learning 
of children, which depends directly on the ability of school districts to 
translate resources into student achievement. If schools are ineffective 
at this task, little can be done to improve equity in student performance 
by simply heaping more resources on poorly performing districts.
Research into the relationship between resources and student perfor 
mance, conducted over the past quarter century, has demonstrated con 
clusively that, within the current organization and operation of 
schools, there is no consistent relationship between resources and stu 
dent performance. Common policy proposals—ones that are used to 
justify pleas for added resources to school districts—simply are not 
supported by evidence about their performance within schools.
Ignoring the evidence on performance is likely to worsen the prob 
lems of performance and inefficiency. The current incentive structure 
in schools does not promote efficient use of resources. Therefore, while 
additional funds might be used effectively by some districts, other dis 
tricts will probably use them ineffectively—which, if past history is a 
guide, leads to no aggregate improvement in performance from 
increased funds.
Large differences in performance exist among teachers and schools. 
Past evidence further indicates that parents and administrators can 
identify the best and worst among these. What is missing is an effec-
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live structure for channeling knowledge about performance into over 
all improvement in the schools. A variety of mechanisms for this have 
been proposed; although there is little operational experience with 
them, the key to each is that resources are more directly linked to per 
formance of the schools. This is an entirely different perspective from 
what has been found in most discussions of school finance reform, 
which gives no weight to student performance in making resource allo 
cations.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970) or Wise (1968).
2. The term "efficient" here is used in the economist's sense of obtaining the maximum possi 
ble performance from any given expenditure of resources. This definition is very different from 
that which appears to have been employed in a number of legal arguments emanating from state 
constitutional requirements to provide an efficient system of public schools.
3. See, for example. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970, p. 29) where they discuss Ribich 
(1968). They state, "Ribich's painstaking analyses suggest, if anything, a variety of sometimes 
conflicting relationships between cost and purely economic benefits from added dollar incre 
ments." They go on to indicate, "There are similar studies suggesting stronger positive conse 
quences from dollar increments, and there are others suggesting only trivial consequences, but the 
basic lesson to be drawn from the experts at this point is the current inadequacy of social science 
to delineate with any clarity the relation between cost and quality. We are unwilling to postpone 
reform while we await the hoped-for refinements in methodology which will settle the issue" (p. 
30).
4. For example, after discussing the difficulty of employing alternative measures of real 
resource differences (such as education levels of teachers), Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970, p. 
26) state: "We have no stomach for such an imbroglio. Ultimately we will need a standard appro 
priate to the rigors of judicial proof, and the only convincingly quantifiable item in the spectrum is 
money available for the general task of education in each district."
5. This section draws extensively on the presentation in Hanushek (1989) which in turn 
updates previous analyses in Hanushek (1981, 1986).
6. Current expenditures per student are deflated by the consumer price index. See Digest of 
Education Statistics, 1989, tables 88 and 114, and updates.
7. On the other hand, evidence from international tests in 1964 suggest that U.S. students have 
historically done relatively poorly (Husen 1967).
8. Digest of Education Statistics, 1988, table 51.
9. Moreover, only 3 percent of teachers in 1986 were in their first year of teaching (Digest of 
Education Statistics, 1988, table 54). The aging and stagnation of the teaching force have, how 
ever, been the subject of separate concerns.
10. The teacher salary data over time that are normally cited are provided by the National 
Education Association, and the sample and reliability of these are unknown (Digest of Education 
Statistics, 1988, table 57). An alternative source, the decennial population censuses, indicates 
smooth increases in salaries of teachers by decade, but these fall relative to annual earnings of all 
college graduates. See Hanushek, Rivkin, and Jamison (1992).
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11. There were also extensive analyses of the report's methodology and of the validity of its 
inferences. See, for example, Bowles and Levin (1968), Cain and Watts (1970), and Hanushek 
and Kain (1972).
12. A qualified study was defined as a production function estimate that: (1) is published in a 
book or refereed journal; (2) relates some objective measure of student output to characteristics of 
the family and the schools attended; and (3) provides information about the statistical significance 
of estimated relationships. Note that a given publication can contain more than one estimated pro 
duction function by considering different measures of output, different grade levels, or different 
samples of students (but different specifications of the same basic sample and outcome measure 
count as only one study). Search procedures for articles involved using the national educational 
data base (ERIC), searching the bibliographies of included and related articles, and scanning the 
tables of content of likely journals. No articles uncovered in this search and meeting the above cri 
teria were excluded, but inevitably some were missed. Articles from this time period that were 
overlooked in the search process but that have subsequently been discovered include Brown 
(1972). Walberg and Rasher (1974). Wendling and Cohen (1981). and Walberg and Fowler 
(1987). And, of course, there have been publications subsequent to construction of this table. The 
inclusion of these articles does not change the weight of the evidence or the substantive conclu 
sions reached.
13. The tabulations, when stratified by grade level, by whether individual or aggregate data 
were used, by output measure, and by value-added or level forms of estimation, yield the same 
qualitative conclusions.
14. Tabulated results are adjusted for variables being measured in the opposite direction; for 
example, the sign for estimated relationships including student-teacher ratios, instead of teacher- 
student ratios, is reversed.
15. Teacher-pupil ratios are treated here as synonymous with class sizes. This is not strictly 
the case and, in fact, could be misleading today. Several changes in schools, most prominently the 
introduction of extensive requirements for dealing with handicapped children in the mid-1970s, 
have led to new instructional personnel without large changes in typical classes. Since much of 
the evidence here refers to the situation before such legislation and restrictions, it is reasonable to 
interpret the evidence as relating to class sizes.
16. In any statistical analysis, which necessarily relies on a sample of all possible students and 
classroom environments, an estimated relationship may not be real but only perceived to be so 
because of the specific sample. Standard regression techniques provide ways of estimating the 
likelihood of being fooled by the sampling into thinking there is a relationship when in fact there 
is not. The shorthand term, "statistical significance," implies that less than 5 percent of the time 
when there is really no relationship would we get an estimate as large as the one obtained. In other 
words, when the estimate is "statistically significant," we are quite confident that some relation 
ship does indeed exist. In all cases, however, the estimates of statistical significance assume that 
the "correct" relationship is being estimated; that is, that the model of achievement is properly 
specified to include the relevant factors determining performance.
17. Note that not all studies report the sign of insignificant coefficients. For example, 45 stud 
ies report insignificant estimated coefficients for teacher-student ratios but do not report any fur 
ther information.
18. Note that only 113 studies report evidence about teacher education. Since data on teacher 
education are so readily available, it seems likely that a number of additional studies investigated 
teacher education effects but discarded the results without reporting them after finding negative or 
insignificant effects.
19. Information on each of these is less frequently available. This is partially explained by 
common reliance on administrative records which do not record them (except perhaps teacher sal-
66 Can Equity Be Separated from Efficiency in School Finance Debates?
aries). The level of the analysis and sampling frame for some studies offer another explanation; 
for example, since expenditures per student are generally measured for districts, the analyses that 
rely on individual student data for a single district would find no variation in this input and thus 
could not include it. More recent studies have generally concentrated on the analysis of individual 
student and classroom data and thus have not considered aggregate expenditure effects.
20. The interpretation of expenditure and salary estimates is sometimes clouded by including 
them in addition to teacher experience, education, and class size. Because multiple regression 
coefficients indicate the effect of a specific variable when all other variables are held constant, 
direct measures of expenditure, for example, in models also including the prime determinants of 
instructional spending would be interpreted as the effect of noninstructional expenditures on 
achievement. Also, because prices can vary across the samples in the separate studies, it is more 
difficult to interpret dollar measures than real input measures. Finally, eight of the thirteen signifi 
cant positive expenditure results in table 1 come from the different estimates of Sebold and Dato 
(1981). In this study, imprecise measurement of family inputs suggests that school expenditures 
may in fact mainly be a proxy for family background.
21. There are several obvious reasons for caution in interpreting this evidence. For any indi 
vidual study, incomplete information, poor quality data, or faulty research could distort the statis 
tical results. Even without such problems, the actions of school administrators could mask any 
relationship. For example, if the most difficult students to teach were consistently put in smaller 
classes, any independent effect of class size could be difficult to disentangle from the mismea- 
surement of a students' characteristics. Finally, the statistical insignificance of estimates can 
reflect no relationship, but it also can reflect a variety of data problems, including high correla 
tions among the different measured inputs. In other words, as in most research, virtually any of 
the studies is open to some sort of challenge.
22. This issue is discussed in Hedges (1990). "The published literature is particularly suscepti 
ble to the claim that it is unrepresentative of all studies that may have been conducted (the so- 
called publication bias problem). There is considerable empirical evidence that the published lit 
erature contains fewer statistically insignificant results than would be expected from the complete 
collection of all studies actually conducted. . .. There is also direct evidence that journal editors 
and reviewers intentionally include statistical significance among their criteria for selecting 
manuscripts for publications.... The tendency of the published literature to overrepresent statisti 
cally significant findings leads to biased overestimates of effect magnitudes from published litera 
ture. ..." (p. 19, listed references omitted).
23. These studies are analyses of covariance or, equivalently, regression analysis using indi 
vidual teacher (or school) dummy variables in addition to measures of prior student achievement, 
family background factors, and other explicitly identified inputs in a regression format. See 
Hanushek (1971,1992); Murnane (1975); Armor et al.(1976); and Murnane and Phillips (1981).
24. Perhaps the closest thing to a consistent conclusion across the studies is that "smarter" 
teachers, ones who perform well on verbal ability or achievement tests, do better in the classroom. 
Nonetheless, while plausible, there remains mixed evidence on how good teacher tests are at indi 
cating teaching ability. Tabulations similar to those in table 1 indicate thirty-one studies that have 
analyzed teacher verbal scores. Of these, eight find positive and significant relationships, and 
another ten find positive but insignificant relationships. These overall findings have been extended 
by a recent study by Ronald Ferguson (1991), which finds teacher ability as measured by scores 
on the Texas teacher test to be related to student performance, although that study is insufficient to 
change the weight of the evidence.
25. The idea of skill differences among teachers is not the only possible interpretation of the 
data. Differences in achievement across classrooms could reflect differences in teachers, in other 
classroom-specific factors, or a combination of both. The teacher skill interpretation is suggested
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by the fact that principals' ratings of teachers are correlated with the covariance estimates of class 
room differences; see Murnane (1975) and Armor et al. (1976). Evidence on the stability of 
teacher effects across grades, test area, and years for individual teachers further supports the inter 
pretation based on teacher skill; see Hanushek (1992). A discussion of skill differences in the pro 
duction function context can be found in Hanushek (1986).
26. School finance court cases have typically contained two elements. First, an equal protec 
tion argument is employed, which asserts that school expenditure differences related to variations 
in the local property tax base are discriminatory. Second, the "education clause" usually found in 
the state constitution is used to back an assertion that large variations in expenditures are imper 
missible. In both instances, the direct evidence provided for the alleged wrong involves variations 
in expenditures (sometimes linked to other things such as property tax wealth).
27. See New York State Office of the Comptroller, Financial Data for School Districts, 1982 
and U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1983 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov°- 
ernment Printing Office, 1983), tables A and C.
28. The argument of municipal overburden is that excessive demands for nonschool expendi 
tures faced by urban districts subtract from what otherwise would be available for schools. There 
fore, the state funding formula should recognize these other expenditures in allocating school 
support. See the arguments in Levittown. For an economic analysis, see Brazer and McCarty 
(1987).
29. As described, there is considerable variation in tax bases and poverty rates within a state. 
Thus, for example, Albany had a property tax base per student that was 34 percent above the state 
average, and yet it also had a poverty rate above the state average. Cutting back on funds for this 
"wealthy" district would potentially harm sizable numbers of poor children.
30. For example, in the situation in New York State, each of the six large districts except New 
York City had expenditures per student above the state average. See Financial Data for School 
Districts, 1982.
31. This situation, known to economists as "compensating differentials," can exist whenever 
jobs or job locations include different attributes such as riskiness, opportunities for learning, or, in 
the case of cities, favorable living conditions. For a general description, see Ehrenberg and Smith 
(1991) or Hamermesh and Rees (1988). In the context of teachers, see Toder (1972), Antos and 
Rosen (1975), and Kenny and Denslow (1980). Differences in the attractiveness of areas can also 
lead to differences in housing and land prices, thus affecting other inputs to education. See, for 
example, Roback (1982).
32. These calculations rely on estimates of the relationship between expenditures per student 
and wealth per student in districts in these states. The R2 of simple regression in each state was 
less than .20, indicating that one-fifth would be an estimate of the upper bound on the potential for 
equating spending by eliminating property tax base differences.
33. This study is entitled "Education Resources and Student Achievement: Good News for 
Schools," presumably because it was one of the few studies that ever found statistically significant 
relationships between expenditure and policy.
34. The basic regression models estimated include median years of schooling and percent 
below poverty in the district, percent minority students, district size, and pupil/teacher ratio in 
addition to expenditure. Expenditure is measured in several alternative ways, and some formula 
tions include treatment of geographic location of districts.
35. Approved operating expenditure excludes certain categories included in total current 
expenditure, such as some transportation, employee benefits, etc. The average approved expendi 
ture in 1978 for the sampled schools was $2,064, compared to an average total current expendi 
ture for the state of $2,527.
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36. The results are unchanged in a qualitative sense if performance is measured by average 
scores in the district as opposed to the percentage of students passing the BCT examinations. The 
magnitude of changes in average scores is somewhat less than of the changes in pass rates pre 
dicted for spending changes, a finding that is consistent with the notion that the average perfor 
mance is relatively close to the established passing score on most of the separate BCTs.
37. Family background is measured according to the percentage of students receiving free or 
reduced lunch and to what percentage is nonwhite. In 1990-91, there are 129 separate school dis 
tricts of which 67 serve countywide populations (outside of city districts), while the remaining 62 
serve individual cities. The estimates are weighted by the number of students in average daily 
attendance, in order to deal with the heteroscedasticity introduced by averaging performance 
across populations of different sizes.
38. The estimates presented exclude two districts (Hoover and Mt. Brook) that are significant 
"outliers in terms of expenditure levels. Because they are noticeably distant from most other dis 
tricts they have an undue influence on the estimated expenditure effects. Including these districts 
yields somewhat larger expenditure effects (ranging from 1.0 to 3.7 percent passing per $1,000 as 
opposed to -.1 to 2.7 percent passing per $1,000 in table 2). Three of the nine estimated coeffi 
cients are significant at the 5 percent level when the two outliers are included. These estimates do 
not, however, provide reliable information about the effects of increasing expenditure because 
there is little or no pattern to expenditures for the remaining 127 districts included in the analysis.
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Can Schools Be Held Accountable 
for Good Performance?
A Critique of Common 
Educational Performance Indicators
Robert H. Meyer 
University of Chicago
Educational indicators are increasingly being used to assess the effi 
cacy of American education. Local newspapers regularly report how 
students in local schools perform on nationally standardized tests, and 
a growing number of states publish formal school report cards that pro 
vide an assortment of student outcome, enrollment, and financial indi 
cators. In April 1991, President Bush elevated the discussion of 
educational indicators to the national level with "America 2000," a 
proposal to establish a national examination system, complete with 
school district, state, and national report cards (U.S. Department of 
Education 1991).
The growing demand for educational performance indicators has 
been motivated in large part by a growing demand for public account 
ability defined in terms of hard outcomes, such as standardized test 
scores, rather than inputs, such as teacher qualifications, class size, and 
course requirements. Demands for public accountability have been 
particularly strong in states that have dramatically increased expendi 
tures on education and in states that have launched major school 
improvement efforts. The increased demand for public accountability 
in elementary and secondary education has paralleled similar demands 
for increased accountability in other public sector activities, for exam 
ple, the Job Training Partnership Act and the new JOBS program, 
enacted as part of the Family Support Act.
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Despite the groundswell of interest in data on school performance, 
many educators and scholars fear that poorly implemented perfor 
mance indicators could ultimately be worse than no indicators at all. 
These fears are not groundless. As will be discussed in this paper, per 
formance indicators based on achievement tests could be flawed in two 
major ways. First, the achievement test underlying a performance indi 
cator could be susceptible to "narrow" teaching to the test or could fail 
to reflect a school's true educational objectives. Second, a performance 
indicator constructed from a simplistic or otherwise inappropriate sta 
tistical model could fail to reflect the true contribution of a school to 
growth in measured student achievement. Under these conditions, a 
high stakes system of educational performance indicators could 
severely distort the behavior of educators and students.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the statistical adequacy of the 
most commonly used educational performance indicators. One of the 
major conclusions of the analysis is that the typical indicators used to 
assess school performance—average and median test scores—are 
highly flawed as measures of school performance. As a result, they are 
of limited value, if not useless, for evaluating relative school perfor 
mance or school performance over time. Indeed, simulation results 
indicate that changes over time in average test scores could very well 
be negatively correlated with actual changes in school performance.
The analysis also demonstrates that the typical indicators used to 
assess school performance are likely to provide schools with the per 
verse incentive to "cream," that is, to raise measured school perfor 
mance by educating only those students who tend to have high test 
scores. The potential for creaming is apt to be particularly strong in 
environments characterized by selective admissions. However, cream 
ing could also exist in more subtle, but no less harmful, forms. For 
example, schools could create an environment that is relatively unsup- 
portive for potential dropouts, academically disadvantaged students, 
and special education students, thereby encouraging these students to 
drop out or transfer to another school. Alternatively, high-quality 
teachers and administrators could gravitate to neighborhood schools 
that predominantly serve high-scoring students.
The paper is .organized in nine major sections, the first of which is 
this introduction. The second section is a discussion of the problems 
that exist with traditional standardized tests; the third presents an
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assessment of the validity of the average test score. I demonstrate that 
this commonly used indicator is highly flawed as an indicator of school 
performance. In the fourth section, I demonstrate that an alternative 
indicator, the gain indicator, avoids all but one of the major flaws asso 
ciated with the average test score. In particular, the gain indicator fails 
to measure the value-added contributions of schools to growth in aca 
demic achievement. The seventh and eighth sections draw on simu 
lated and actual data to illustrate the advantages of gain indicators over 
average summary scores. I first investigate value-added indicators, and 
then consider the consequences of evaluating schools on the basis of 
incomplete indicators. Finally, I present recommendations for the 
phased-in development of valid educational performance indicators. 
An appendix provides technical information concerning the simula 
tions reported in the fifth section.
The Problems With Traditional Standardized Tests
Many educators and testing experts believe that there is a great need 
for new and improved ways of testing student achievement. A major 
problem with national standardized tests is that they are designed to 
appeal to all schools regardless of their educational objectives. These 
tests, if used in a high stakes indicator system, could drive teachers and 
administrators to focus almost exclusively on low-level academic con 
tent (Smith and O'Day 1990; Clune 1991). The achievement tests used 
as the basis for a performance indicator system should ideally reflect a 
balance of low- and high-end content so that the performance of 
schools that serve low- and/or high-achieving students can adequately 
be measured. This implies that a minimum competency test is unlikely 
to be satisfactory as the basis for measuring school performance. The 
problem with minimum competency exams is that many students 
receive a perfect score year after year. If the tests differ from one grade 
to the next, the recorded gain for these students is totally artificial. If 
the tests do not differ, their recorded gain is zero—in most cases, a vast 
understatement of their true gain in achievement. The simple achieve 
ment models presented later in this paper are not really appropriate for 
tests that exhibit low ceilings and/or high floors. However, the models
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could be extended to allow for the "censoring" of test scores at the high 
and low extremes of the test score distribution.
Critics of standardized tests also argue that conventional multiple 
choice tests are not well suited to assessing skills involving higher 
order thinking and problem solving, the kinds of skills that are increas 
ingly valued in our economy. They argue that the multiple choice for 
mat is generally limited to asking simple questions that have definite 
answers. As a result, a history exam is reduced to questions about dates 
and events, rather than the causes of the Civil War; a mathematics 
exam is reduced to a long series of addition and multiplication prob 
lems, rather than questions involving the application of mathematics to 
solving real-world problems. It is feared that a system of performance 
indicators based on such tests is likely to encourage teachers and 
administrators to focus their teaching on repetitive, rote learning.
These criticisms have stimulated a number of states to begin devel 
oping new, performance-based tests (Dominitz and Meyer 1991). One 
commonplace example of an authentic performance-based test is the 
field portion of a driving test. A driving test assesses, more or less, 
what a driver needs to know to drive on city streets. Indeed, the best 
way to pass a driving test is to practice driving. In contrast, typical 
standardized math tests fail to assess what most students need to know 
about mathematics, the capacity to tackle extended real-world prob 
lems calling for the application of diverse mathematics skills. Advo 
cates of performance-based tests argue that these tests will be 
relatively immune to the phenomenon of narrow teaching to the test 
and more congruent with state educational curriculum goals.
Level Indicators
Standardized student testing is conducted for a variety of different 
reasons: to provide information on individual students and obtain 
aggregate school-level indicators. At the student level, for example, 
standardized test scores may be used to diagnose student strengths and 
weaknesses in subskill areas, 1 to guide teachers in providing instruc 
tion that matches the needs of individual students, to guide students in 
making curriculum and career choices, to determine, in states that have
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minimum competency examinations, whether students are eligible for 
graduation, and to guide postsecondary institutions and employers in 
making admissions and hiring decisions, respectively.
These data, if aggregated to the classroom or school level, yield 
educational indicators that measure, for example, the share of students 
scoring above or below certain thresholds or the average level of 
achievement. I refer generally to statistics of this kind as level indica 
tors. As previously mentioned, level indicators are widely reported by 
schools. Indeed, they are calculated and readily made available by the 
companies that provide testing services to schools throughout the 
nation (Goldman 1990). They are also reported at the national level by 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Unfortunately, some 
of the level indicators reported by schools and states are subject to 
obvious statistical flaws. Well-known examples include average SAT 
and ACT scores. The problem with these indicators is that they are 
based on nonrandomly selected groups of students—in particular, 
those students who aspire to attend selective colleges or universities. 
As discussed by Hanushek and Taylor (1990), Powell and Steelman 
(1984), and Wainer (1986), these indicators tend to be highly unreli 
able as measures of the true level of achievement in schools and states. 
In this paper, I limit my analysis to level indicators that are not subject 
to these problems.
If correctly constructed and based on appropriate tests, level indica 
tors convey potentially useful descriptive information concerning the 
proficiency levels of students in particular classrooms or schools. 
Indeed, they could sensibly be used to target assistance (financial or 
otherwise) to schools that serve students with low test scores. The crit 
ical question for the present discussion is whether such indicators are 
valid and useful measures of school or classroom performance. The 
answer to this question is no. School performance indicators, by defini 
tion, must validly measure the contribution of schools to growth in stu 
dent achievement for students in particular grades or sequence of 
grades.
Average (or median test) scores fail to do this for four reasons. First, 
the average test score fails to localize school performance to a specific 
classroom or grade level—the natural unit of accountability in a tradi 
tional school. 2 This lack of localization is, of course, most severe at the 
highest grade levels. In my judgment, a performance indicator that
80 Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance?
fails to localize school performance to a specific grade level or class 
room is likely to be a relatively weak instrument of public accountabil 
ity.
Second, the average test score reflects information that is aggre 
gated across time and grade levels and therefore tends to be grossly 
out of date. For example, consider the average test score for a group of 
high school seniors. The test scores for these students reflect learning 
that occurred in kindergarten, roughly twelve-and-one-half years ear 
lier, through the twelfth grade. Indeed, a twelfth-grade level indicator 
could be dominated by information that is ten or more years old. 3 The 
fact that average test scores reflect out-of-date information severely 
weakens them as instruments of public accountability. In order to allow 
educators to react in a timely and responsible fashion, performance 
indicators must reflect information that is current.
Third, average test scores at the school, district, and state levels tend 
to be highly contaminated due to student mobility in and out of differ 
ent school systems. For example, the typical twelfth-grade student is 
likely to attend several different schools over the period spanning kin 
dergarten through twelfth grade. For this student, a test score reflects 
the contributions of more than one and possibly many different 
schools. The problem of contamination is compounded by the fact that 
rates of student mobility tend to differ dramatically across schools. 
Contamination is apt to be especially high in communities that undergo 
rapid population growth or decline or experience significant changes in 
their occupational and industrial structure. Contamination due to stu 
dent mobility is probably a relatively minor problem at the national 
level, since rates of in- and out-migration are low compared to rates of 
mobility within the nation.
Fourth, the average test score is not a value-added indicator; that is, 
it fails to measure the distinct contribution of a school to growth in 
educational achievement. As a result it absorbs differences across 
schools in student achievement levels that are due not to differences in 
school productivity but rather to variations in student achievement 
prior to entering school and to differences in growth in student 
achievement that are systematically related to differences in student 
and family background characteristics.
In summary, the average test score suffers from four major flaws, 
any one of which could be sufficient to invalidate it as a measure of
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school performance. In the next section I therefore consider an alterna 
tive indicator that largely avoids the problems of nonlocalization, 
aggregation across time and grade levels, and contamination, namely, 
the gain indicator. Immediately following is a series of simulations that 
compare the average test score relative to the gain indicator.
Gain Indicators
The gain indicator measures the average growth (or gain) in 
achievement from one point in time to another for a given cohort of 
students. If students are tested at least once a year, the gain indicator 
largely avoids three of the problems that seriously undermine the aver 
age test score as a valid and up-to-date measure of school performance: 
the problems of nonlocalization, aggregation across time and grade 
levels, and contamination due to student mobility. However, the gain 
indicator does not measure the value-added contribution of schools to 
growth in student achievement, that is, it does not measure school per 
formance. Rather, it measures the joint contributions of students, fami 
lies, communities, and schools to growth in student achievement. As 
such, it is an extremely informative descriptive indicator that should be 
included, along with the value-added indicators introduced below, in a 
comprehensive system of educational indicators.
The quality of the gain indicator depends critically on the frequency 
of student testing. Annual (or more frequent) testing is ideal for several 
reasons. First, performance is localized to single grade levels, the natu 
ral unit of accountability. Second, the information reflected in the indi 
cator is completely up to date. Third, contamination due to student 
mobility is limited only to students who transfer schools during the 
school year.
As the time interval between tests increases, the problems of local 
ization, contamination, and aggregation over time and grade levels 
become more acute. In fact, for time intervals of more than two years, 
it could prove difficult to construct valid and reliable gain indicators 
for schools with high mobility rates. There are two options in such 
cases. First, mobile students could simply be excluded from the data 
for a classroom or school. Dyer, Linn, and Patton (1969) refer to this as
82 Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance?
the "matched sample" approach. The problem with this approach is 
that nonmobile students are apt to be unrepresentative of the school 
population as a whole, both in terms of student characteristics and edu 
cational experiences. Moreover, the number of nonmobile students in 
such cases could be simply too small to yield reliable (statistically pre 
cise) estimates of average student gain. The second option is to include 
mobile students in the gain comparison for a given school even though 
the students obtained part of their schooling from another school. Of 
course, this option is feasible only if mobile students take the same 
tests in different schools and if their test scores are made available to 
the schools to which they move or exit. This clearly would be feasible 
only in states that have mandated state assessment systems. Even so, 
students who move across state lines would be lost unless the states 
happen to use the same state tests and are prepared to exchange student 
test data. A more fundamental problem with this approach is that the 
contamination introduced by mobile students severely jeopardizes the 
validity of the gain indicator if the mobility rate is high. The bottom 
line is that infrequent testing seriously compromises the validity of the 
gain indicator.
How Bad is the Average Test Score as a Measure of School 
Performance? Simulation Results
This section presents a series of simulations designed to assess 
whether the average test score has any value as a measure of educa 
tional productivity. I consider the validity of the average test score for 
comparisons across schools and for comparisons over time for the 
same school. The second type of comparison is particularly relevant 
for the purposes of evaluating the efficacy of school reform efforts.
Let L(c, g) represent the average level of achievement in a particular 
school for cohort c at the end of grade g. Similarly, let G(c, g) represent 
the average gain in achievement in a particular school for cohort c 
from the end of grade (g-1) to grade g, that is,
-l). (1)
Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance? 83
Equation (1) implies that, for a given cohort, the average level of 
achievement at the end of a particular grade, say grade 10, is the sum 
of prior gains in achievement plus the initial average level of achieve 
ment, that is,
L(c, 10) = L(c, 0) + G(c, 1) + ... + G(c, 10). (2)
Given alternative assumptions concerning initial achievement and the 
pattern of gain values over time and across grade levels, I can compute 
the average level of achievement at the end of grade 10 for each 
cohort.
To emphasize the contrast between average achievement and the 
gain in achievement, I assume that average initial achievement and 
average student characteristics are identical for all schools at all points 
in time.4 1 also assume, for simplicity, that all students begin first grade 
at the same age and advance from one grade to the next each year. In 
this case, a unique time index is implied by the cohort and grade, level 
indices. The relationship between time, birth cohort, and grade level is 
given by the formula5
/ = c + g + 6.
To facilitate comparisons across schools at the same grade level, I stan 
dardize the school gain values so that the average gain for the entire 
population at a given point in time is equal to zero at each grade level. 
Average 10th grade achievement is similarly standardized to have 
mean zero. Finally, I assume that the achievement test underlying this 
analysis is scaled so that the standard deviation of school gain values is 
approximately equal to 10 in the typical grade.6 To provide the reader 
with some intuitive sense of the standardized gain values, table 1 lists 
percentile values associated with a range of gain indicator values.
The first pair of simulations illustrate the failure of average test 
scores to localize school performance to specific grade levels. Subse 
quent simulations illustrate the consequences of contamination and 
aggregation across time and grades. Technical details of the simula 
tions are presented in the appendix.
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Table 1. Gain Percentile Values, Given the Assumption that Average
Gains are Normally Distributed
Gain indicator values, given zero Gain percentile values, given the 
mean and standard deviation assumption that average gains are 
equal to 10 normally distributed 
30 9^9 
20 97.9 
10 84.1 
5 69.2 
0 50.0
-5 30.8
-10 15.9
-20 2.3
_________-30___________________(U_________
The first simulation, as summarized in table 2, contrasts three 
schools that differ in terms of their patterns of (standardized) gain in 
grades one through six and grades seven through ten, respectively. To 
simplify the analysis I assume that these patterns persist over time and 
that there is no student mobility. School 1 exhibits gain values of zero 
(the average) at all grade levels. School 2 exhibits exceptionally high 
gain values in the upper grades and exceptionally low gain values in 
the lower grades. Finally, school 3 exhibits a pattern of gain values that 
is exactly opposite to the pattern exhibited for school 2. As indicated, 
the three schools differ fundamentally in terms of their gain values in 
the early and late grades. Despite these differences, however, the 
schools are indistinguishable in terms of their average level of achieve 
ment at the end of tenth grade. The exceptionally high and the excep 
tionally low gain values simply cancel out for schools 2 and 3.
A similar result is observed in the second simulation, as depicted in 
figure 1. Figure 1 charts the average level of tenth-grade achievement 
over time, prior to and after the implementation of hypothetical aca 
demic reforms in 1992. The academic reforms are assumed to follow 
an era of stable but average gains in achievement at all grade levels. 
Panels A and B in figure 1 depict two different scenarios. In panel A 
the average achievement gains at each grade level increase gradually 
after 1991. In panel B, the average achievement gains also increase
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steadily, but they are limited to grades seven to ten. The gain values are 
indicated on the graph by the solid gray lines. The tenth-grade achieve 
ment levels are indicated on the graph by the solid black lines. As in 
the previous simulation, the two schools differ substantially in terms of 
their gain values at different grade levels. Despite these differences, 
however, there is no perceptible difference between the two schools in 
terms of average tenth-grade achievement. In short, these two simula 
tions demonstrate that average test scores provide no information on 
differences in productivity between different levels of a school system. 
They do, however, suggest that average test scores provide at least a 
rough indication of the productivity of the school system overall. In 
fact, this is generally not true, as is demonstrated below.
Table 2. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement by School, Given 
Alternative Patterns of Gain
Average gain per grade
School
1
2
3
Initial
achievement
0
0
0
Grades
Ito5
0
20
-20
Grades
6 to 10
0
-20
20
Average 
achievement at
the end of
tenth grade
0
0
0
The second set of simulations illustrates the problem of aggregation 
across time and grade levels. These simulations demonstrate vividly 
how average test scores are determined in large part by past gains in 
achievement and hence are apt to be quite misleading as indicators of 
current gains. To highlight the problem of aggregation across time and 
grade levels I assume that achievement gains within a school are iden 
tical at all grade levels and that there is no student mobility. Figure 2 
charts average tenth-grade achievement and average achievement 
gains over time, prior to and after the introduction of hypothetical aca 
demic reforms in 1992. Panel A of figure 2 depicts a scenario in which 
academic reforms reverse a trend of gradual deterioration in average 
achievement gains across all grades and initiate a trend of gradual 
improvement in average achievement gains across all grades. Panel B
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Figure 2. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Alternative Patterns 
of Gain Over Time
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of Figure 2 depicts a scenario in which academic reforms have abso 
lutely no effect on average achievement gains. The reforms, however, 
are preceded by an era of gradual deterioration in average achievement 
gains across all grades, followed by a brief period (1987-1991) of 
gradual improvement across all grades. As indicated in the graph, the 
average tenth-grade test score provides a totally misleading view of the 
effectiveness of the hypothetical academic reforms implemented in 
1992. In panel A, the average 10th grade test score declines for five 
years after the introduction of successful reforms. In panel B, the aver 
age tenth-grade test score increases for a decade after the introduction 
of reforms that have no effect on student achievement growth. These 
results are admittedly somewhat counter intuitive. They arise from the 
fact that 10th grade achievement is the product of gains in achievement 
accumulated over a ten-year period. 7 The noise introduced by this type 
of aggregation is inevitable if school performance is at all variable over 
time. (The interested reader may want to peruse appendix tables A-3 
and A-4. These tables provide additional information concerning the 
two simulations discussed above.)8
The problem of aggregation over time and grade levels also intro 
duces noise into the comparisons of different schools at the same point 
in time. The degree to which noise of this type affects the relative rank 
ing of schools depends on whether the variance over time in average 
achievement growth is large relative to the variance across schools in 
achievement growth. To illustrate this point, figure 3 considers the con 
sequences of aggregation over time and grade levels for two schools 
that are identical in terms of average achievement gains over the long 
term. In the short term, however, average achievement gains are 
assumed to vary cyclically. For school 1, average gains alternate 
between ten years of gradual decline and ten years of gradual recovery. 
For school 2, average gains alternate between ten years of gradual 
improvement and ten years of gradual decline. These patterns are 
depicted in panel B of figure 3. The correct ranking of schools, based 
on average achievement growth, is noted in the graph. Panel A depicts 
the associated levels of average tenth-grade achievement for the two 
schools. The ranking of schools based on this indicator is also noted. 
The striking aspect of figure 3 is that the average tenth-grade test score 
ranks the two schools incorrectly exactly 50 percent of the time. In 
short, the noise introduced by aggregation over time and grade levels is
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Figure 3. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Alternative Cycles of 
Decline and Recovery in Average Gain
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particularly troublesome if one is comparing schools that are roughly 
comparable in terms of long-term average achievement growth. On the 
other hand, this problem is less serious for schools that differ dramati 
cally in terms of long-term average achievement growth. It is also less 
serious if cycles of decline and improvement tend to be perfectly corre 
lated. This seems unlikely as a general rule.
The third and final set of simulations illustrates the possible conse 
quences of contamination due to student mobility. These simulations 
illustrate the extreme sensitivity of average test scores to in-migration 
of students. To highlight the consequences of student mobility I 
assume that achievement gains within a school are identical at all grade 
levels and over time. The first simulation envisions an environment in 
which there are three types of schools that vary in terms of their aver 
age achievement growth. 9 Panel A of table 3 reports the effects on 
average 10th grade achievement of alternative rates of student mobility 
among the three schools. Panel B of table 3 reports the fraction of stu 
dents who change schools, given alternative annual rates of student 
mobility. Notice that student mobility causes average tenth-grade test 
scores to collapse toward zero, the average level. For the high- and 
low-gain schools, for example, an annual mobility rate of 20 percent 
leads to a reduction in average test scores of over 70 percent. In other 
words, the average test score is severely biased against high gain 
schools that happen to serve highly mobile student populations. These 
numbers suggest that average test scores are apt to be highly mislead 
ing indicators of school quality for schools exposed to high rates of 
student mobility. 10
If rates and patterns of student mobility vary over time, average test 
scores are also apt to provide a misleading picture of actual changes in 
school quality over time. This point is illustrated in figure 4, which 
simulates the effects on average tenth-grade achievement of an influx 
of students from a low-quality to a high-quality school system. Events 
of this kind undoubtedly occur frequently throughout the nation as 
school systems merge, communities grow, and the occupational struc 
ture of jobs evolve in a local labor market. Panel A of figure 4 simu 
lates the effects of a gradual influx of students that takes place over a 
ten-year period: 1992-2001. Panel B simulates the effects of an instant 
influx of students in 1992. Despite the fact that average achievement 
growth remains constant after the influx of students, average achieve-
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ment levels decline precipitously following the influx of students under 
either scenario. In the case of the gradual influx of students, the aver 
age level of achievement declines by as much as^SO percent. Moreover, 
average achievement does not return to its 1991 level until the year 
2010. In the case of the instant influx of students, the average level of 
achievement falls instantly by 90 percent and is back to its 1991 level 
within a decade. In short, idiosyncratic shifts in patterns of student 
mobility have the potential to grossly contaminate the average test 
score as an indicator of contemporaneous school performance.
Table 3. Consequences of Student Mobility
A. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement by School, Given Alternative Rates 
of Student Mobility
Annual mobility rate (percent)
Gain value
High 
Medium 
Low
0
100 
0 
-100
2
86.9 
4.4 
-86.7
5
74.9 
3.4 
-69.3
10
56.7 
0.3 
-56.7
20
26.8 
-3.8 
-28.1
40
13.4 
-2.3 
-11.3
B. The Fraction of Students Who Change Schools while in Grades 1 through 10, 
Given Alternative Rates of Student Mobility (percent)
One or more
changes
Two or more
changes
0
0
17.0
1.7
37.0
8.7
62.7
21.7
89.3
56.0
99.7
94.0
The simulations presented in this section demonstrate that average 
test scores have the potential to provide a totally misleading portrait of 
educational productivity, both over time and across schools. Indeed, 
the simulations possibly understate the degree to which average test 
scores are flawed as valid measures of school performance since they 
address the problems of nonlocalization, aggregation, and contamina 
tion one at a time, not simultaneously. Fortunately, gain indicators 
largely avoid the three problems investigated in the above simulations. 
Moreover, these indicators are generally easy to compute.
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Figure 4. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Different Patterns of 
Student Mobility
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An Example Based On National Data
The policy significance of the above discussion is aptly illustrated 
using data on average mathematics scores from 1973 to 1986 from the 
National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP). As indicated in 
panel A of table 4, NAEP scores for eleventh graders exhibit the by- 
now familiar pattern of sharp declines from 1973 to 1982 and then par 
tial recovery between 1982 to 1986. The eleventh-grade data, by them 
selves, are fully consistent with the premise that academic reforms in 
the early and mid-1980s generated substantial gains in academic 
achievement. In fact, an analysis of the data based on gain indicators 
rather than average test scores suggests the opposite conclusion—see 
panel B of table 4. Gain indicators were constructed in panel B by 
computing the change in average test scores over time for given birth 
cohorts." The gain indicators reveal that achievement growth during 
the 1982 and 1986 period was actually no better than achievement 
growth during the prior 1978 to 1982 period. In fact, gains from sev 
enth to eleventh grade were actually slightly lower during the 1982 to 
1986 period than in previous periods! The rise in eleventh-grade math 
scores from 1982 to 1986 apparently stems from an earlier increase in 
achievement growth for that cohort rather than from an increase in 
achievement growth over grades seven to eleven. In short, these data 
provide no support for the notion that high school academic reforms 
generated significant increases in test scores during the mid-1980s. 
These data also vividly confirm the general superiority of gain indica 
tors, relative to level indicators, as measures of educational productiv 
ity.
Value-Added Indicators
As discussed in the previous section, the gain indicator measures the 
joint contribution of students, families, communities, and schools to 
growth in student achievement. The problem is that a school may rate 
highly in terms of a gain indicator primarily or solely because the 
school serves students capable of rapid achievement growth. Unfortu-
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nately, failure to achieve a valid measurement of school performance 
could provide schools with the incentive to improve "measured" per 
formance simply by trying to control the types of students who attend 
their schools.
Table 4. NAEP Mathematics Exam Data___________________
A. Average Test Scores 
Grade/Age 1973 1978 1982 1986
3rd/9 
7th/13 
llth/17
219.1 218.6 219.0 
266.0 264.1 268.6 
304.4 300.4 298.5
221.7 
269.0 
302.0
B. Average Test Score Gains
3rd to 7th/9 to 13 
7thtollth/13tol7
1973 to 1978 1978 to 1982
45.0 50.0 
34.4 34.4
1982 to 1986
50.0 
33.4
SOURCE: Dossey et al (1988).
In order to isolate the distinct contribution of a school to growth in 
student achievement, a statistical model must be used. The statistical 
model, if valid, allows one to estimate for each school or classroom the 
expected (or average) gain in achievement that would be realized by a 
given student. In this sense, the model estimates school performance 
controlling for differences across schools in student characteristics and 
perhaps school-level variables such as aggregate student and commu 
nity characteristics. If these characteristics differ significantly across 
schools or classrooms, value-added and gain indicators could differ 
significantly. Dyer, Linn, and Patton (1969), Hanushek (1972), and 
Murnane (1975) were among the first researchers to estimate value- 
added indicators of school performance.
What variables should be included as control variables in a value- 
added model of student achievement and school performance? From 
the perspective of school accountability, it is important to control for 
all factors external to schools, in particular, student and community 
characteristics. Performance with respect to intrinsic school and class 
room factors is what matters. In practice, most school districts have 
ready access to some, but not all, of the student characteristics that are 
likely to determine student achievement: (1) Is a student eligible for a
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free or reduced-price school lunch? (2) Is a student eligible for special 
education services? (3) Does a student's family receive financial assis 
tance from welfare programs? and (4) Is the student classified as being 
at-risk? It is not well known whether these variables adequately control 
for differences across schools in average student characteristics. If not, 
value-added indicators, as implemented, might not fully eliminate the 
distortions (see below) associated with level and, to a lesser extent, 
gain indicators.
The exact relationship between a gain and value-added indicator is 
as follows. For a given cohort at a given grade level, the average gain 
in student achievement G is the sum of two terms: the value-added 
contribution of a school to growth in student achievement P and the 
average contribution of (external) student and community characteris 
tics to growth in student achievement F(X), where X represents a set of 
student and community characteristics, and the function F is estimated 
from an appropriate statistical model of student achievement growth. 12 
Similarly, a level indicator is the sum of three terms: P, F(X), and aver 
age achievement prior to entering a given grade (see above section on 
simulation results). From the perspective of measuring school perfor 
mance, the term F(X) is a source of error in a gain and level indicator. 
Prior average achievement is an additional source of error in a level 
indicator.
The fact that gain and level indicators measure school performance 
with error has important implications for the use of these indicators for 
purposes of school choice and accountability. Because of the contami 
nation due to these errors, level indicators, and to a lesser extent gain 
indicators, are likely to give students the wrong signals about which 
schools to attend. In practice, this means that prospective students, 
both academically advantaged and disadvantaged, could be fooled into 
abandoning an excellent neighborhood school simply because the 
school served students that were disproportionately academically dis 
advantaged. At the other extreme, these indicators could contribute to 
complacency on the part of families whose children attend schools that 
disproportionately serve academically advantaged students. In fact, 
these schools could be adding relatively little to the achievement 
growth of their students. In short, indicators other than the value-added 
performance indicator convey potentially inaccurate information about 
school quality and therefore are likely to distort the school choices of
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students and families. As a result, student achievement is apt to be 
lower than it would otherwise be.
The consequences of using invalid performance indicators for pur 
poses of public accountability are if anything potentially much worse 
than in the case of school choice. This stems from the fact that the indi 
cators used for purposes of public accountability have the potential to 
influence, if not determine, the objectives of teachers and administra 
tors. Indeed, if teachers and administrators are in any way rewarded or 
penalized on the basis of their performance with respect to a given 
indicator, they are likely to respond to these incentives by trying to 
improve their measured performance. In other words, they will have an 
incentive to "teach to the test." More to the point, they will have an 
incentive to "teach to the indicator derived from the test."
This phenomenon is the key to understanding why valid perfor 
mance indicators are potentially capable of generating substantial gen 
uine improvements in school quality. However, it is also the key to 
understanding how statistically invalid indicators could severely dis 
tort the behavior of teachers and administrators. Consider, for example, 
the consequences of using a level indicator to evaluate school perfor 
mance. A level indicator is the sum of school performance and two 
error components that are determined by average student characteris 
tics, average prior achievement, and community characteristics. If this 
indicator is used to evaluate school performance, it provides teachers 
and administrators with the incentive to raise measured school perfor 
mance by teaching only those students who rate highly in terms of 
average student characteristics, average prior achievement, and com 
munity characteristics. In general, these students will be high socioeco- 
nomic status, academically advantaged students. This is the 
phenomenon referred to earlier as "creaming".
The potential for creaming is apt to be particularly strong in envi 
ronments where schools have the authority to admit or reject prospec 
tive students and to expel already enrolled students. However, the 
problem could also exist in more subtle but no less harmful forms. For 
example, schools could: (1) create an environment that is relatively 
inhospitable to academically disadvantaged students, (2) provide 
course offerings that predominantly address the needs of academically 
advantaged students, (3) fail to work aggressively to prevent students 
from dropping out of high school, (4) err on the side of referring "prob-
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lem" students to alternative schools, (5) err on the side of classifying 
students as special education students (if these students are exempted 
from statewide testing), and (6) make it difficult for low-scoring stu 
dents to participate in statewide examinations. These activities are all 
designed to improve average test scores in a school, not by improving 
school quality but by selecting high-scoring students.
As an alternative to trying to select high-scoring students, high- 
quality teachers and administrators could gravitate to neighborhood 
schools that predominantly serve high-scoring students. Hence, using 
the average test score as a high-stakes performance indicator could 
trigger an exodus of highly skilled educators from schools that dispro 
portionately serve academically disadvantaged students.
One final problem with the average test score is that teachers, 
administrators, and the public are apt to correctly perceive it as an 
unfair measure of school performance, thereby undermining the legiti 
macy of the entire indicator system. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that this has occurred in one of the states studied by Dominitz and 
Meyer(1991).
The criticisms discussed above apply equally, although with less 
force, to the gain indicator, since it is subject to a single source of error, 
F(X).
Multiple Dimensions Of Performance
Thus far, I have ignored the fact that schools typically have multiple 
objectives, both academic and nonacademic. Several issues that arise 
in the context of multiple objectives need to be addressed at this point. 
First, it seems likely that an ideal performance indicator system would 
include separate indicators designed to match each and all of the objec 
tives adopted by a school. Such a system would probably include indi 
cators designed to measure school performance in conventional 
academic subjects, possibly mathematics, science, literature, history, 
reading, and writing; but it could also include indicators of school per 
formance in other areas, for example, citizenship, employment readi 
ness, and fine arts. The problem is that it could prove technically 
difficult, burdensome, and expensive to measure outcomes in all of
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these areas. If indicators are available for only a subset of objectives, 
however, it is possible, even likely, that those objectives would effec 
tively dominate all other objectives. This could distort the behavior of 
teachers and administrators by giving them the incentives to devote 
most of their instructional time to the subjects covered by performance 
indicators.
One solution to this dilemma is to measure school performance in 
the areas that are considered to be central to the missions of schools. 
Indeed, there could be advantages to adopting a more limited set of 
educational objectives than currently exists. The adoption of perfor 
mance indicators could conceivably force parents and educators to 
decide what educational objectives are really important.
It seems inevitable, though, that some important educational objec 
tives could be too difficult to measure. If so, one alternative is to mea 
sure the inputs (instructional time and resources) devoted to these 
activities. This could counteract the incentives to limit instruction in 
these activities in order to devote more time to activities that are evalu 
ated. On the other hand, the absence of performance indicators in par 
ticular areas eliminates the opportunity to hold schools accountable for 
their performance in these areas.
Second, it seems likely that some educational objectives could be 
more important than others. How can priorities of this nature be incor 
porated into an indicator system? One possibility is to construct an 
overall performance indicator that reflects the preferences of an indi 
vidual, community, or state. A linear, weighted average of individual 
performance indicators is one particularly simple example of a prefer 
ence function. Such a system has recently been adopted in California 
(Dominitz and Meyer 1991). One potential weakness of the linear pref 
erence function is that it allows high performance in one dimension to 
substitute fully for low performance in another. In fact, most students 
and parents are likely to prefer schools that are very good in many 
dimensions, as opposed to schools that are excellent in some areas, 
poor in others. If so, states and communities could adopt preference 
functions that limit the degree of substitutability between competing 
objectives. Examples of such functions include the Cobb-Douglas and 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions (Henderson and 
Quandt 1971). This is clearly an area for further research.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The average test score, one of the most commonly used indicators in 
American education, is highly suspect as an indicator of school perfor 
mance. 13 This indicator suffers from four major deficiencies: it fails to 
localize school performance to the classroom or grade level; it aggre 
gates information on school performance across time and grade levels; 
it is contaminated by student mobility; and it fails to measure the dis 
tinct contribution of schools to growth in student achievement. As a 
result, the average test score is a weak, if not counterproductive, instru 
ment of public accountability. The gain indicator, on the other hand, 
avoids three of the four problems that plague the average test score. As 
such, it is a very useful descriptive indicator. The value-added indica 
tor has the major advantage that it avoids all four of the problems that 
affect level indicators. In particular, it eliminates the incentive for 
schools to cream.
The value-added approach to measuring school performance relies 
on a statistical model to identify the distinct contributions made by 
schools to growth in student achievement. The quality of a value-added 
indicator is determined by four factors: the frequency with which stu 
dents are tested, the quality and appropriateness of the tests that under 
lie the indicators, the adequacy of the control variables included in the 
appropriate statistical models, and the technical quality of the statisti 
cal models used to construct the indicators.
In terms of the first issue, I believe that states need to seriously con 
sider testing students at every grade level, as is currently done in South 
Carolina (Dominitz and Meyer 1991), or at least at every other grade 
level, beginning with kindergarten. Annual testing maximizes account 
ability by localizing school performance to the most natural unit of 
accountability, the grade level or classroom. It also limits the contami 
nation caused by student mobility and yields up-to-date information on 
school performance. Less frequent testing, for example, testing at 
grades kindergarten, four, eight, and twelve, might be acceptable for 
national purposes, since student mobility is not really at issue at the 
national level. 14 For purposes of evaluating local school performance, 
however, the problems created by student mobility argue strongly for 
frequent testing. To limit the costs and burden imposed by frequent stu-
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dent tests, however, it might be sensible to vary the frequency of test 
ing across schools. Annual testing could be implemented only in 
schools or school districts where student mobility is high. In addition, 
annual testing could be implemented in areas with limited enrollments 
in order to improve the reliability of estimates in these areas, and in 
schools with low measured performance in order to monitor these 
schools with greater vigilance.
With respect to the second and third issues, it is important that states 
make it a major priority to collect extensive and reliable information 
on student and family characteristics and to develop state tests that are 
technically sound and fully attuned to their educational goals. Finally, 
further research is needed to assess the sensitivity of estimates of 
school performance indicators to alternative statistical models.
NOTES
1. For diagnostic purposes student test scores are often reported separately by subskill areas.
2. This point also applies to classrooms that serve students in more than one grade and 
ungraded classrooms.
3. This would occur, for example, if the variability over time of school performance is higher 
in elementary school than in middle or high school.
4. This assumption guarantees that differences across schools in average gain reflect differ 
ences in school performance rather than differences in student characteristics.
5. For example, the cohort born in 1980 entered first grade in 1986 and is expected to com 
plete twelfth grade in 1998. Note that the concept of the birth cohort needs to be modified slightly 
to accommodate school districts that require first graders to be six years old prior to beginning 
school.
6. To further facilitate comparisons across schools at the same grade level, gain values could 
be standardized so that the standard deviation is equal to ten for every grade in every year. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that gain indicators constructed in this fashion are not compara 
ble across grades or over time.
7. In the simulations discussed in the text, the average tenth-grade test score is, in fact, exactly 
equal to a ten-year moving average of average achievement gains. This stems from the simple 
assumption that achievement gains are identical at different grade levels in the same year.
8. The appendix tables report achievement gams by grade level and cohort. As indicated in the 
text, achievement gains change from year to year but are always identical across different grade 
levels in the same year. This shows up in appendix tables A-3 and A-4 as gain values that are 
equal on diagonal lines that run from the bottom left to the top right of the tables.
9. Average growth is assumed to be equal to 10, 0, and -10, respectively, in the three types of 
schools. See appendix A for additional details.
10. This conclusion is based on the assumption that at least some student mobility occurs 
across schools of different quality, a reasonable supposition, we think, in the absence of contrary 
data.
Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance? 101
11. NAEP was originally designed to permit this type of analysis. In mathematics, the tests 
have generally been given every four years at grade levels spaced four years apart. For this illus 
trative analysis, I assume that average test scores in 1973 are comparable to the unknown 1974 
scores.
12. For concreteness, consider the following statistical mode of achievement growth for stu 
dents in a given grade:
where i and j index individuals and schools respectively, Y represents growth in student 
achievement, X represents a set of student and community characteristics (indexed by k), a(j) 
represents a school-specific intercept, b represents a set of coefficients (indexed by k), and e 
represents a random error term. The gain indicator for school j is given by G = I Y(i,j)/n(j), where 
n(f) = the number of students in school j. The value-added performance indicator for school j is 
given by P = a(j). The average contribution of external characteristics in school j is given by
F(X)=ZI.b(k)X(i,j,k)/n<j). 
ik
13. Other level indicators, such as the median test score, are similarly suspect.
14. A kindergarten test is needed so that the growth in student achievement in grades one 
through four can be monitored. In our view, the National Assessment of Educational Progress and 
recent proposals for national testing in grades four, eight, and twelve are seriously flawed by their 
failure to include a test at the kindergarten or first-grade level. I suspect that one reason for this 
omission is that both enterprises are insufficiently aware of the flaws of level indicators and insuf 
ficiently aware of the advantages of gain and value-added indicators.

Appendix 
Descriptions Of Reported Simulations
This appendix presents results for the simulations presented in the text. 
Each simulation is defined in terms of the gain in achievement accrued by a 
student at a particular school in a given grade at a given point in time. The 
birth cohort subscript is implied by the grade and time subscripts, as discussed 
in the text. It is given by c = t - g - 6. For simplicity, I assume that students 
begin first grade at age six and advance to subsequent grades one year at a 
time. Gains in achievement are reported by grade and cohort and tenth-grade 
achievement for some of the simulations. Gains in achievement for a given 
year are reported on diagonal lines that run from the bottom left to the top 
right of the tables.
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Appendix Table A-1. Data for Figure 1A
Year
cohort
completes
grade 10
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average gain
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
by grade
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Average
achievement
in grade 10
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
6
10
15
21
28
36
45
55
Appendix Table A-2. Data for Figure IB
Year
cohort
completes
grade 10
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average gain
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
by grade
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
10
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Average
achievement
in grade 10
0
0
0
0
0
2
6
12
20
28
36
44
52
60
68
105
Appendix Table A-3. Data for Figure 2A
Year 
cohort 
completes 
grade 10
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average gain by grade
1
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Average 
achievement 
in grade 10
145
135
125
115
105
95
85
75
65
55
45
37
31
27
25
25
27
31
37
45
55
106
Appendix Table A-4. Data for Figure 2B
Year 
cohort 
completes 
grade 10
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average gain by grade
1
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
2
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
3
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
4
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
5
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
6
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
7
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
8
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
10
Average 
achievement 
in grade 10
145
135
125
115
105
95
87
81
77
75
75
76
78
81
85
90
94
97
99
100
100
107
Appendix Table A-5. Data for Figure 3, School 1
Year 
cohort 
completes 
grade 10
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average gain by grade
1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
3
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
4
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
5
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
6
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
10
7
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
8
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
9
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
10
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Average 
achievement 
in grade 10
110
126
138
146
150
150
146
138
126
110
90
74
62
54
50
50
54
62
74
90
110
108
Appendix Table A-6. Data for Figure 3, School 2
Year 
cohort 
completes 
grade 10
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average gain by grade
1
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
2
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
3
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
4
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
5
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
6
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
7
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
8
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
9
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Average 
achievement 
in grade 10
90
74
62
54
50
50
54
62
74
90
110
126
138
146
150
150
146
138
126
110
90
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A major issue in the literature on the economics of education is: Do 
schools make a difference? Do different schools produce different out 
comes, and if so, why? Numerous studies have analyzed this question 
at the primary and secondary levels, usually using cognitive learning as 
the output variable. Only a small number of studies have tackled this 
issue at the college level, where the research interest has largely 
focused on the returns to quantity rather than quality. These studies 
have used future earnings or occupational status as the output variable, 
consistent with the premise that an important function of education is 
to improve one's position in the labor market. Colleges can enhance 
productivity and earnings by imparting general or specific skills, or 
information that helps students make good choices about their future 
career directions. Studies of college quality, like those of the quality of 
primary and secondary schools, have come up with ambiguous and 
contradictory results.
For example, in his analysis of the NBER Thorndike earnings data 
(for a group of World War II veterans whose earnings were measured 
in 1969), Wales (1973) found that graduates of top colleges (as mea 
sured by the Gourman rating, which is related to selectivity) received 
significantly higher earnings. Using the same data, Wachtel (1976) 
found that college expenditures per student exert a positive effect on 
earnings, and Solmon and Wachtel (1975) found that college type, as 
measured by Carnegie classification, also matters. According to Reed 
and Miller (1970), college rank (as measured by the average verbal and
in
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mathematical aptitude of entering freshmen) had a positive effect on 
the weekly earnings of a sample of men surveyed by the Census 
Bureau in 1967. However, most of the students covered by these stud 
ies were in college prior to the vast expansion of the 1960s, which 
changed the nature of the higher education industry. In these regres 
sions, usually only one college characteristic is specified as an indica 
tor of quality. And only a small set of student background variables is 
included. Astin and others have argued that the impact of college qual 
ity is minimal once these are controlled (Astin 1968; Griffin and Alex 
ander 1978). Indeed, a study by Alwin (1974) found only a small 
relationship between occupational success and college characteristics, 
after controlling for student composition.
One key problem encountered by all these studies has been the diffi 
culty in obtaining detailed information about student characteristics, in 
order to control for ability, family influence, and prior education, 
which is essential if the purpose is to calculate the value added by the 
school. Longitudinal data tracking the individuals in a cohort are par 
ticularly scarce. Another problem has been the difficulty in obtaining 
disaggregated information about schools. A final problem is that we 
rarely have data about the student's college experience and academic 
achievement, such as choice of courses, major and GPA, that may 
influence earnings. (See Hanushek 1986, for a thorough analysis of 
these and other problems that beset the "school effectiveness" and 
"educational productivity" literature.)
In this paper we exploit a uniquely rich data set, the National Longi 
tudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) and the Post- 
secondary Education Transcript Study (PETS), to overcome these 
problems and answer the questions: Does it matter which college a stu 
dent attends? If it matters, which college characteristics lead to higher 
earnings? Do higher expenditures or a more selective student body 
imply superior results? Which is better, a large research university or a 
small liberal arts college? Does the public/private typology make a dif 
ference, as some feel it does at the secondary level? We also examine 
the impact on earnings of student behavior while at college. Are aca 
demic achievement and curriculum choice harbingers of future 
achievement? (For a preliminary analysis of these issues see James, 
Alsalam, Conaty, and To 1989.)
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We begin by setting forth our methodology, including our model, 
data sources, choice of variables, and statistical technique. In the sec 
ond part of this paper we present our findings concerning the effects of 
college characteristics, and in the third we give our results concerning 
the effects of other aspects of the college experience, particularly 
choice of major. The fourth section is a summary of our results and 
their limitations.
Briefly, our fixed-effects model shows that the particular college 
attended does indeed make a difference, explaining 17 to 29 percent of 
the variance in earnings. However, we are unable to tie this college 
effect down to observable college characteristics, which taken as a 
group explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance in earnings. These 
effects exist, but they are very small.
Moreover, whether fixed effects or observable characteristics are 
measured, the college effect becomes statistically insignificant once 
family background, labor market experience, and major are controlled. 
To a large extent the world perceives a differential college effect 
because it is perceiving "gross output" rather than "value-added" and 
is not taking account of the many other factors that affect earnings, 
some of which are correlated with choice of college.
In contrast to these negative findings about college effects, we find 
that what a student does while in college strongly affects future earn 
ings, even after all the other variables in our model are controlled. 
Apparently, direct measures of skill acquisition matter more than indi 
rect screening by college characteristics.
Methodology
The Model
As is well known, there are multiple outputs of higher education, 
including knowledge gained, earning power enhanced, values formed, 
amenities consumed, and research undertaken, all of which enter into 
student and social utility functions. In this paper we concentrate on one 
output of education—future earnings—as a function of all the jointly 
supplied inputs.
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We model earnings (Y) as a function of four sets of variables:
Xj = a set of individual characteristics including family background 
and prior academic achievement;
X2 = a set of institutional characteristics, including college expendi 
tures, college organization, and student body composition, which 
determine the value added by the college;
X3 = higher educational experience variables that are chosen by the 
student but may be influenced by the college;
X4 = labor market variables, such as experience and weeks worked per 
year.
Our focus here is on the impact on earnings of institutional characteris 
tics and other aspects of the higher educational experience.
Before presenting our results we outline the data and expected 
direction of causal relationships, and discuss our treatment of several 
methodological problems.
Data Sources and Sample
Information about student characteristics, earnings, and other labor 
market variables comes from the National Longitudinal Study of the 
High School Senior Class of 1972, which follows this cohort through 
further education and into the labor market. This survey gives detailed 
information about family background, education, and academic 
achievement prior to entering college, as well as subsequent labor mar 
ket experience. The fifth follow-up in 1986 includes 12,841 men and 
women. Two-thirds of the total had some postsecondary education and 
one-fourth had received their college degree. We deal in this paper 
with a subset of the latter group, the 1,321 males whose graduating 
institution was identified, who took at least sixty credit hours in that 
institution, and who worked for an employer at least twenty hours per 
week in 1985. Most of them had been out of college for seven to nine 
years.
There are 499 colleges and universities in our subsample. Over half 
are Ph.D.-granting institutions, three-quarters are public, and enroll 
ment size varies from 288 to 50,011. Many of the smaller colleges 
enrolled only one member of our sample, but 285 institutions (typi-
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cally the larger ones) had two or more observations, totaling 1,107 
male students; we used these as a subsample for the fixed-effects mod 
els. We obtained most of our data about the characteristics of these col 
leges and universities from the Higher Education General Information 
Survey (HEGIS), which conducts annual surveys of postsecondary 
four-year institutions; we chose 1975 as a representative year for our 
cohort. This was supplemented by data from Cass and Birnbaum 
(1975).
Finally, the Postsecondary Education Transcript Study gave us the 
college transcripts of each student, from which we derived the college 
experience variables. None of the previous studies on college quality 
has had access to such detailed information about curriculum choices 
and achievement in college. All financial data were inflated to 1986 
prices using the Consumer Price Index.
Institutional Characteristics
We view the college consumer as purchasing a set of characteristics 
that is experienced uniformly by all students at a given institution. In 
our fixed-effects model we identify each college by a dummy variable 
that captures all its observable plus unobservable characteristics. In our 
ordinary least squares (OLS) models we examine the observable char 
acteristics in greater detail. This section describes some of the observ 
able variables we use.
The school effectiveness literature has been particularly interested 
in the influence of "expenditures per student." If colleges were compet 
itive, privately financed, profit-maximizing institutions, and if consum 
ers cared primarily about future earnings and had full information 
about educational production functions, higher costs would have to be 
covered by higher prices which would be sustainable only if they led to 
higher future earnings. However, the institutions in our sample are 
public or nonprofit, much of their revenues coming from state legisla 
tors or donors, and devices such as accreditation procedures and repu 
tation limit entry. Under these circumstances, colleges may have 
potential profits with which to pursue their own discretionary goals, 
their nonconsumer funders may support multiple objectives, and stu 
dents may be uninformed about college effects or may care about 
many outputs of education besides future productivity. As a result of all
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these factors, we do not have a strong a priori reason to expect a sys 
tematic relationship between college expenditures and future earnings.
To investigate the expenditure effect, we started with the idea of 
decomposing college spending into its separate components—expendi 
tures on instruction, research, institutional support services, and finan 
cial aid. However, strong multi-collinearity precluded this strategy. 
Therefore we used, alternatively, the most inclusive measure, logged 
educational and general spending per student (LXPS); the most 
directly relevant measure, logged instructional expenditures per stu 
dent (LINSXPS); and a combination of inputs—the student-faculty 
ratio (S/F) and average faculty salaries (FACSAL). Ideally, we would 
have adjusted our measures of monetary inputs for regional cost differ 
ences, but unfortunately we did not have access to the detailed city-by- 
city, education-relevant cost-of-living index that would be necessary to 
convert these monetary inputs into real inputs. However, our experi 
ments with S/F captured the basic idea. As it turned out, the results for 
all the cost variables were very similar, and those with LXPS are pre 
sented in this paper.
We wanted to investigate whether institutions under public versus 
private control, with research versus teaching missions, and with pre 
dominantly graduate versus undergraduate student bodies, behave dif 
ferently. Theory suggests that such differences exist, but the direction 
and magnitude are ambiguous. For example, private institutions may 
utilize their resources more efficiently than public ones and may bene 
fit from a halo effect in the labor market or on the other hand may have 
to devote substantial resources to fundraising (see James 1989). The 
presence of doctoral students may lead to a diversion of resources 
away from undergraduates or conversely may add a pool of cheap 
labor available to teach undergraduates. And similarly, research may 
enhance or detract from the undergraduate teaching function (see 
James 197$; James and Neuberger 1981). These possible effects were 
captured by entering private colleges, Ph.D.-awarding institutions, and 
Research Type I Universities (Carnegie classification) as dummies 
(PRIV, PRIV*E, PHD, RES) or, alternatively, as interactions with 
expenditures per student, and by including the percent of graduate stu 
dents in total enrollment (PGRAD). The total number of FTE students 
(LFTE) was entered to allow for economies or diseconomies of scale.
College Choice, Academic Achievement and Future Earnings 117
Regional dummies were included to capture regional fixed effects. 
Only East (E) had any impact and was left in the final regression.
We were particularly interested in the impact of the average SAT 
score of entering freshmen as an index of institutional selectivity 
(SEL). Selectivity may influence earnings in several ways: it may raise 
the amount of learning, hence the acquisition of general human capital 
at the institution through the peer group effect; it may be an informa 
tional signal to employers about the probable aptitude of individual 
students (a version of the screening hypothesis); and students from a 
more selective institution may benefit from its prestige or from the 
social network that it generates.
Higher Educational Experience
While in college the student makes a number of choices—concern 
ing major, curriculum, how hard to work to obtain a high GPA, and 
whether to proceed to a postgraduate degree. How do these choices 
influence future earnings? We examine the impact of choosing majors 
in Engineering (ENG), Business (BUS), Humanities and Fine Arts 
(HUM), Social Science (SOCSCI), Math plus Physical Science 
(M&SCI), Biological Science (BIO), Health Professions (HEALTH), 
and all others (OTHER), relative to education, the omitted category. 
The choice of major influences the range of occupational options that 
will be open to a student later in life; therefore we would expect some 
of these dummies to be positive and others to be negative. We also 
included the number of college math credits and Math GPA; our final 
specification uses the interaction of these two terms (MATH*GPA). 
Finally, we introduce the college GPA as an independent variable, on 
grounds that this may signal cognitive skills and traits such as disci 
pline and perseverance, to the employer. Postgraduate degrees are bro 
ken down into MA and all others (HIDEG); the latter, in particular, is 
expected to have a positive effect.
Background Characteristics
A voluminous literature documents the fact that family background 
and prior academic achievement strongly influence future earnings, 
much of this operating through their impact on the choice of college
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and probability of completing college. We would expect background 
effects on earnings to be much smaller in this study, where everyone 
has a college degree and characteristics of the college are explicitly 
included. However, some background variables may still be important, 
in part because they serve as proxies for unobserved productivity- 
enhancing student characteristics such as ambition, learning acquired 
in the household, and access to labor market information. Including 
these variables should therefore increase the explanatory power of our 
model and reduce the potential bias in the estimated coefficients of the 
college variables with which they may be correlated. Student back 
ground variables included as controls were race or nationality 
(BLACK, BLK-SOUTH, HISP), religion (CATH, JEW), parental 
income (FAMINC), father's education (FAED), attendance at Catholic 
high school (CATHHS) and other private high schools (OTHPVT), 
percentile rank in high school (PRANK), a dummy for playing a lead 
ership role in high school newspaper, student government, or athletics 
(XCURR), and the individual's verbal plus mathematics SAT score or a 
transformation of ACT scores into SAT (SAT). (For the method used to 
convert ACT to SAT, see Astin 1971.)
Labor Market Experience
While our focus is on undergraduate education, in some equations 
we control for a host of basic market variables that influence earnings: 
total months of employment since degree (EXP), tenure on current job 
(TEN), weeks worked in 1985 (LWW), hours worked per week (LHW, 
which we treat as a two-part spline allowing for the possibility that 
returns per hour may differ for hours worked under or over 35 per 
week), and a dummy for career interruptions that exceeded one year 
(INTERR). Marital status and number of children in 1985 were 
included as variables that might influence unobservable labor market 
choices such as effort.
Specification Problems and Alternative Models
A problem that always arises in the school effects literature con 
cerns biases that may be introduced by unobserved elements of student
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and institutional characteristics, and by the endogeneity of elements of 
some college and labor market variables. For example:
1. The omission of some institutional characteristics may understate 
the total college effect. We deal with this problem by including a 
dummy variable for each college, which captures its full observable 
and unobservable characteristics in the fixed-effects model.
2. The correlation between unobserved student characteristics and 
observed institutional characteristics may bias the college effect. Sup 
pose that, as a result of student choice and college admissions proce 
dures, ambitious, hard working students end up in colleges with a high 
selectivity index and expenditure rate. These colleges would appear to 
increase the earnings of their students, whereas actually they were sim 
ply choosing students who would have earned a lot anyway due to their 
ambition. We have tried to minimize this problem by including numer 
ous observable student variables (such as high school rank and extra 
curricular activities), and college experience variables (such as curricu 
lum and GPA) that may be correlated with and therefore proxy the 
unobserved characteristics. In some equations, we used instrumental 
variables for SEL and LXPS.
3. Some colleges may have policies that induce their students to 
enter remunerative majors and to acquire postgraduate degrees (for 
example, these colleges may not offer low-paid education majors, may 
require math, and may help their students gain entry to graduate and 
professional schools). If so, controlling for the higher educational vari 
ables understates the college effect. We deal with this problem, in part, 
by running our regressions with and without the higher educational 
variables. If college policies determine curriculum choice, the college 
effect on earnings should decline when curriculum is controlled.
4. The effect of the higher educational experience variables may 
also be biased by their correlation with unobserved student characteris 
tics; e.g., students who choose to take math courses may be smart and 
hard working and hence earn high wages because of these characteris 
tics, not because of the skills they acquired while taking math. We con 
sidered using two-stage techniques here, but it is difficult to find 
instruments that are clearly exogenous, can confidently be excluded 
from the wage equation, and are good predictors of curriculum choice. 
Thus, we have not been able to eliminate the possibility that the large
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effects found for the college experience variables are due, in part, to 
their correlation with unobserved student attributes.
5. Similar specification problems could be outlined with respect to 
the labor market variables.
Despite all these limitations, we believe that a clear picture does 
emerge of the impact of college characteristics and college experience 
variables, since our basic results are robust with regard to the various 
specifications explored.
College Effects
Tables 1 and 2 present our estimate of logged annual earnings for 
1985 (LY 85) as a function of college characteristics (X2) and higher 
educational experience (X3), in some cases controlling for student's 
background (X,), which precedes college, and labor market choices 
(XJ, which follow college. Lifetime earnings would obviously have 
been a preferable but unavailable dependent variable. Our indicator of 
earnings seven to nine years after college is a much better indicator 
than starting wages, which have sometimes been used in studying 
school effects.
We present a series of equations that starts with X2 and sequentially 
adds Xi, X}, and X4. Table 1 uses fixed college effects and is based on a 
subsample of 1,107 students in 285 colleges with two or more students. 
Table 2 uses OLS with observable college characteristics in place of 
the institutional dummies and is based on the full sample of 1321 stu 
dents and 499 colleges. In addition to giving the individual variables, 
we also calculate the proportion of variance explained by the individ 
ual, institutional, higher educational experience, and labor market vari 
ables as a group. When all the variables are included, we are able to 
explain over half the variance in earnings of this cohort of college 
graduates.
Fixed Effects
Column (1) of table 1 presents a "gross output" fixed-effects model 
that replicates "what the world sees." Each college is represented by a
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Table 1. 1985 Annual Earning Regressions for Males with Fixed College 
Effects Explanatory Power of Groups of Variables 
(2+ sample)
College + College + 
College College + background + background + 
dummies background LM LM + higher ed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R2
Entire model .333a ,365a
College 
dummies .333a .286b
Background .032a
Labor market
.507a
.21 l c
.022b
.142a
.56a
.171
.015C
.124a
Higher ed. exp. .053J
NOTES: Each regression is estimated for a sample of 1,107 males from the High School Class of 
1972 who eventually received a bachelor's degree, from 285 colleges, each of which had two or 
more students in our sample, 
a. Significant at .1% level 
b. Significant at 1% level 
c. Significant at 5% level
Background variables that were significant in at least one equation in Tables 1 or 2 are family 
income, SAT score. Black, Black*South interaction. Catholic, Catholic H.S., other private high 
school. See text for other background variables that were included.
Labor Market variables are experience, tenure on current job, log weeks worked last year, hours 
worked per week, marital status, number children, career interruption.
Higher Education variables are dummies for different majors (Business, Engineering, Math-Sci 
ence, Humanities, Social Science, Biology, Health Science, Other, Education as omitted cate 
gory), GPA, Math*GPA, MA degree, higher degree.
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Table 2. Annual Earnings Regressions for Males with Observable 
College Characteristics (full sample)
College 
characteristics
(1)
College + 
background 
+ LM
(2)
College + 
background 
+ LM
(3)
College + 
background 
+ higher ed
(4)
College characteristics
SEL
LFTE
PRIV
EAST
PRIV*E
PGRAD
LXPS
LXPS*RES
.051 
(2.93)b
.08 
(3.48)a
.004
(.08)
-.025
(.55)
.149 
(2.1)c
-.001
(.5)
.003
(.05)
-.003
(.62)
.026 
(1.42)
.064 
(2.74)b
-.029
(.54)
-.04
(.9)
.136 
(1.94)c
-.002
(.81)
.011
(.21)
-.005
(.94)
.017 
(1.06)
.048 
(2.32)c
-.05
(1.04)
-.052
(1.3)
.182 
(2.93)b
-.001
(.59)
.035
(.76)
-.003
(.6)
.012 
(.8)
.037 
(1.84)d
-.005
(.11)
-.008
(.20)
.106 
(1.76)d
-.001
(.38)
-.009
(.21)
-.003
(.74)
Higher education experience
BUSMAJ
ENGMAJ
M&SCI
HUM
SOCSCI
.326
(6.89)a
.484
(7.75)a
.273
(4.05)a
.051
(.82)
.259
(5.32)a
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Table 2 (continued). Annual Earnings Regressions for Males with 
Observable College Characteristics (full sample)
College 
characteristics
0)
BIO
HEALTH
OTHER
GPA
MATH*GPA
MA
HIDEG
Constant 9.013
(20.96)a 
R2
Entire model .038a
College 
characteristics .038a 
Background 
Labor market
Higher ed. exp.
College + 
background 
+ LM
(2)
8.984
(20.8)a
.09a
.014C 
.039a
College + 
background 
+ LM
(3)
-1.018
(.83)
.301 a
.013b 
.03b 
.211 a
College + 
background 
+ higher ed
(4)
.238
(3.78)a
.243
(3.35)a
.189
(3.83)a
.066
(2.0)c
.002
(3.45)a
.05
(1.45)
.151 
(2.59)b
-.67
(.22)
.382a
.005 
.025b 
.202a
.079a
NOTES: Each regression is estimated for a sample of 1321 males from the High School Qass of
1972 who eventually received a bachelor's degree from 499 colleges. See Table 1 for significance
levels and other variables that were included in regressions.
a. Significant at .1% level
b. Significant at 1% level
c. Significant at 5% level
d. Significant at 10% level.
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dummy that captures its fixed effect. Consistent with conventional wis 
dom, the college that a student attends makes a significant difference in 
this model, explaining 33 percent of the variance. This specification 
maximizes the college effect, since it subsumes both observable and 
unobservable college characteristics (including 285 dummy variables) 
and does not control for anything else.
Of course, much of this effect stems from the background of the stu 
dents, which is not randomly distributed across colleges. Thus, in col 
umn (2) we include both institutional dummies and student 
background, in an effort to measure "value added" by the college. 
Although the proportion of variance explained by the college dummies 
declines (to 29 percent), their effect remains highly significant. In col 
umn (3) we enter the basic labor market variables, and column (4) adds 
the higher educational experience variables. As discussed above, these 
explanatory variables may in part be capturing college policies or cor 
related student characteristics that determine earnings. Therefore, their 
inclusion should increase the explanatory power of our model and at 
the same time decrease the apparent college effects. Indeed this is what 
happens. In the last equation, the fixed college effects as a group 
explain only 16 to 17 percent of the variance in earnings, half of the 
original amount, and given the large number of degrees of freedom 
used up, this is no longer significant. For reasons given earlier, we 
believe the "true" size of the effect is smaller than that in equation (1), 
but larger than that in equation (4); i.e., it explains between 17 and 29 
percent of the variance in earnings and is marginally significant.
Observable College Characteristics
Table 2 replicates these results using observable college characteris 
tics in place of the separate dummy variables for each institution. 
These equations attempt to ascertain where the college effect is coming 
from. We are not very successful in that regard, since the observed 
characteristics as a group explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance in 
earnings, once other variables are controlled.
Column (1) includes college characteristics only, and column (2) 
adds family background. Column (3) is closest in spirit to earlier esti 
mations by Wachtel (1976), Solmon and Wachtel (1975), and Reed and 
Miller (1970), and our results are similar (positive but small college
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effects)—increasing our confidence in these findings. The differences 
in our overall conclusions, then, stem from the richer set of variables 
we have been able to use. When both higher educational experience 
and labor market variables are included, as in column (4), neither the 
individual college characteristics nor their sum has a significant effect.
To the extent that observable college variables matter, it appears that 
characteristics associated with size, control, and possibly student body 
composition matter most. A doubling in enrollments increases earnings 
4 to 6 percent, an indication of economies of scale in producing future 
earnings that may stem from greater program variety (enabling better 
student-major matches) or from greater visibility and access to labor 
market information. We obtain ambiguous results on the advantages of 
attending a private college, consistent with our ambiguous predictions: 
this has a positive effect (of 10 to 13 percent) in the East (where private 
colleges have long-standing labor market connections), but not in the 
rest of the country. As expected, SEL has a positive effect in columns 
(l)-(3)—a 100-point increase in SAT of freshman class increases earn 
ings 3 to 5 percent)—but its size declines and significance disappears 
when higher educational experience and labor market variables are in 
the equation, as in column (4).
In contrast to the college variables that matter, expenditure per stu 
dent (LXPS) has a small coefficient that is never close to significance. 
This contradicts Wachtel's earlier finding but is consistent with Morgan 
and Duncan's (1979) and with much of the literature on primary and 
secondary school effectiveness.
We thought that the high-spending institutions might be universities 
that allocate much of their resources to graduate programs and 
research. To test this possibility, we tried specifications in which LXPS 
was interacted with Ph.D.-granting or Research Type I universities 
and/or dummies added for Ph.D.-granting institutions, research institu 
tions, and percentage of graduate students. The interaction terms were 
always negative, and the main LXPS effect became more positive (or 
less negative), but nothing we did ever made it significant. Apparently 
research and graduate programs do not increase or decrease future 
undergraduate earnings, and they also do not explain the unimportance 
of LXPS. We obtained similar results when instructional expenses, fac 
ulty salaries, and S/F ratios were used instead of LXPS. Based on the
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experience of this sample, it appears that attending a higher-spending 
college is not the way to increase future earnings.
Alternative Specifications
Because these negative findings about selectivity and expenditures 
per student run counter to the conventional wisdom, we explored alter 
native specifications to see whether and under what conditions positive 
effects might emerge (see table 3).
1. We attempted to deal with the endogeneity problem by using 
instrumental variables to predict the selectivity of a student's college; 
the predicted selectivity value was then used in place of the actual 
value in column (1). We did the same for expenditures per student. The 
coefficients on SEL and LXPS rise when instrumental variables are 
used, but neither equation changes our basic conclusion that LXPS is 
always insignificant, and SEL is insignificant when higher educational 
experience and labor market variables are in the equation.
2. We considered the possibility that multi-collinearity among col 
lege characteristics was hiding the true significant effect of SEL, so we 
omitted all other institutional variables from the equation. We did the 
same for LXPS. As expected, the size of the SEL and LXPS coeffi 
cients increased in these specifications, but they remained insignificant 
when higher educational experience and labor market variables were 
both in the equation; and, of course, the total college effect declined.
3. Finally, we interacted SEL (and LXPS) with several student, col 
lege, higher education, and occupational variables to ascertain whether 
our uniform-effects model is understating the true effect (e.g., see 
Summers and Wolfe 1977). Perhaps SEL (or LXPS) has a higher pay 
off to students with higher SAT scores, or for those entering science 
majors, professional or managerial occupations, or going on to higher 
degrees. In general these interaction terms were insignificant. We con 
clude that if an interactive model is appropriate, these data are simply 
not strong enough to detect it.
Through all these specifications, our best estimate remains that the 
college a student chooses does make a marginal difference, that this 
difference becomes insignificant as additional explanatory variables 
are added to the model, and that only a very small fraction can be 
ascribed to college characteristics readily observed and measured.
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Table 3. Alternative Specifications with SEL LXPS, and X3
R2
SEL
LFTE
PRIV
E
PRIV*E
PGRAD
LXPS
LXPS*RES
SEL
(1)
.383a
.069
(1.48)
.037 
(1.88)d
-.007
(.17)
-.049
(.97)
.116 
(1.91)d
-.001
(.25)
.002
(.06)
-.004
(.84)
LXPS
(2)
.382a
.011
(.75)
.037 
(1.83)d
-.007
(.16)
-.009
(.24)
.109 
(1.79)d
-.001
(.43)
.043
(.28)
-.004
(-96)
SEL only LXPS only
(3) (4)
.378a .377a
.017
(1.48)
-
-
-
-
-
.022
(.59)
-.001
(.21)
Notes! Columns (1) and (2) use instrumental variables to predict SEL and LXPS, respectively, 
and then use the predicted values in place of the actual values. The full equation includes Col 
lege Characteristics, Background, Labor Market, and Higher Education Experience, as in equa 
tion (4), Tables 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 omit all college characteristics except SEL and LXPS, 
respectively; full equation includes Background, Labor Market and Higher Education Experi 
ence.
a. Significant at .1% level, 
b. Significant at 1% level, 
c. Significant at 5% level 
d. Significant at 10% level.
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Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
LY85
Institutional variables
SEL
LFTE
PRIV
EAST
PRIV*E
PGRAD
LXPS
LXPS*RES
Higher educational experience
MATH*GPA
GPA
BUSMAJ
ENGMAJ
M&SCI
HUM
SOCSCI
BIO
HEALTH
OTHER
MA
HIDEG
Mean
10.26
9.87
9.031
0.248
0.202
0.091
12.267
8.840
1.630
23.785
2.914
0.230
0.103
0.058
0.061
0.178
0.062
0.027
0.166
0.140
0.054
Standard deviation
.52
1.16
1.046
8.800
0.430
3.558
33.444
0.464
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The Higher Educational Experience
Explanatory Power
While institutional characteristics do not explain a large proportion 
of the variance in earnings, other aspects of the higher educational 
experience, such as choice of major, number of math credits taken, 
GPA, and postgraduate degree matter a great deal. All of these vari 
ables are highly significant, add substantially to the R2 of the model 
and, as a group, explain 3 to 8 percent of the variance in earnings in the 
OLS regressions, more than the observable college and student charac 
teristics put together. They explain somewhat less—2 to 5 percent—in 
the fixed-effects model, consistent with the hypothesis that the higher 
education variables are determined, in part, by unobserved college pol 
icies. (See tables 1 and 2.)
Students with a higher GPA have higher expected earnings; when 
GPA increases from C to B or from B to A, annual earnings rise 7 to 8 
percent. (Also see Wise 1975.) While GPA indicates, in part, that stu 
dents have acquired specific knowledge, we prefer to think of it as a 
proxy for unobservable characteristics such as ability combined with 
inputs of time and effort, general human capital characteristics that 
also lead to higher productivity in the labor market. This interpretation 
is supported by the behavior of the student's SAT, which has a positive 
effect in equations (2) and (3) that becomes negative when GPA enters 
in equation (4). Suppose that the SAT is a proxy for academic ability or 
potential achievement, which must be combined with inputs of time 
and effort to produce actual achievement. If the combination is present 
it produces achievement in college and thereafter; but if the input of 
effort is not forthcoming in college, it probably will not be forthcoming 
at work either. By this interpretation, ability alone does not generate 
significantly higher grades or earnings; the payoff to GPA is a payoff to 
the combination of ability and effort.
The positive return to college math is also noteworthy for educa 
tional policy. Taking three additional math credits (usually one course) 
and receiving an A increases earnings 1 to 2 percent. This is not sur 
prising since math governs entry to certain highly-paid occupations
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such as engineering. (For a further discussion of the impact of math, 
see Alsalam 1989a.)
A higher degree, particularly the Ph.D., LL.D or M.D., also has a 
significantly positive effect, raising earnings 10 to 15 percent (and 
probably more at a later point in the age-earnings life cycle).
This leads us to the important issue of returns to major. Which 
majors are worth more in the marketplace—those imparting general or 
specific skills? While there are large differences in the returns to differ 
ent majors, in general we cannot say that either vocational or liberal 
arts majors have an advantage. For example, Education (which is the 
omitted category) is one of the least remunerative majors, but Engi 
neering and Business, also vocational majors, are on top, 30 to 40 per 
cent higher than Education. The Physical and Social Sciences are in 
between, 20 to 30 percent higher than the other liberal arts subjects, 
Humanities and Fine Arts.
Equilibrium Wage Differentials by Major and Social Efficiency
How are these differences in returns to majors sustainable, and 
would society be better off if students were induced to move to the 
higher-paying (and presumably higher-productivity) majors? The 
answers to these two questions are interrelated.
One well-known explanation for why this can be an equilibrium sit 
uation is that different majors lead to jobs with different combinations 
of pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits, and different students have 
different preferences between these and hence make different choices. 
(For example, this might explain the low return to Humanities majors 
and the high return to Business majors who become managers.) In this 
case the differential returns to majors reflect differential tastes, are sus 
tainable in the long run, and as long as students have accurate informa 
tion, it would not be efficient to shift more of them involuntarily into 
higher-paying majors.
A second explanation is that students differ in innate ability and/or 
work effort, that these differences lead them to choose "hard" or 
"easy" majors and to earn high or low wages. (For example, the entry 
and exit requirements are probably more demanding for Engineering 
majors than Education majors.) As a variant on this explanation, some 
majors may have "gatekeeping" courses, such as math, which some
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people find hard, others easy; those with math aptitude are more likely 
to choose these majors and to earn a rent on their scarce aptitude. 
According to this interpretation, we cannot assume that people who 
choose different courses and majors are otherwise similar in ability or 
effort or attribute their earnings differential to their choice of major or 
to specific skills they have acquired in college; furthermore, if more 
students entered higher-paying majors, they may well have lower pro 
ductivity and earnings than current students.
A third explanation focuses on the reasons why some majors are 
"hard" and others "easy" and interprets these differences as an institu 
tional response to situations where large differences in the real cost of 
training students exist across majors, and "society" believes that ability 
or effort, rather than price, should be used to ration space in high-cost 
fields in order to avoid myopic choices of majors and jobs. If price is 
the same for all programs of study (as tends to be the case at the under 
graduate level), but barriers to entry and exit vary, monetary returns 
will also vary; and this may be both sustainable and efficient. Under 
this scenario, we would expect majors with the highest training costs to 
have the greatest restrictions and hence the highest private monetary 
returns. Impressionistically, we seem to observe this relationship at the 
extremes (for example, this may explain the entry and exit difference 
between Engineering and Education), but there does not seem to be a 
good fit among fields in the middle.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have defined college quality as a multidimen 
sional concept, and this paper has concentrated on one dimension— 
value added to future earnings, a proxy for future labor market produc 
tivity. Our rich longitudinal data source has allowed us to control for an 
unusually wide range of incoming student characteristics, thereby 
yielding better estimates than previously possible of the impact of col 
lege and curriculum choice on future earnings.
Briefly, our fixed-effects model indicates that a student's choice of 
college does make a difference, explaining 17 to 29 percent of the vari 
ance in earnings. However, we are unable, using OLS, to tie this col-
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lege effect down to observable college characteristics, which, taken as 
a group, explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance. Thus, prospective 
students and the families who make their decisions based on these 
readily accessible indicators will not be getting much pecuniary return; 
on the other hand, investing time and effort to collect information 
about the "unobservable" characteristics of colleges may pay off.
The observable characteristics, as well as the total college fixed 
effect, become insignificant once curriculum choice and labor market 
experience are included in the equation. While controlling for all these 
variables may lead us to underestimate the total college contribution, 
omitted student variables may have the opposite effect. If the former 
bias exceeds the latter, we may conclude that the true size of the col 
lege effect is greater than that in column (4) of table 1 but less than that 
in column (1) and is marginally significant. Experiments with random- 
effects models and instrumental variables did not change this basic 
conclusion.
In particular, expenditures per student never have a large or signifi 
cant effect, and college selectivity, which is widely believed to predict 
success, has effects that are both small and insignificant once other 
variables are in the equation. Findings concerning college selectivity 
cast some doubt on the screening hypothesis, since this is a logical can 
didate for employers to use as a proxy for ability. According to these 
results, they do not do so.
In contrast to the limited effects of college choice, what a student 
does while in college (which is presumably related to the human capi 
tal acquired there), strongly affects future earnings, even after all other 
variables in our model are controlled. Grades, major, math courses, and 
further degree are all highly significant and, taken as a group, explain 3 
to 8 percent of the variance in earnings, more than measured college 
and student characteristics put together. This finding casts further 
doubt on the screening hypothesis.
Several caveats are in order at this point. First of all, part of the large 
effect of the higher educational experience variables probably stems 
from the unobservable productivity-enhancing student and college 
characteristics with which they are correlated, but which we could not 
capture. Second, the relative returns to different majors and occupa 
tions may change through time as a function of supply and demand, so 
it is impossible to generalize from this cohort to all cohorts. Third, the
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relative earnings of different majors and occupations may change over 
the lifetime of this cohort as a function of their training and its returns. 
For example, the doctors and lawyers in our sample had relatively little 
experience and are probably at the start of a steeply rising age-earnings 
profile, while the opposite is true for nurses and teachers.
Fourth, we have assumed uniform college effects; if a thoroughly 
interactive model is more appropriate, we may have underestimated 
college effects. (This sample is not suitable for analyzing such a 
model.) Finally, these results apply to men only; a paper on women is 
now in process, and the picture appears quite different. But at this 
point, we would have to conclude that if quality and output are defined 
in terms of future earnings and productivity, high inputs do not neces 
sarily lead to high outputs, and indeed there is no easy way to identify 
high-quality colleges.
Can it be inferred that students who spend long hours trying to get 
accepted into selective colleges, that parents who pay high tuition, and 
that colleges with large expenditures are all wasting their time and 
money? Not necessarily. As we said at the beginning, colleges produce 
many outputs, and higher future earnings is but one of them. Institu 
tions may be interested in research as well as teaching, parents may be 
interested in the cognitive development and/or value formation of their 
children, students may be interested in the social ambience of their col 
lege, and all of these may be important to society at large. Indeed, 
much of the expenditures of higher-spending institutions may be 
directed toward these other ends, some of which may have a diffuse 
long-run impact on productivity. Therefore, it is imperative to under 
take other studies with alternative output measures to get a complete 
picture of the determinants and consequences of college quality.
NOTES
1. There may be substantial multi-collinearity among these variables. We did not consider this 
a big problem since we are not trying in the paper to identify the separate effects of each student 
background variable, but rather to control them to avoid overestimating the value added by the 
college. We also included an Ftest for the joint significance of the group as a whole.
2. Switching to OLS in table 2 allows us to use the entire sample of colleges and students as 
well as to weight student differentially in order to adjust for the stratified sample design used by 
NLS and make them representative for the sample as a whole. Using the unweighted subsample to 
replicate table 2 indicates that the coefficients and significance of our variable are largely 
unchanged by the weighting procedure. We also used a random-effects or generalized least-
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squares model, to take account of the fact that all the people who attend the same school are sub 
ject to a common component and therefore have less independent variation than OLS would pre 
sume. It turned out that the variance component due to the unobserved college effect is negligible; 
the size and significance levels of some variables increase, but most are unchanged. Therefore we 
present the fixed effects and OLS results in this paper.
3. Economies of scale were also found in Cohn, Rhine, and Santos 1989, who used student 
enrollments and research as outputs; i.e., average costs fall as a composite of these outputs rises.
List of Symbols and Data Sources
College Characteristics
SEL Mean SAT Score of Incoming Freshman Class 1976. 
LFTE The log of the full-time equivalent enrollment. 
PRIV Dummy variable indicating private institutional control. 
EAST Dummy variable indicating attendance at a Northeastern 
college.
PRIV*E Dummy variable indicating attendance at a Private 
Northeastern college.
PGRAD Proportion of full-time-equivalent students who are 
graduate students.
LXPS The log of total educational and general expenditures per 
full-time equivalent student, including expenditures on 
instruction, research, public services, libraries, academic 
support, student services, institutional support, operation 
and maintenance of plant, scholarships and fellowships, and 
educational and general mandatory transfers.
LXPS*RES Interaction of LXPS and the Carnegie Classification of
Type 1 institutions. Carnegie Institution "A Classification 
of Institutions of Higher Education." 1988 p. 1.
Higher Educational Experience
MATH*GPA Total number of math, statistics, and computer science 
credits earned in college multiplied by the grade point 
average the student earned in these courses. Math credits 
are calculus level and above; i.e., precollegiate and 
collegiate math are excluded.
GPA Grade point average at first undergraduate degree-granting 
institution.
BUSMAJ Dummy variable indicating business major. 
ENGMAJ Dummy variable indicating engineering major.
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M&SCI Dummy variable indicating a physical science or 
mathematics major.
HUM Dummy variable indicating humanities or fine arts major.
SOCSCI Dummy variable indicating social science major.
BIO Dummy variable indicating a life science major.
HEALTH Dummy variable indicating a health science major.
OTHER Dummy variable for all other major except education which 
is the omitted category.
MA Dummy variable indicating receipt of a Master's degree.
HIDEG Dummy variable indicating the receipt of a Ph.D. or
professional degree above the master's level, such as law or 
medicine.
SOURCES: Riccobono, J., L. B. Henderson, G. J. Burkheimer, C. Place, J. R. Levinsohn 
National Longitudinal Study: Base Year (1972) through Fourth Follow-Up (1979) Data File 
Users Manual. Vols. 1-4 C. D. Carroll, et al., Tlie National Longitudinal Study of the High 
School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) Fifth Follow-Up (1986) Data File User's Manual. Higher Educa 
tion General Information Survey (HEGIS), 1975. Tuition and selectivity taken from Cass, James 
and Max Birnbaum, Counselors' Comparative Guide to American Colleges: 1976 Edition (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1975). Jones, C., R. Baker, and R. Borchers, National Longitudinal 
Study of the High School Class of 1972: Postsecondary Education Transcript Study Data File 
User's Manual, National Center for Educational Statistics, August 1986.
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The Financial Squeeze on Higher 
Education Institutions and Students
The Balance Between Quality and Access
W. Lee Hansen 
University of Wisconsin
This paper attempts to illuminate recent discussions about the tre 
mendous financial pressures experienced by students, their parents, 
and colleges and universities in paying the costs of higher education 
(McPherson and Shapiro 1991). It does this by placing these develop 
ments in the context of long-run pendulum-like swings in society's 
interest in promoting greater access to higher education and enhancing 
the quality of the higher education enterprise. These swings are made 
apparent by using a new approach to organize and analyze the data on 
higher education finance. 1
The conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that we are cur 
rently in a transitional phase, following a thirty-year period of conflict 
between proponents of access-equity and of instructional quality. This 
shift in emphasis toward a joining of quality and access concerns is 
accompanied by an intense struggle over how the costs of achieving 
these objectives are to be shared among students, their parents, state 
and local taxpayers, voluntary contributors, and in the case of student 
financial aid, higher education institutions and the federal government 
(Hauptman 1990a, 1990b).
We start by assuming that the goals of higher education are influ 
enced by a wide variety of internal and external forces. Whatever these 
aims may be, they do not emerge exclusively or even principally from 
internal analysis, deliberation, and pressures. Rather they grow out of 
external forces and events. This pattern is reflected in the common 
practice among educators of moving toward new goals and pushing for 
increased levels of funding in the wake of external events, such as 
renewed pressure for increased institutional support after Sputnik, or
* This paper is part of a larger collaborative effort with my colleague Jacob O. Stampen.
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new student financial aid programs after the beginning of the War on 
Poverty. Each episode is followed by some new event that sets off a 
reaction in yet another direction, so that the process repeats itself.
Precedent for this view emerges from the research of historians as 
well as scholars from other disciplines who have tried to capture alter 
nating patterns of change in economics, history, politics, and the like. 
These analyses use terms such as "tensions," "cycles," "pendulums," 
"spirals," and "dialectics" to describe the patterns that are uncovered. 2 
Observers generally agree about the nature and identity of these cycles, 
whose life spans average between twelve and seventeen years 
(Schlesinger 1986, p. 24). They also agree that these cycles alternate 
between emphasizing public action versus private interest. These oscil 
lations have been described by Hirschman (1982) as the "frustrations 
of public life" and by others as "liberal versus conservative" eras. 
Whatever the term, the meaning is generally the same.
The most active exponent of the cycles view is Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr., who notes that each cycle "must flow out of the conditions and con 
tradictions of the phase before and then itself prepare the way for the 
next recurrence."3 Schlesinger's analysis provides a useful framework 
for sharpening our research questions concerning recent changes in 
higher education goals and financing. The principal questions guiding 
this analysis are: First, how have the goals of higher education changed 
over the past half century? Second, does investment in higher educa 
tion respond to changes in these goals? Third, how did changes in the 
goals and investment in higher education affect quality and access, the 
sharing of the costs of quality and access between students and society, 
and the ability of students and their families to finance college atten 
dance?
Two sources of information are at hand to help answer these ques 
tions. One is the abundant literature on higher education. That litera 
ture can be distilled to reveal broad trends and critical shifts that 
illuminate the goals and direction of higher education. The results that 
emerge from such an analysis are difficult to assess because of the 
varying interpretations that can be given to them. The other is national 
statistical data on higher education enrollments, expenditure patterns, 
and the like. Such data reflect both the trends and responses to them 
just mentioned. The statistical data available for identifying finance- 
related changes are not ideal. Routinely gathered federal statistics on
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higher education finance are incomplete, lack adequate detail, and suf 
fer from definitional changes over time. These problems make it diffi 
cult to document in consistent fashion the financial trends as well as 
systematic changes in these trends.
However, even sometimes difficult to interpret information and 
imperfect data can yield important insights when the patterns of 
change can be related to the forces that underlie them. Only by trying 
to establish such connections is it possible to say something useful 
about the current policy debate on quality and access in higher educa 
tion.
Cross Currents in Higher Education
American higher education over the past half century has been buf 
feted by a combination of demographic, social, political, and economic 
forces. Some of these forces are separable whereas others are closely 
linked. The linking of these forces may have been most obvious in the 
1930s and 1940s. During the depression of the 1930s, college enroll 
ments grew more slowly than they had in the past, and with the begin 
ning of World War II they dropped substantially. Immediately after the 
war enrollments shot upward as a direct response to the GI Bill. 
Another view is that much of this gain served to "make up" for the 
slower enrollment growth of the 1930s and early 1940s.
After World War II, demographic factors emerged as a stronger ele 
ment for change. By the early 1950s, most of the World War II veterans 
had passed through the educational system. Enrollment levels 
remained relatively stable until the late 1950s, due to the slow growth 
in the size of the traditional college-age population, and gradually 
increased into the early 1960s. An explosion of enrollments occurred in 
the mid-1960s as the post-World War II "baby boom" population 
reached maturity. Enrollments rose even more sharply, as interest 
heightened about increasing the enrollment of previously under-repre 
sented ethnic minorities as well as women. This increase continued 
through the 1970s, although the rate of growth slowed considerably. 
By the early to mid-1980s overall enrollment growth came to a virtual 
halt, and remained relatively unchanged for a few years; recently it has
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renewed its upward climb. Enrollment declines attributable to the 
declining size of the traditional college-age population were offset by 
increased college attendance among people age twenty-five and above. 
Meanwhile, college participation rates for most minority groups have 
declined since the mid-1970s, as they have for males generally; at the 
same time, significant gains occurred for females.
Political forces have also exerted a powerful influence on the 
growth of higher education in the United States and are revealed most 
immediately in governmental actions. Ultimately, however, these 
actions reflect even more powerful forces, namely, the changing priori 
ties of the citizenry who determine the focus of political action and 
availability of resources for higher education. The need to compete 
with the Soviets after Sputnik helped expand state and local resources 
for higher education. The same was true of concerns about broadening 
access for minorities and economically disadvantaged in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. These efforts proved effective in galvanizing public 
opinion and bringing about the allocation of more federal resources to 
higher education. The student unrest experienced by higher education 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s probably had the opposite effect. 
Whether the current view that higher education can be an effective 
instrument for enhancing our international competitive situation— 
which would thereby increase the resources allocated to higher educa 
tion—is valid or not remains unclear.
The economic environment also plays a key role in the shaping of 
higher education. Periodic wars and recessions have affected the tax 
revenues of the federal as well as state and local governments and have 
also had an impact on private contributions. As a consequence, the 
resources available to higher education institutions have fluctuated in 
often unpredictable ways. More important, competition from other 
state and local programs has reduced the relative allocation of 
resources to higher education. The productivity slowdown that began 
in the early 1970s made conditions even worse.
Though external forces are critical, it is also apparent that higher 
education has sought to chart its own course. Such efforts are reflected 
in a long series of reports that articulate the goals and aspirations of 
academic institutions.4 Closely related are the periodic attempts made 
by economists, historians, and other social scientists to offer new ideas 
and interpretations that stir the air and stimulate thinking about the
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course of higher education—among them the current debate about 
diversity and cultural values.
Periods of Analysis
To facilitate this analysis we have defined four distinct periods 
which emerge out of our review of the qualitative material. The first 
period begins in the late 1930s and continues into the early 1950s. It 
reflects growing concerns about access to college, culminating with the 
GI Bill and its enormous impact on enrollment after World War II.
The second period begins in the mid-1950s and continues to the 
mid-1960s, thus capturing the enormous expansion of the higher edu 
cation sector. It also picks up the emphasis on the elusive dimension of 
quality that was spurred by concern about America's lagging technol 
ogy in the face of the Soviet launching of Sputnik. In addition, it 
reflects the widely publicized studies by economists establishing the 
link between investment in education and economic growth.
The third period, from the mid-1960s to 1980-81, embraces the 
search for ways to expand opportunities for students to attend college. 
The first phase began with the initiation of federal student aid pro 
grams in 1965 and culminated with the federal decision in 1972 to 
establish a national need-based student aid system. It was followed in 
the late 1970s by what can best be described as a phase of consolidat 
ing the financial aid system and confronting other equity-related prob 
lems, as exemplified by the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 
1978.
The fourth period began in 1980-81 and continues to the present. It 
represents the beginning of a sharp swing away from access to con 
cerns about the quality of instruction, efficient use of resources, and 
once again education's role in economic growth. At present we may be 
entering a new phase, as concerns about access compete more actively 
with the push to improve quality.
These periods and their alternating swings between quality and 
access closely correspond to Schlesinger's pendulum-like political 
cycles mentioned earlier. Since the late 1940s, when society promoted 
increased college attendance, higher education sought to expand
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access. When society promoted economic development and national 
security, higher education sought to improve quality.
The resulting swings do not necessarily emerge as sharply as the 
political cycles approach would suggest. Thus, they cannot be pre 
cisely dated in every case. Moreover, the data reflect the aggregation of 
not only changes in societal attitudes and behavior but also the percep 
tions of change emerging within higher education institutions and the 
actions these perceptions generate. Here we must ignore these micro- 
level underpinnings of these changes, even though they constitute an 
important part of the story.
Analytical Framework
With the time periods for this analysis established, we turn to the 
data in hopes of learning whether changing political-social-economic 
conditions and the accompanying societal mandates exerted any effect 
on resource allocation in higher education. We begin by describing the 
structure of the nation's investment in higher education institutions and 
in student support. We then examine higher education expenditures 
and revenues in an effort to highlight major trends and the interplay 
between the external and internal forces affecting resource allocation 
within the higher education sector. This information paves the way for 
measuring the burden of higher education costs and how these costs 
are shared among students/parents, state and local taxpayers/private 
donors, and also federal taxpayers, through federal student financial 
aid programs.
Our first task is to define proxy measures for the concepts of quality 
and access in the context of higher education finance. For purposes of 
this analysis, instruction-related costs are viewed as an indicator of 
efforts to promote quality. Tuition and fees, less student financial aid 
funds, are viewed as an indicator of efforts to improve access.
We recognize that these magnitudes are at best crude proxies for 
what we really want to measure. Rather than total student aid, we 
would prefer to focus on the portion of aid that enables young people 
from lower income families to undertake and continue with their 
higher education; in the absence of such aid, they would not be able to
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do so. Similarly, rather than concentrating our analysis on all instruc 
tion-related expenditures, we would prefer to focus on the portion of 
those expenditures that "makes a difference" in quality (i.e., that pro 
duce greater and more lasting increments of student learning).
Even more important is the extent to which changes in these catego 
ries of expenditure affect quality and access. Spending more or less 
would obviously change the dollar totals. Whether, for example, addi 
tional expenditures would enhance quality or improve access is more 
difficult to say, given the complexity of higher education management. 5 
Nonetheless, for purposes of this analysis we shall take the dollar totals 
and changes in them as crude indicators of the relative priority given to 
quality and access in higher education.
If we are to determine who pays the instruction-related costs of 
higher education, then it becomes essential to identify how these costs 
are split between students and others. Thus, we must separate that por 
tion of the costs paid by students through tuition and fees from that 
paid by taxpayers and private donors. The portion of instruction- 
related costs not paid by students is described as the nonstudent share, 
i.e., total expenditures paid by taxpayers for public institutions, and by 
voluntary contributions for private institutions. It should be obvious 
that there is no fixed distribution of these costs; their sharing can easily 
shift as conditions change.
The sharing of costs has still another dimension. It concerns the 
extent to which the share of instruction-related costs paid by students is 
offset by student financial aid. If we think of tuition and fees as the 
gross share of institutional costs paid by students, we can describe the 
net share as tuition and fees less student financial aid. The smaller the 
net share of total instruction-related costs paid by students, the greater 
the emphasis on access.
The Data
We rely heavily on official data from the Department of Education 
and its predecessor, the U.S. Office of Education. Because of changes 
in the data collection systems as well as periodic alterations in the defi 
nitions of expenditures and revenues, the detailed data are not com-
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pletely comparable over the almost 50-year period under study. 
Nonetheless, the broad categories employed here are generally consis 
tent We caution readers that this analysis for all of higher education 
obscures potentially important differences between public and private- 
independent institutions; these differences will be examined in a subse 
quent paper.
We also utilize data on student financial aid. With the development 
of state-based student aid programs in the late 1950s, federal funding 
under the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and the major 
financial aid programs of the federal government beginning in the mid- 
1960s, these additional resources, which for the most part go directly 
to students, are not fully captured in the institutional data. To remedy 
this defect, we draw upon data on student aid expenditures compiled 
by the College Board beginning in the early 1970s. We have extended 
these data back to the late 1930s, and in the case of veterans' benefits 
provided through the GI Bill, back to the mid-1940s.
An unresolved problem with the financial aid data lies in figuring 
out how to eliminate from the totals those funds distributed to students 
attending proprietary schools. Such schools, and there are many more 
of them than there are colleges, are not included in the institutional 
data on expenditures and revenues. For this reason, the student finan 
cial aid data overstate the resources devoted to broadening access. This 
overstatement may have grown to as much as 15 percent of the total 
since the 1970s, as eligibility for student aid was expanded beyond 
higher education to include all of postsecondary education. (Work is 
underway to separate out student aid expenditures for students attend 
ing proprietary institutions).
The total value of resources for higher education is best captured by 
institutional data on expenditures shown in table 1 and by the College 
Board data on the amounts of aid provided to students shown in table 
2. One difficulty arises with these data; serious overlap exists between 
the "scholarships and fellowships" item in the institutional data and the 
"institutional and other grants" item in the College Board data. 
Because the data are not quite comparable, we proceed under the 
assumption that the amounts of scholarships and fellowships shown in 
the institutional data are correct, and that the College Board totals are 
accurate. This requires subtracting the total of scholarships and fellow-
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ships from total institutional spending before attempting to aggregate 
these two sources of data.
Table 1. Alternative Measures of Expenditures by Institutions of 
______Higher Education, 1988-89 (in billions)______________
Current Educational Instruction- 
Type of expenditure fund and general related
Instruction $38.8 $38.8 $38.8 
Academic support,
including libraries 8.9 8.9 8.9 
Student support 5.8 5.8 5.9 
Institutional support 11.5 11.5 11.5 
Operation &
maintenance of plant 8.7 8.7 8.7 
Mandatory transfers 1.5 1.5 1.5
Public service 4.2 4.2 
Research 11.4 11.4
Scholarships & 
fellowships 5.9 5.9
Auxiliary enterprises 12.3
Hospitals 11.8
Independent operations 3.0
Total____________$123.9_____$96.8_______$75.3
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, unpublished data.
Before continuing, it is helpful to know the overall level of 
resources devoted to quality and access. In 1988-89 (the most recent 
years for which complete institutional data are available) total current 
fund expenditures reached $123.9 billion. Total expenditures on stu 
dent financial aid reached $25.5 billion. The total resources devoted to 
quality and access add up not to the sum of these two numbers, which
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is $149.4 billion, but rather to $143.5 billion; this makes allowance for 
the $5.9 billion "overlap" mentioned above (see table 3). Overall, these 
expenditures represent 2.93 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
This figure is misleadingly high because total current fund expendi 
tures include an array of activities that are not directly related to the 
instructional activities of colleges and universities. A closer approxi 
mation to the costs of interest for this analysis is provided by what are 
called educational and general expenditures. This amount is arrived at 
by subtracting from total current fund expenditures the costs of operat 
ing auxiliary enterprises, hospitals, and independent operations, all of 
which are activities bearing little or no direct relationship to the 
instructional missions of colleges and universities. The result is that 
educational and general expenditures, which in 1989-90 totaled $96.8 
billion, are 22 percent lower than the total current fund expenditures 
(see table 3).
Table 2. Financial Aid Expenditures for Postsecondary Education, 
______1988-89 (in billions)_________________________ 
Type of student aid Amount
Federal supported programs 
Generally available aid
Grants, loans, work study, institutional aid $18.4 
Specifically directed aid
Veterans, military, etc. 1.5 
State grant programs 1.6 
Institutional and other grants 4.0 
Total_______________________________$25.5
SOURCE: The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1981 to 1991, August 1991, Table 1. 
NOTE: The amounts shown above include some aid awarded to students attending proprietary 
schools which are not included in the data for institutions of higher education. Hence, the student 
aid data overstate the amounts of aid available to college students. The magnitude of the over 
statement is in the 15 percent range.
While educational and general expenditures come closer to the 
mark, they still include activities that go well beyond instruction. Two 
types of expenditures need to be excluded. One is for public service 
activities directed to external audiences; included would be such things 
as extension activities carried on by land-grant institutions. The other
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is for research, a central activity of major research universities and typ 
ically carried out with the help of external funding. The fact that 
research produces new knowledge, some of which filters back into 
instruction through the teaching done by researchers and through the 
professional journals and textbooks used by countless students across 
all types of colleges and universities, suggests that some part of 
research activity is instruction-related. Because it would be so difficult 
to assess the impact of research on instruction for undergraduates in 
particular, no attempt is made to allocate any part of research expendi 
tures to instruction.
Table 3. Overall Institutional and Student Financial Aid Expenditures 
on Higher Education, 1988-89 (in billions)
Institutional data
Expenditures
Current Fund 
Education & general 
Instruction-related
Total
(1)
$123.9 
96.8
N/A
w/o SFA
(2)
$118.0 
90.9 
75.3
Student 
financial aid 
expenditures
(3)
$25.5 
25.5 
25.5
Total 
Total expend1 tures 
expenditures as percent of 
unduplicated GDP
(4) (5)
$143.5 
116.4 
100.8
2.93% 
2.38% 
2.06%
SOURCE: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Educa 
tion and the College Board. 
NOTE: Column 4 is sum of columns 2 and 3.
After excluding expenditures on public service and research (see 
table 1), we arrive at instruction-related expenditures (shown in line 3 
of table 3) which in 1988-89 amounted to $75.3 billion. When com 
bined with the student aid total, we find that expenditures of $100.8 
billion on quality and access represent 2.06 percent of GDP (table 3), 
To provide a point of comparison, total current expenditures on K-12 
education accounted for 4.2 percent of GDP.
We also need to know the amount of tuition and fees paid by stu 
dents. This information comes from the institutional revenue data. In 
1988-89 tuition and fee revenue amounted to $30.8 billion. To the 
extent that instruction-related expenditures amounted to $75.3 billion, 
the tuition and fees component of revenue covered 40.9 percent of 
these costs. The remaining revenue used to pay instruction-related 
costs is provided largely by state and local governments in the case of
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public colleges and universities and by private donors in the case of 
private institutions. While both instructional costs and tuition rates dif 
fer appreciably among public and private institutions, these differences 
are ignored here.
Normalizing the Data
Before moving ahead with the analysis, the data must be normalized 
in order to facilitate comparisons over time. Instruction-related expen 
ditures must be adjusted for changing enrollment levels. This is done 
by constructing a new measure, instruction-related expenditures per 
full-time equivalent (FTE) student. It is important to use FTE enroll 
ment because of the sharp increase in the proportion of part-time stu 
dents since the 1970s.
To assess the strength of efforts to enhance both quality and access 
we need some standard against which to make comparisons. The ideal 
would be a measure of changes in the relative capacity of the economy 
to finance quality and access in higher education. Such a measure 
makes it possible to avoid having to correct for price level changes 
because it converts the data from nominal to relative values.
Since GDP provides such a convenient and well-understood mea 
sure of aggregate output and hence aggregate capacity to pay, we uti 
lize GDP per employed member of the civilian labor force (CLF) as an 
indicator of the public's capacity to pay. GDP is preferable to other 
widely used measures because it reflects the value of all goods and ser 
vices produced in the economy; it can also be related more directly to 
frequently made comparisons of higher education expenditures. Thus, 
GDP per member of the CLF provides a rough measure of the ability 
of the average worker to provide tax and nontax support for higher 
education.
The final step requires us to express the various cost measures, such 
as instruction-related cost per FEE student, as a percent of GDP per 
member of the CLF. With these measures it becomes possible to high 
light relationships among the level of instruction-related costs, who 
pays for them, and how financial aid affects the student share of these
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costs. This information makes it possible to offer a preliminary assess 
ment of society's efforts to promote quality and access simultaneously
The Results
The key measures needed for this analysis are expressed as a per 
cent of GDP per member of the CLF and are presented in table 4. The 
first column shows instruction-related costs per FTE as a percent of 
GDP/CLF. These costs rose steadily from 1947^8 to 1972-73, 
dropped in 1976-77, began increasing again after that, and by 1988-89 
exceeded the previous high in 1972-73. Within the framework pre 
sented here, it appears that investment in quality increased steadily 
through the early 1970s, dropped off a bit later in the decade, and then 
began rising again. The rise in the 1980s proved to be steep, when 
emphasis once again shifted to improving the quality of higher educa 
tion.
The access story is more difficult to follow because of its several 
distinct components. The first is the pattern of change in tuition and 
fees. The second is institutional aid, which colleges and universities 
provide out of their own resources. The third is other student aid, 
which comes largely from veterans' benefits, social security benefits 
for eligible college students, and federal student aid programs.
Further clarification is necessary concerning these three sources of 
other student aid. Veterans' benefits provided a major stimulus to col 
lege attendance immediately after World War II, again but to a lesser 
extent after the Korean War, and yet again but to an even smaller 
degree after the Vietnam War. The benefits available to World War II 
veterans included a monthly stipend plus government payment of all 
tuition and fees. The fact that the "other aid" was so great right after 
the end of World War II is not surprising; approximately half of all col 
lege students at the time were veterans. Their benefits included govern 
ment-paid tuition of up to $500 per year and a monthly allowance 
which for a single veteran without dependents provided $65 per 
month. The impact of veterans' benefits diminished through the 1950s 
because fewer Korean War veterans attended college under a some 
what different GI Bill set up to deal with this new group of veterans.
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Under this legislation veterans were not reimbursed for their tuition 
and fees, though the monthly stipend for a single veteran had risen to 
$105 per month. By the late 1950s the amount of funding provided 
through such benefits had greatly diminished. This aid increased again 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s as Vietnam War veterans enrolled and 
was based on GI Bill benefits similar to those given to Korean War vet 
erans.
Table 4. Instruction-Related Costs, Tuition and Fees and Student 
Financial Aid Per Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Student 
Relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Member of the 
Civilian Labor Force (CLF) (in percent)
Academic 
year
1947-48
1951-52
1957-58
1965-66
1972-73
1976-77
1980-81
1984-85
1988-89
Instruction- 
related 
costs
(1)
13.2
14.5
15.3
16.8
18.4
17.8
18.1
19.1
20.1
Tuition 
and fees
(2)
3.5
4.3
5.3
6.3
6.2
6.1
6.3
7.3
8.2
Institutional 
aid
(3)
0.5
0.7
0.7
1.0
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.3
1.6
Other 
aid
(4)
12.5
6.4
2.4
0.9
4.9
5.8
6.5
5.2
5.2
Total 
student 
aid
(5)
13.0
7.1
3.1
1.8
6.2
7.0
7.6
6.5
6.8
SOURCES: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Edu 
cation and the College Board. Data on GDP and CLF are from various issues of the Economic 
Report of the President. 
NOTE: Calculations for years prior to 1965-66 are based on GNP rather than GDP.
Since the shift to an all-volunteer army in the early 1970s, it has 
been more difficult to view veterans' educational benefits as a form of 
student financial aid. Instead, such benefits can be considered a part of 
the military compensation package, a sort of deferred wage payment 
granted in the form of educational benefits. Another argument for not 
including veterans' benefits in student aid is that these benefits to vet 
erans of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam represented an effort by 
society to make up for the well-below market wages paid to the many
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men who had been drafted into military service. For the purpose of this 
analysis, however, veterans' educational benefits are viewed, as they 
are by the College Board, as a component of student financial aid.
Social security benefits for eligible dependents began in 1965 and 
were finally phased out in the early 1980s. These benefits are more 
problematic because they were confined to college students age eigh 
teen to twenty-one. After the establishment of need-based Pell Grants 
in 1972, the rationale for continuing social security benefits was seri 
ously undermined. It took a decade before Congress finally voted to 
eliminate them.
More important than the aid provided by institutions, at least since 
the mid-1960s, is that offered by the federal government through 
grants, loans, and work-study programs. The development of student 
aid programs dates from 1964 when anti-poverty legislation estab 
lished work-study programs, and a year later when the Higher Educa 
tion Act of 1965 established the Guaranteed Student Loan program and 
a series of related institution-based aid programs. This was followed by 
another major initiative in 1972, when Congress passed legislation to 
create what are now called Pell Grants.
The data on institutional student aid, other student aid, and total stu 
dent aid appear in columns (3), (4), and (5) of table 4. The results are 
expressed as aid per FTE student as a percent of GDP/CLF. Institu 
tional aid grew sharply through the early 1970s. Thereafter, the per 
centage remained roughly constant through the middle 1980s, when it 
increased quite sharply. Other aid varied more widely in response to 
changes in the level and mix of veteran's benefits and federal student 
aid programs. The precipitous drop from 12.5 percent in 1947-^8 to 
0.9 percent in 1965-66 is a result of the drying up of veterans' benefits. 
So also is the sharp increase by 1972-73 as federal student aid pro 
grams expanded and veterans' benefits expanded once again. Federal 
aid continued increasing to 1980-81. Since then other aid declined, 
falling back close to its 1972-73 level.
The pattern of change in total aid is dominated by movements in 
other aid. Nonetheless, changes in institutional and other aid may 
move together or in opposite directions. Since 1980-81 the decline in 
other aid was partially offset by increased institutional aid. Some 
would argue that the decline in other aid pushed institutions to provide 
more aid from their own budgets. Another explanation is that increased
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student aid from institutions represented an effort to ameliorate the 
sharp increases in tuition and fees that were then taking place.
The impact of student aid on access is revealed in table 5. Column 
(2) shows tuition and fees that can be described as the gross student 
share of instruction-related costs. Column (3) shows the net student 
share, which is tuition and fees less institutionally-provided student 
financial aid. Column (4) shows what can be called the net net student 
share, which is tuition and fees after subtracting both institutional and 
other student aid. Negative values in column (5) indicate that total stu 
dent aid exceeded total tuition and fees paid by students, whereas posi 
tive values indicate the opposite.
Table 5. The Burden of the Costs of Higher Education; Based on Costs 
Per Full-Time Equivalent (FIE) Student Relative to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) Per Member of the Civilian Labor 
Force (CLF) (in percent)
Academic
year
1947-48
1951-52
1957-58
1965-66
1972-73
1976-77
1980-81
1984-85
1988-89
Instruction-
related
costs
(1)
13.2
14.5
15.3
16.8
18.4
17.8
18.1
19.1
20.1
Gross
student
share:
tuition
and fees
(2)
3.5
4.3
5.3
6.3
6.2
6.1
6.3
7.3
8.2
Net student
share, incl.
inst. aid
(3)
3.0
3.6
4.6
5.3
4.8
4.9
5.1
6.0
6.6
Net net
student
share, incl.
all aid
(4)
-9.4
-2.8
2.2
4.5
-0.0
-0.9
-1.3
0.8
1.4
SOURCES: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Edu 
cation and the College Board. Data on GDP and CLF are from various issues of the Economic 
Report of the President.
With this as background, we come back to the quality-access trade 
off. With respect to quality, the increasing figures from 1947-48 
through 1972-73 (column (1) of table 5) suggest that quality was ris-
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ing. This rise was followed by a decline that continued through the 
early 1980s. However, the trend has been upward since the late 1970s.
Meanwhile, the focus on access was exceptionally strong in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. It dropped off sharply through the late 1950s 
and continued doing so into the middle 1960s. With passage of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965, the pattern suddenly reversed itself, as 
evidenced by a sharp fall in the net net-student share, to zero in 1972- 
73 and even lower through the remainder of the decade. Since 1980-81 
the aggregate amounts invested in student aid have fallen short of total 
tuition revenue.
The resulting pattern can be summarized as follows:
Periods Quality Access 
WW E to 1947^48 Presumably high Rising
1947^8 through 1965-66 Falling
1947-48 through 1972-73 Rising
1965-456 through 1980-81 Rising
1972-73 to 1980-81 Falling
1980-81 to 1988-89 Falling
1976-77 to 1988-89 Rising
In general, when the emphasis on access falls, the emphasis on quality 
rises, and vice versa.
Sharing the Costs
How are the costs of achieving quality and access being shared? 
Table 6 can help answer this question. One view of this sharing is pro 
vided by columns (1) and (2), which indicate the division of instruc 
tion-related costs between students and others—meaning mostly 
taxpayers for public institutions and voluntary contributors for private 
institutions. The student share rose steadily through 1965-66, dropped 
off a bit and then remained relatively constant through 1980-81, and 
afterward increased once again to its highest level ever. The magnitude
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of the increase rose from about one quarter to slightly more than 40 
percent of instruction-related costs.
Table 6. Sharing the Costs of Higher Education, Based on Costs Per FuU 
Time Equivalent (FTE) Student Relative to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) Per Member of the Civilian Labor Force (CLF) 
(in percent)
Academic
year
1947-48
1951-52
1957-58
1965-66
1972-73
1976-77
1980-81
1984-85
1988-89
Gross 
student
share 
tuition
and fees
(1)
26.3
29.7
34.6
37.5
33.6
34.2
34.6
38.0
41.0
Non-student 
share:
taxpayers 
institutional
and donors
(2)
73.7
70.3
65.4
62.4
66.4
65.8
65.4
62.0
59.0
Other
aid
(3)
3.5
4.7
4.9
5.8
7.3
6.7
6.3
6.6
7.9
Total
aid
(4)
94.6
43.9
15.6
5.2
26.4
32.5
35.8
27.3
26.1
Aid
(5)
98.1
48.7
20.4
10.9
33.7
39.2
42.1
33.9
33.9
SOURCES: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Edu 
cation and the College Board. Data on GDP and CLF are from various issues of the Economic 
Report of the President.
The reasons why the student share increased so dramatically need to 
be examined. Several explanations come to mind. One is that it may 
have been politically more difficult to increase nonstudent assistance 
than student contributions. When revenue is tight because of rising 
demands for other publicly provided goods and services and the reluc 
tance of taxpayers and donors to provide more funds, it is easier to 
increase the tuition of already-enrolled students who, because of the 
large economic benefits of college looming ahead, sense that they must 
pay. Another plausible explanation is that because private benefits to 
college attendance are so apparent while the social benefits are more 
difficult to document, society has been moving to require students, the 
most direct beneficiaries of college, to pay an ever larger share of the
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instructional costs. These and other possible rationales obviously 
require more careful study.
Another way to examine the sharing of these costs is to compare 
instruction-related expenditures with institutional and other aid, as 
seen in table 6. Column (3) shows that institutional aid has always pro 
vided a relatively small share of total instruction-related expenditures. 
Interestingly, institutional aid increased steadily through 1972-73 and 
then dropped off, no doubt because of the growth of federal student 
aid. However, institutional aid resumed its steady increase from 1980- 
81 through 1988-89, as institutions allocated to student aid more of 
their additional revenue from tuition and fees.
The patterns of change in other aid and total aid are similar to those 
shown in tables 4 and 5. Total aid about equalled total instructional 
costs in 1947-48 but then fell to almost nothing by 1965-66. With the 
beginning of federal student aid programs in 1965-66 a sharp increase 
occurred, which continued through the 1980s. Since then other aid 
dropped, largely as a result of the slow growth of federal student aid 
funds.
Interpretation/Summary and Discussion
In examining the goals and financing of higher education over the 
past half century, we find cyclical patterns of change. These changes 
reflect cycles similar to those noted by Schlesinger, cycles that may 
also exist in other areas of economic activity. For higher education, 
however, these cycles translate essentially into two alternating man 
dates, one to improve quality and the other to improve access. Such 
cycles can be viewed as representing normal variation within the sys 
tem.
Over the period since World War II, the rate of investment in higher 
education has risen considerably. As shown in table 7, investment rose 
from less than 1 percent prior to the middle 1960s, when it first 
exceeded 1 percent; since 1972-73 it has been stabilized at 1.5 percent. 
Much of the increase came from the expansion of higher education 
enrollments which more than quadrupled. As a percentage of the civil 
ian labor force, the number of FTE students slightly more than dou-
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bled. Overall, quality increased as shown earlier in table 4, with 
instructional costs rising from 13.2 to 20.1 percent. This is an impres 
sive gain, occurring as it did when enrollment increased so dramati 
cally. Thus, quality and access improved substantially over the period 
as a whole.
Table 7. Indicators of Expansion of Investment in Higher Education
Academic 
year
1947-48
1951-52
1957-58
1965-66
1972-73
1976-77
1980-81
1984-85
1988-89
Instruction- 
related
expenditures 
as a percent 
ofGDP
(1)
0.49
0.45
0.60
1.04
1.49
1.50
1.47
1.48
1.54
All 
student aid
as a 
percent of 
GDP
(2)
0.48
0.21
0.12
0.11
0.50
0.59
0.62
0.50
0.53
FTE
enrollment 
(in 
millions)
(3)
0.07
0.66
0.72
1.15
1.99
2.09
2.09
1.98
2.07
Total
investment
in higher 
education
as a 
percent of 
GDP
(4)
2.3
1.0
2.6
4.7
7.3
8.1
8.8
9.0
9.5
FTE
enrollment
as a 
percent of 
CLF
(5)
3.7
3.1
3.9
6.2
8.1
8.4
8.1
7.8
7.7
SOURCES: Based on data from U.S. Department of Education and Economic Report of the Pres 
ident.
What we find particularly interesting is how changes in the goals of 
higher education affected quality, access, and the sharing of costs 
between students and society. The relative constancy until recently in 
the gross student share, represented by tuition and fees, and the sys 
tematic changes in instruction-related costs and the net student share, 
are remarkable. The fact that these latter two measures displayed such 
variation is an interesting commentary on the changing priorities in 
higher education finance. Equally surprising is the fact that total stu 
dent financial aid exceeded combined tuition and fee revenues in two 
quite different time periods—through most of the 1970s and also much 
earlier, just after World War II.
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If the late 1960s and 1970s was a period of concern about access, 
the concern of the 1980s was with quality. By the measures adopted for 
this analysis, quality declined in the 1970s and increased in the 1980s, 
whereas access increased in the 1970s and decreased in the 1980s. It 
should be noted, however, that increased investment in quality in the 
1980s was small relative to the increase in access from the mid-1960s 
to the mid-to late-1970s. As a result, little has materialized in the way 
of quality gains.
Throughout the 1970s the push for wider access through increased 
student aid brought with it pressures to hold down tuition increases. As 
a result, additional demand for higher education was stimulated, which 
brought enrollments to even higher levels in a period when constrained 
budgets made it increasingly difficult to hire additional faculty. As sup 
port for instruction-related costs lagged, the principal casualty was fac 
ulty salaries, which fell dramatically in real terms through the 1970s 
and into the early 1980s (Hansen 1986).
By the early 1980s the results of this process were becoming more 
evident. Though increased student aid may have helped stimulate 
enrollments, it was not clear that it had done much to stimulate the 
enrollment of young people from lower income families. 6 Nonetheless, 
institutions needed more resources to hire faculty in an ever tighter 
labor market. As faculty salaries rose, instructional costs began to 
climb. Simultaneously, student aid resources contracted in relative 
terms.
The 1980s saw the absence of increases in traditional forms of 
financial support, which meant that tuition and fees had to be raised. To 
deal with the hardship created by this response, institutions began pro 
viding additional financial aid out of their own resources. Increasingly, 
however, the resolve to continue this practice appears to be weakening. 
Despite the growing emphasis on quality, society's investment in it 
increased only slightly in the 1980s because overall resources for 
higher education remained tight.
During the 1980s, a shift in public and institutional priorities away 
from access and toward quality appeared to be underway. This move 
was financed largely by students through tuition increases rather than 
by traditional sources of support, such as state and local taxpayers and 
private donors. In an attempt to respond to the growing concern about 
quality, institutions have been forced to find whatever financial support
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they could. In the absence of other support, tuition and fees were 
raised.
An unresolved question is how much the emphasis on access in the 
1970s contributed to the nation's goal of enhancing equal educational 
opportunity. Indeed the net cost of college attendance declined sharply 
for young people with incomes low enough to qualify for student aid; 
this proved to be a major accomplishment. While college participation 
rates for low-income students did not increase, evidence for the early 
1980s shows that low family income was not by itself an important 
determinant of whether students dropped out or completed college. 
The growing availability of financial aid largely offset the effects of 
low family incomes. Rather, weak academic preparation, as indicated 
by mediocre performance in high school and low scores on standard 
ized tests, constitutes the most important remaining barrier to expand 
ing access to college. 7 This suggests that access will be difficult to 
increase without improving the quality of instruction at the secondary 
level. In other words, current efforts to improve the quality of instruc 
tion could be effective if in the process academic performance 
improves among high school graduates from low-income families. As 
larger proportions of better-prepared young people enter college, stu 
dent financial aid may become even more effective as a means to 
ensure greater equality of opportunity in higher education.
Still another question concerns the impact of current efforts to 
improve the quality of education. The implicit argument is that tuition 
increases have been required to improve the quality of the education. 
By paying higher faculty salaries, increasing expenditures to update 
equipment and facilities, and introducing new technology to the class 
room, institutions believe they have been improving quality. Most 
institutions would have preferred to find other ways of meeting these 
increased costs; they would have liked to receive more state and local 
revenue as well as larger voluntary contributions. Despite the much- 
publicized fact that tuition and fees have increased sharply, public 
reaction against these increases has not been noticeably strong. It has 
certainly not been strong enough to elicit additional support from other 
sources or to restore the real levels of faculty salaries. Whether these 
changes have adversely affected quality remain to be determined.
The challenge now lies in finding better ways of using existing 
resources, so as to continue to achieve increasing access and improving
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quality. If this can be done, the chances for obtaining additional 
resources to broaden access and enrich quality should be greatly 
enhanced.
NOTES
1. Most analyses of the higher education finance data show relatively little in the way of sys 
tematic patterns of change.
2. The importance of cycles has been emphasized primarily by the Schlesingers: see Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr. (1986) and Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. (1949). Also see McClosky and Zaller (1984), 
Kaestle (1972), Hirschman (1982), and Hegel (1817).
3. Schlesinger goes on to say that such cycles "cannot be determined, short of catastrophe by 
external events. War, depressions, inflations may heighten and complicate moods, but the cycle 
itself rolls on, self contained and self sufficient" (pp. 27-29). Hegel might have characterized a 
cycle as a part of a dialectical process wherein each asserts a thesis which, as time passes, draws 
opposition resulting in the formation of an antithesis, which causes the beginning of a new cycle. 
However, surviving elements of a previous cycle's thesis become permanent parts of a presum 
ably richer and more highly developed array of public policies.
4. Those reports include the President's Commission on Higher Education, Higher Education 
for American Democracy (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1947); The Report of 
the President's Commission on National Goals, Goals for Americans (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1960); Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Quality and Equity: New Lev 
els of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968); National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational 
Reform (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1983); Association of American Colleges, 
Integrity in the College Curriculum: A Report to the Academic Community (Washington, DC, 
Association of American Colleges, 1984); and, Ernest L. Boyer, College: The Undergraduate 
Experience in America (Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 
1987).
5. The evidence indicates that over the past decade or more employment in higher education 
has increased at a much faster pace for nonfacuity than faculty personnel. Whether this represents 
an enhancement of instruction quality is doubtful. For more details, see Bergmann (1991).
6. For two different views, see McPherson and Shapiro (1991) and Hansen (1983).
7. These patterns are documented by Stampen and Cabrera (1986) and also Cabrera, Stampen, 
and Hansen (1990).
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The Economics of Education 
in a World Of Change
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Emeritus
The Meanings and Scope of Education, Economics, 
and Change in the Present Context
Central to any meaningful analysis of the economics of education is 
the notion of change, an idea that I wish to explore in these pages. To 
do so it is first necessary to bring some clarification to the meaning and 
scope of the terms "education" and "economics of education." Only 
then is it possible to determine what sorts of changes—societal, politi 
cal, economic, or others—are indeed relevant to this context. I then 
turn to the implications of change as it affects and is affected by educa 
tion in industrialized societies. Although they merit their own study, 
for want of space I refer only incidentally to common and distinctive 
aspects of such change in less developed countries.
First, education is much more than schooling. It is all sorts of invest 
ments in learning. This must be obvious as soon as one looks across 
diverse societies and cultures around the world at any given time. Even 
illiterate societies have educational systems. It is equally obvious if we 
look over historic time in given societies, whether in the Eastern or the 
Western hemisphere. Lawrence Cremin is well known for his broad 
definition of education, which encompasses all investments of time in 
learning. This notion, however, leaves open the question of how far 
schools in fact educate, and whether education (in schools or else 
where) is always a "good."
Second, economics is more than what money measures. If usually 
we think of "education" in normative terms, what about "economics"? 
Which type of economics—positive or negative—is primarily relevant 
here, and to what extent can the positive and the normative be sepa 
rated?
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This leads immediately to the question: Does the "economics of 
education" encompass broader values, or is it concerned only with 
monetary costs and returns? To be sure, most of the benefit-cost analy 
ses of investments in education have been limited in this manner. So 
limited too, have been treatments of education in aggregative analyses 
of "national economic growth." But "human resources" are much 
more, in both individual and societal perspective, than potentials for 
contributing to monetary returns.
Third, societal change has many facets. We all experience change 
over a life span, but this could be the situation even in an essentially 
changeless, traditional society. Today's "world of change" has certain 
unique features. Here societal traits, some of which may shift rapidly, 
bring myriad changes that are manifest over a single life span of an 
individual. Other changes become evident in their impacts over longer 
periods.
Three societally relevant sorts of intra-cohort changes may be con 
ceptually distinguished. (1) General economic cycles bring cyclical 
changes in both investments in education and returns on such invest 
ments. (2) Rapid, innovative changes can have immediate impacts on 
the demands for services of skilled people. Such changes may be tech 
nological or organizational or a combination of the two. (3) Finally, 
there are education-induced societal changes within the adult life span 
of a single cohort, which arise in response to changes in the distribu 
tion of education among a population, whatever the shares of overlap 
ping cohorts in such a change. Stated to include demographic changes 
in age and sex distributions, they might better be termed changes in the 
distribution and quantity of human capital.
In fact, changes of all three of these societal sorts can and often will 
arise contemporaneously. Sorting out these components in changing 
associations between education and earnings has been one of the 
important endeavors in empirical studies of the economics of educa 
tion in recent years.
Where change is so slow as to be barely perceptible within the span 
of an individual life, the immediate consciousness of change over a 
lifetime will reflect only age cycles that seem to repeat themselves. 
However, when change is cumulative over extended periods, whether 
slow or rapid, its analysis in relation to the economics of education has 
often been characterized merely by comparisons between historic eras
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or sharply contrasting contemporary societies—relationships that are 
usually simplified by disregarding societal intra-cohort shifts. Such 
simplification can be well justified except in cases where rapid intra- 
cohort shifts constitute a major feature of an historical era or a particu 
lar contemporaneous society. This exception, however, is extremely 
important.
Change and the Economics of Education 
in Industrialized Countries
Concentrating on change and education in industrialized countries, 
five main subjects call for attention. First is the proposition that dise- 
quilibria drive modernization, and that human capital plays a major 
part in that process. Second, uncertainty in the face of change has 
implications of uncertainty for education, and in particular for the roles 
of general education in a world of change. Third must come consider 
ation of the ongoing debates concerning vocational, specialized, and 
general education with rising affluence (pervasive in connection with 
less developed as well as economically advanced nations). Fourth, 
what may we have to say about the roles and distribution of postschool 
training among members of a population in the face of dynamic 
change? Finally, are those who drop out of school early irrational? 
What about motives and incentives for educational decisions and con 
cerning postschool behavior?
The argument that human capital and disequilibria constitute the 
mainspring of growth is the theme of a 1990 book by T. W. Schultz, 
entitled Restoring Economic Equilibrium. There he stresses three 
"common omissions" in modern growth theory. These are (1) special 
ization as a key to most modern increases in income; (2) disequilibria 
as increasing incomes are realized from advances in technology, from 
the proliferation of human capital, and from other sources; and (3) 
entrepreneurs as agents in restoring equilibria. The emphasis on spe 
cialization is not unique to Schultz. Indeed, this enlargement of Adam 
Smith's division of labor has characterized a number of papers, pub 
lished and unpublished, by other economists over the past decade. Nor 
is a stress on entrepreneurship new; it was central to Schumpeter's the-
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ory of economic development eighty years ago, although it has 
received little attention recently. What is distinctive in Schultz's recent 
work is the extent to which he focuses on small entrepreneurs and the 
nature of his treatment of "disequilibria." Criticizing economists in 
general, he writes, "It has become an art to conceal economic disequi 
libria that occur as a consequence of modern increases in income," 
whether such increases arise from technological change or from 
growth in human capital. In Schultz's (1975) view, disequilibria caused 
by modernization are seen as signals of income-increasing processes, 
which in turn give rise to new opportunities—hence his emphasis on 
the importance of "the ability to deal with disequilibria." That ability, 
designated elsewhere as "allocative" versus "worker" ability, has been 
shown to be associated with the completion of higher levels of school 
ing in both the United States and India. 1 A partial appreciation of the 
importance of this sort of entrepreneurial ability appears frequently 
today in nonacademic publications—for example, in Forbes magazine 
and the Wall Street Journal. But there is a paradox in all this. It would 
seem that specialization yields progress, but that a general education 
should provide the firmest base for dealing with and adapting to 
change. Specialization precipitates the disequilibria that give rise to 
economic progress; general education underlies abilities to remove 
those disequilibria through their creative resolution.
Second, a society in which the unexpected is perceived as the norm 
calls for "general education." Change breeds uncertainty, and a world 
of dynamic change is inevitably characterized by doubts and questions 
that affect the economic logic of choices in preparation for and in reac 
tions to the unexpected. In addition, there are uncertainties for the indi 
vidual in an advanced market economy that overlap with changes in 
the societal environment. This raises the question: How far do individ 
ual uncertainties inherent in a market system coincide in the nature of 
their effects with the overlapping uncertainties associated with cyclical 
or rapid technological or structural changes?
One essentially simple theme of this discussion is the importance of 
ensuring flexibility in adaptation to changes in technologies and in skill 
demands and supplies. This leads to a fundamental proposition regard 
ing educational choices as viewed from both individual and societal 
perspectives. In brief, a critical function of education in the early years 
would seem to be "general" learning, in that it will provide a flexible
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foundation for future learning, whether in formal institutions or else 
where.
But what is a "general education"? Most fundamental and most gen 
eral of all is undoubtedly the learning of attitudes and behavior that 
takes place (or fails to take place) in the home. This is why advanced 
industrial societies have exerted ever increasing pressure to provide 
formally for the education of children in the preschool years. It is a rea 
son also for tendencies to ask ever more of the schools as socializing 
agencies, demanding that they go far beyond their earlier roles (some 
church or elite boarding schools aside). Moreover, work experience in 
itself may provide elements of general education for future job success 
in almost any vocation. All of these tendencies can have important eco 
nomic effects, even if we define "economic" in the narrowest, mone 
tary sense.
Beyond this, numeric and verbal literacy are undoubtedly among the 
most elemental foundations of general education throughout the indus 
trialized world. But definitions of "functional verbal literacy" change, 
while numerical literacy tends to become less demanding on the one 
hand (with the omnipresent cash register) and more demanding on the 
other hand, in terms of mathematical literacy. Cutting across them all 
now is the issue of computer literacy.
Meanwhile, "practical"—not to be confused with "vocational"— 
learning has been coming in for more attention, along with estimates of 
its costs even if not yet of its returns. What constitutes "generally prac 
tical" learning will depend on environmental conditions.
It is evident that the more technologically advanced and diverse a 
society, and the more rapid the pace of economic change, the greater 
must be the demand for a general education that can foster adaptability, 
whether from an individual or a societal perspective.
Third, where, then, does specialization come in? A fallacy that 
remains common in some quarters, even today, is the notion that 
schools should "turn out" students fully trained for particular interme 
diate-level jobs. Usually this argument underlies demands for the voca- 
tionalization of secondary schools. But frequently it confounds the 
vocational with the practical, which may be of general relevance to 
most members of a population. Even if the "practical" skill is of gen 
eral relevance, questions may still arise as to the cost and effectiveness 
of providing it in schools or through other channels. This leads into the
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question, What level of general schooling should candidates attain 
before vocational specialization? Cogent arguments for increased spe 
cialization may well hold with reference to postcollege education, for 
example, even while in a particular environment arguments for wide 
spread vocational specialization during secondary school might attract 
little support. What we have to remember is that the case for rising spe 
cialization in advanced economies rests on two assumptions: (1) that 
the students already will have attained high levels of general education, 
and (2) that they are well prepared to deal with changes in future 
knowledge and practice in the general area of their specialization. 
Rapid change in an advanced society supports and depends upon both 
high levels of training in general competence in a cluster of specialties 
and increased high-level specialization.
It is in such a context that Rosen (1983) contributed his eminently 
readable essay on specialization, the gist of which was that incentives 
to specialize arise from increasing returns in utilization of human capi 
tal. This comes about because of the indivisibility of human capital, 
embodied as it is in the human being. In Rosen's words, "The return to 
investment in a particular skill is increasing in its subsequent rate of 
utilization because investment costs are independent of how acquired 
skills are used" (p. 44). He illustrates the working of this principle by 
pointing to the differences between men and women in incentives to 
invest in human capital, and to the division of labor within households. 
Decker and Murphy (1990), among others, have expanded on Rosen's 
discussion to carry further the argument concerning the importance of 
rising specialization. As an economy becomes technologically more 
complex and the quantity of disembodied knowledge in a society 
becomes progressively larger, no one person can contain more than a 
minute fraction of the total. Limitations on the extent of specialization 
go beyond Adam Smith's size of the market to include the costs of 
coordination. In our day we are witnessing a multiplication and refine 
ment of communication technologies that lowers coordination costs 
and the barriers of distance, even as an increasingly complex market 
economy takes over a major part of the task of coordinating the work 
of ever more specialists.
An argument between T. W. Schultz and his Chicago colleagues per 
sists with respect to the concept of disequilibria and the place that 
Schultz has given to that concept. There is substantial agreement,
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nonetheless, with respect to the importance of high-level specialization 
in the dynamics of an advanced economy.
Next is the question: How do the uncertainties of change and 
postschool human investments interact? In an economically advanced 
and dynamic society, continued learning over the adult years must be 
important for almost everyone but will not be the same for all. For 
some it may be in large part a process of recovery from earlier mal- 
allocation of time away from what should have been learned, even at 
relatively low levels of both general capabilities and particular voca 
tional skills. At the other extreme, manifest in most professions, con 
tinuous intensive learning is required merely to keep up with rapid 
increases in knowledge. At both extremes, and in between, postschool 
learning is an essential ingredient in sustained productivity for both 
individuals and society. Catching up and keeping up both are impor 
tant, whether or not entrepreneurial in an innovative sense. Even if 
catching up and keeping up are in themselves more reactive than cre 
ative, both are essential in the processes of societal change.
Indeed, whether a society is characterized by dynamic change or 
not, an examination of postschool learning is necessary in order to 
identify returns on investments in schooling, insofar as the extent of 
postschool investment in human capital is associated with the extent 
and nature of prior schooling. Or to be more precise, such an investiga 
tion is necessary unless one of two special situations prevails: either 
(1) postschool learning is determined fully by the prior schooling with 
out any further investment in human capital; or (2) rates of return to 
schooling and postschool investments in learning are the same. But 
these are very special situations. Even in an essentially static approach, 
it becomes necessary to look further into what happens in the 
postschool years. One of the most debated issues in the economics of 
education centers around just this problem. Jacob Mincer (1993) has 
pursued it empirically for the United States over some years, sorting 
out what part of observed life-earning streams associated with different 
levels of schooling are in fact attributable to postschool investments, 
whether in direct outlays or in forgone earnings.
As soon as we shift to talk about change, further questions arise in 
the interpretation of life-earnings paths constructed from cross-sec 
tional age-earnings distributions. Only if there is no change across 
cohorts in the forms of those paths will a construct based on age-earn-
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ings data at a given time give an unbiased picture of the experiences of 
any real population cohort. If later cohorts have generally higher earn 
ing streams, the cross-section data will understate the increases of 
earnings over a life span. If there are inter-cohort declines, the steep 
ness of intra-cohort earnings paths will be overstated.
As we should expect, this is one of the spheres in which there has 
been a relatively active and pragmatic treatment of the three sorts of 
societal change listed above as they pertain to the economics of educa 
tion—cyclical shifts, innovative change as it affects demands for skills, 
and changing relative skill supplies.
Finally it is necessary to treat some critical questions concerning 
distributions of knowledge and incentives among a population. One of 
the most important developments in microeconomic theory over the 
past generation has been the evolution of the economics of informa 
tion. I have already referred to this indirectly in earlier remarks con 
cerning specialization. But it has much wider and more profound 
implications for economic theory in so far as that theory is built on one 
or another concept of "rationality" in human behavior. It calls on us to 
reassess incentive structures. In the real world what may they imply for 
the "rationality" of behavior with respect to educational decisions 
made by individuals? And what about decisions in the use of whatever 
human capital the individual may have acquired? At this point, where 
incentives meet motivations, goals, and values, the economist's con 
cerns must interact with the concerns of both psychologists and philos 
ophers. That is a large order. Here I shall cut it down to just two 
questions, centered primarily, in both cases, on what might be labeled 
societally "perverse" incentives.
First is the problem of understanding decisions of educational lag 
gards in an affluent society in which schooling is available to all. If the 
importance of basic general education is so evident, why do many 
youths remain virtually illiterate, as happens in the United States even 
today? Does this come back to ignorance of the knowable, or to a lack 
of economically rational motivation, or to both? For that matter, is a 
negative educational motivation economically rational in a subsociety 
that presents some youths with perverse economic incentives? Is the 
problem one of short time horizons with heavy subjective discounting 
of potential future returns? If so, why those high discount rates? Or are 
immediate returns to time spent in criminal activities just too tempting
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relative to the risks, ethical values forfeited aside?2 These are critical 
questions not only for sociologists and psychologists, but for econo 
mists as well. There is a clear difference between the psychologist and 
the economist in approaching this problem, however—a difference that 
dictated use in the first sentence of this section of the word "incen 
tives" rather than "motivations."
Or, to consider the issue from a different angle, what about the slow 
reactions of educated people who resist or delay in responding to 
changes in their future prospects that are relatively easy to predict? Is 
this in fact an important phenomenon that slows progress for both soci 
ety and the individual? Or is it bound up with a lack of readiness to 
take the chances inherent in creative action? Can economists contrib 
ute anything here? Perhaps so.
Some further light might be shed on such questions by taking 
another look at a microeconomic theory of the firm in a world of uncer 
tainty. Over many decades G. L. S. Shackle developed and honed a 
theory of behavior of the firm in the face of uncertainty (not insurable 
risk). He introduced the idea of "potential surprise," favorable or unfa 
vorable, in focusing attention. 3 Relatively small variations in likely 
eventualities would not have such an effect. This proposition may have 
both a psychological and an economic basis. Economically, the pursuit 
of information and planning of changed actions or policies are costly, 
both in direct outlays and in the value of forgone uses of time. Psycho 
logically, there may also be a conservation of effort so long as motiva 
tions to avoid potential surprise are not strong. This line of thought 
brings us to two practical hypotheses with reference to those who drag 
furthest behind and those who will lead in a changing environment, 
respectively.
First, looking at educational decisions in this way should help us to 
understand the seeming irrationality of the disinterest shown in even 
elementary schooling among members of subpopulations whose entire 
immediate environments are loaded with anti-education incentives. 
Not only is the future heavily discounted; in addition any subjective 
sense of favorable potential surprise associated with schooling is dis 
tant. In such considerations, economics and psychology are joined.
Second, the lower the cost of expanding knowledge and the greater 
the capability for involvement in directed change, the more economi 
cally sound and pleasurable will be involvement in innovative actions.
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This is where contributions of education to entrepreneurial leadership 
may come in. Unfortunately, however, incentives can be as perverse 
among some of the presumably well educated as among the educa 
tional laggards—perverse not so much in terms of individual financial 
incentives as societal benefits and costs.
Conclusions
The bottom line is in the uses of time over and across time. In St. 
Augustine's remarkable treatment, time is seen to exist only in retro 
spect (as memory) and prospect (as expectation). The present is no 
more than a transition from past to future. But past events make the 
future, and today's future is tomorrow's past. Change is everywhere, 
even in a society that is repetitive in the turnover of events and the 
ways in which people make use of time as they move through their life 
cycles. However, societal change today is much more than repetition as 
successive cohorts pass through time. Education has played and con 
tinues to play a significant part in that process, even as it is also a 
response.
Conceptually static models of the economics of human resource 
development and utilization are simplifications that provide a first step 
toward understanding the decisions that make up economic life. But 
these first steps can be misleading. Simple repetition in the purest form 
is in fact an impossibility today, and what can be seen at any given 
time is already the reflection of relevant recent and prospective 
changes. Those changes include population growth, shifts in the skill 
mix of the population (due both to schooling and out-of-school learn 
ing), and technological innovations—all of these in both the recent 
past and in expectations for the future. Any one of them might predict 
at least directions of change in an otherwise static human investment 
model, but it is humbling indeed to take all of them together along with 
changes in the pace and mixes of change. To see this, consider what 
might happen to human investments and indeed to economic life in 
general, if the really big change came—a cessation of change! Can we 
even imagine such a situation in the next generation, given what we 
see around us and the very nature of human nature?
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And so I come to the fundamental generalization—that what we 
observe is itself a function of change, and so is most of what we may 
say in general terms concerning the economics of education. Despite 
changes that will come (for better or for worse) in the educational 
structures and contents of a future world, this much we can say with 
assurance: education itself contributes to change. And a world of 
change calls for learning both within and outside of schools. It calls for 
general education as a preparation for future learning, for specializa 
tions that can cope with change, and for both applied and theoretical 
learning.
The empirical referents in even our static models of human invest 
ment decisions and benefit-cost theory are built on expectations con 
cerning a reality that is always changing. That reality is embedded in 
the flow of time. And so it happens that we are facing and affecting 
change, whether we see things that way or not. In the long run only a 
conscious awareness of this fact can bring us closer to understanding 
the events and the problems that surround us and in which we are inev 
itably enmeshed.
Notice, however, that none of the relatively firm pronouncements 
just set forth says anything about the underlying purposes of education, 
nor do they take note of the origins of economics in moral philosophy, 
so wisely stressed by Harry Johnson (1972) in his commentary at a 
conference on "The Equity Efficiency Quandary in Education." Yet the 
present paper was written to communicate with an essentially aca 
demic audience from diverse disciplines, and on the same day I pre 
sented to a group of economists a paper that I called 'The Day 
Aristotle Visited an American School System." Both Harry Johnson in 
the late twentieth century A.D. and Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. 
stress the importance of reason, and both challenge us to look beyond 
narrow boundaries in our thinking to ask what is really important: in 
the present context, education for what? In Aristotle, this is lifelong 
learning, from early upbringing of children (to "moral virtue" by incul 
cation of good habits), on to an unending pursuit of wisdom, both theo 
retical and practical. In Harry Johnson it is essentially the same, though 
he too is a man of his own time. The twenty-first century will soon be 
here. Perhaps it will call us to seek a wisdom less bounded by formal 
academic disciplines and more alert to the human questions that are 
already calling upon us to probe the roots of education in our day.
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NOTES
1. For early examples, see Chaudhri 1968, and especially, Welch 1970.
2. Richard Freeman (1992) has addressed this problem recently in a working paper for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
3. For an applicadon of some of his ideas to investments in human beings, see Bowman 1972.
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